Afghanistan: Peace in Our Time?
Afghanistan: Peace in Our Time?
Summary: Several uncoordinated but interesting peace overtures coming from Taliban, the US, an academic expert and the Afghan government. It doesn’t necessarily mean anything will happen: January’s spike in terror attacks are still fresh in the mind. But Barnett Rubin’s calm, clear and intelligent open letter response to the Taliban sets a good example and could help guide the Taliban towards engagement and options for dialogue. That the Taliban responded almost immediately to Rubin is unprecedented and cause for some encouragement. Confidence building measures could be sought. Low-level ceasefires monitored by, for example a joint Taliban/UN/Afghan government and US group, could contribute to this. UPDATE: A different Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, also replied to Barnett Rubin, slightly less positively…. text below
There has been a flurry of peace-related writings from major parties to the protracted Afghan conflict, including the Afghan Presidency, the US, the Taliban and legendary Afghanistan expert, Barnett Rubin.
On 14 February, the Taliban released a “Letter to the American People”, seemingly an attempt to bypass the US government and appeal directly to the American people in the hope that they will sway US policy. The letter highlights all the problems the US have created in Afghanistan and the cost in lives and money.
In brief, insisting on prolonging the war in Afghanistan and maintaining American troop presence is neither beneficial for America nor for anyone else, rather it endangers the stability of the entire world. This is irrefutable reality which is only rejected by your arrogant authorities. If you want peaceful dialogue with the Afghans specifically and with the world generally, then make your president and the war-mongering congressmen and Pentagon officials understand this reality and compel them to adopt a rational policy towards Afghanistan!
On 23 February, world-famous Afghanistan expert and former US government negotiator and advisor, Barnett Rubin, recently published a short paper “Theses on peacemaking in Afghanistan: a manifesto”. It offered a highly articulate tour around the historic and current reasons for Afghanistan remaining beset by intractable conflict.
Given the dependence of all Afghan actors on external assistance, it is impossible for them to reach agreement if their patrons oppose it. Therefore, the starting point must be to build a sufficient international consensus as a basis for any negotiation and devise a mechanism to make a credible commitment to sustain the state into the future.
The difficulty of defining or even imagining an end state that would meet the minimal needs and demands of such a large number of actors (United States, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China, India, Afghan urban westernized elites, Pashtun nationalists, Afghan Islamists, and non-Pashtun ethnic leaders, for starters) undermines the credibility of any negotiation. Each actor tends to believe that its adversaries have no feasible proposal and are using talks to buy time.
It was slightly disappointing to read only in the sense that it offered little more than “hope” that economic progress offered by the TAPI pipeline and Chinese and Indian investment in and around the region might bring about national and international cooperation.
On 26 February, the Taliban have stated that they are prepared to enter into talks with the United States
The Political Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan calls on American officials to talk directly to the Political Office of Islamic Emirate regarding a peaceful solution to the Afghan quandary.
It would help in finding a solution if America accepts the legitimate demands of the Afghan people and forward its own concerns and requests for discussion to the Islamic Emirate through a peaceful channel.
The Islamic Emirate made it clear to the American people and congressmen through an open letter that war is not our choice, rather it has been imposed upon us. For ending the occupation, we want a peaceful resolution to the Afghan issue.
But far more interesting and potentially valuable has been Rubin’s direct response to the Taliban’s “open letter”.
I had been pondering the question: “Why doesn’t anyone respected and credible reply to Taliban open letters?” ever since the Taliban started this process of communication via their website roughly ten years.
Rubin expertly ticks all the right boxes in his response and is very good at acknowledging mistakes on the US side and the missed opportunities. He is also firm and clear in pointing out Taliban errors without bias.
The flaw in your call for dialogue is that it is addressed only to Americans, not your fellow Afghans. You accuse Afghans opposing you of “committing treason against our nation,” but the government of Afghanistan, corrupt and divided as it may be, is recognized by every nation in the world—not just Washington and its allies. Your dialogue with the U.S. government cannot replace dialogue with that government and the millions of other Afghans who fear your attacks and your return. Trying to exclude them repeats the mistake the U.S. made by excluding you….
Your call for the United States to end the fighting would be more persuasive if you offered to abandon it yourselves. You need not alter your entire position: just change the order of events by challenging the U.S. and Afghan government to agree to a temporary ceasefire before the office formally reopens, regardless of who controls how many districts this week or the next.
Surprisingly and encouragingly, the Taliban have responded directly and promptly to Rubin, giving Rubin some credit for the reach out – this from the Twitter account of Abdulqahar Balkhi, one of the accounts generally seen as an official Taliban spokesman:
Great piece by @BRRubin however I would personally like to respond to some (intentional/unintentional) misconceptions. Foremost, I appreciate your recognition that Taliban are not what Kabul propagates, and the deaths & imprisonment as well as policies of leaders are proof
Assertion in early paragraph that peace through dialogue is impossible is flawed b/c #Taliban have asked for dialogue from beginning yet it is US that will not come down from high horse & let go of false pride (colonial mentality).
Wrongly interpreted that #Taliban exclusively seek talks with US rather Taliban demand direct talks with US first due to main source of conflict being occupation. If we agree on ending occupation, talks b/w Afghans with or without international mediation will bear fruit.
US insistence on killing/imprisoning all Taliban cemented fact that supposed Afghan gov has no decision making authority as admitted by Gul Agha/Karzai/others to Taliban seeking amnesty, contradicting own assertion that Taliban underestimate Kabul ability & authority.
Qatar Political Office opening delayed precisely due to contentious issue of naming office & only opened once US agreed it could be called ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ so assertion otherwise is false (we have signed documents for proof)
Closure of Political Office by US again proved that US do not care about treaties or promises (sequence began with mass killing of surrendered #Taliban prisoners in 2001) & only used office for domestic popularity contest (prisoner exchange), not for advancing peace
Closure of Political Office by US again proved that US do not care about treaties or promises (sequence began with mass killing of surrendered #Taliban prisoners in 2001) & only used office for domestic popularity contest (prisoner exchange), not for advancing peace
Conclusion – your proposal is well-intentioned but until & unless US talks directly to #Taliban about ending occupation, no meaningful ceasefires or dialogue b/w Afghans can take place b/c US is calling all the shots (puppets cant even remove own governors)!!!
The response shows at least that the Taliban are listening, absorbing and considering engagement. It would be helpful if the dialogue could continue.
It occasionally feels that a peace deal could actually be reached almost unexpectedly. There is one recurrent and circular argument between the Taliban and the US which runs like this:
Taliban: to achieve peace in Afghanistan the US needs to withdraw
US: The fighting needs to stop before we can withdraw
Although the Taliban appear to resist the idea of ceasefires in this response, local ceasefires or other forms of local collaborative initiatives – initially small scale and temporary – could be offered as confidence building measures. Create a joint body that includes Taliban/Afghan Govt/UN and US representatives to monitor the ceasefire. The aim would be in part to monitor a ceasefire but also to develop lines of communication and build confidence in the good intentions of the other party. Both sides need to save face, both sides need to avoid unhelpful talk of “winning and losing”.
Adding to the sense of “stuff happening”, on 28 February, Ashraf Ghani offered a peace deal to the Taliban that would give them recognition as a political movement and reintegration and protection for Taliban members. Pahjwok reports today that:
In an expected overture, the national unity government asserted its desire to strike a “truthful and sustainable peace deal” with the Taliban who are ready for reconciliation.
President Ashraf Ghani spoke of his administration’s desire for peace negotiations with the insurgent movement in his remarks to the second meeting of the Kabul process. For their part, the Taliban have offered to launch talks with the United States
A political framework for peace dialogue should be created with a ceasefire and the Taliban recognised as a political group with an official political office, the president suggested. The militant outfit would have to respect the rule of law, he said.
If they promise shunning the insurgency, Taliban prisoners may be freed and their names struck off from international blacklists. Former fighters and refugees could be reintegrated and provided with job opportunities.
Ghani promised his government would ensure facilities and security for the Taliban who joined the peace process.
What does it all mean, if anything? We have had many false dawns where it comes to talks, or “talks about talks”. It would be a brave analyst to proclaim this series of dialogues a prologue to peace: recent Taliban terror attacks in January have hardened even more hearts against them and Afghans are increasingly interested in registering and addressing war crimes. Regrettably, the current US administration appears spectacularly under-resourced for any form of political initiatives in relation to Afghanistan. The Taliban should be encouraged to engage in any manner of political activities and dialogue. However, sooner or later, the Taliban will have to be confronted with the notion that, for all their propaganda and claims of controlling a nationwide “jihad”, they are not actually that popular or relevant to a young and forward-looking Afghan populace. See also the Afghanistan Analyst’s Network’s “manifesto” addressing the need for essential institutional reform needed to improve the chances for dialogue.
Sorry, I appear to have ended on some pessimistic points…
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UPDATE: This additional response from the other Taliban lead spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid is significantly less optimistic – interesting there are two separate and differing responses…
Thank you for reaching out to us. We have read your reply however would like to point towards a few crucial points you missed.
– If your country (United States of America) were occupied by us, its land and airspace were usurped and many American citizens were killed in their sleep by our forces every day, it is entirely plausible that you would not have the same views as you hold today, therefore it is hoped you will remain pragmatic.
– Our country has been occupied which has led to an American style supposed Afghan government being imposed upon us. And your view that we talk to them and accept their legitimacy is the same formula adopted by America to win the war.
– You have said that we supposedly killed civilians in our martyrdom attacks. This should give us a pause because a war is raging, most of the civilians are being killed by the operations and bombardments of your forces and even if we were to accept that our operations also cause civilian casualties, then answer us, what has compelled us carry out such attacks? Perhaps you also remember that we lost one and a half million Afghans in our war for independence against the Soviet Union, however we endured all these hardships for the greater cause of attaining freedom from invasion.
– You ask us not miss opportunities. We have not lost opportunities but cannot frame plots as opportunities either. The Kabul Process and other such efforts seek surrender from the Islamic Emirate at a time when the Islamic Emirate is without a doubt a force that has defeated an international arrogant power like America with all its allies and tools at disposal. So do you believe such a proposal is logical?
– You state that the Kabul government should be recognized because it is also recognized by the entire world!!!?
In 2001, the entire world also agreed with, supported and accepted the American invasion of our country, so should we also have accepted the invasion?
Moreover during the Soviet occupation of our country, majority of the world including the United Nations officially accepted and recognized the Kabul regime as legitimate. So would it have been reasonable for the Afghan resistance of the time to follow suit?
– The main issue as it stands is that the entire world probably fears America, however we do not fear America. We have weighed America and have gained tremendous experience from fighting against her. America does not hold the right of determining the nature and type of governments in other countries. If you hold similar views then that is perhaps because you are an American citizen however no free human being can ever allow such audacity and interf erences.
The crux of the matter is, what is the vital concern of America, is it really terrorism?
Or is it extracting the mineral wealth of Afghanistan, imposing a self-styled government, preventing establishment of an Islamic system and pursuing imperial ambitions in the region from this land?
If it is the former, then we are sincerely committed to resolving it. We do not wish to interfere in the affairs of others and neither do we seek conflict with anyone including the United States. Our repeated letters to the American administration, people and congress were for this exact same purpose.
But if it is the later, then understand that this nation is unlike other nations which America has currently subdued, exploited their resources, are pursuing imperial ambitions inside them and are directly interfering in their internal affairs. In such circumstances, we do not care about America, neither do we wa nt to talk nor end resistance nor will we get tired. Then it is up to American analysts like you to keep score of the losses, whom suffers the most and whom loses in the end?
Regards
Standard tactics, softest targets…
Summary: a terror attack against an NGO in Jalalabad reminds us of the difficulties in protecting soft targets and the absence of talks with the Taliban
Ongoing fighting in Jalalabad. On Wednesday morning, terrorists using small arms, rocket propelled grenades and suicide bombs launched an assault on the Save the Children Compound NGO in Jalalabad. At least 12 are reported to have been injured although it is believed that around 100 people might actually work in the compound. Local security forces are attempting to clear the buildings.
Violence in the playground
I hadn’t yet had the time to gather my thoughts on the Taliban attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. The tactics of suicide bomb-followed by small arms and grenades-followed by protracted struggle to root out a handful of die-hard fighters-followed by confusion over casualties and the identity of the perpetrators are now long-established. The assailants could be Taliban, Islamic State or the Haqqani Network (who are generally seen as loyal to the Taliban). An NGO dedicated to the welfare of children ranks alongside hospitals, schools and universities as the softest of all possible targets.
The Taliban – who certainly have no problem killing some civilians but often distance themselves from the deaths of other civilians – appear officially to have denied involvement in this particular attack:
Zabihulla-M @ZabihullaM4 2 hours ago
#Clarification The ongoing attack in#Jalalabad has nothing to do with the Mujahidin of Islamic Emirate.
Islamic State have a strong presence in Nangarhar province. Criticism of the performance of local security forces in neutralising such attacks is probably technically and tactically justified but still harsh, given the very difficult task with which they are confronted, fighting room to room against fanatics whose express intention is to be carried out feet first.
Despite a new offer by the Afghan government through the High Peace Council, there was not much movement toward government-Taleban talks to end the war peacefully in the past year. Both sides continue to engage in general pro-peace rhetoric, while allowing little to happen in practice. Currently, they are bogged down in a dispute over whether the Taleban political office should be in Kabul or Qatar.
Summary: President Ghani states that the Afghan army cannot survive more than 6 months without US support
Wasn’t sure if this was an unguarded moment under pressure or a planned insertion into the interview. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani was interviewed by US CBS News. Confirming the more or less absolute dependence of the Afghan security forces on the United States, Ghani asserted that:
We will not be able to support our army for six months without US support, and US capabilities
Very much shades of the early 1990s Najibullah regime here, which managed – to the surprise of many – to hold together with Soviet backing. When the plug was pulled, in terms of finance, training and weapons as the Soviet Union collapsed, the Afghan regime followed swiftly. The assessment sounds about right and should not come as a surprise. But the US government, with Trump at the head, seems quite prone to lurches in policy direction, even if currently talking tough about defeating the Taliban…
WASHINGTON: President Ashraf Ghani has said that the Afghan National Army will not last more than six months without US support and the Afghan government will also collapse.
Mr Ghani acknowledged his government’s almost absolute dependence on Washington in an interview to a television show CBS 60 Minutes, broadcast earlier this week.
But Gen John Nicholson, the commander of US forces in Afghanistan, said in the same programme that with America’s new strategy and with increased US pressure on Pakistan to cooperate, he was certain he could win Washington’s longest war, which was now in its 16th year.
According to a transcript released on Tuesday, a CBS journalist asked the Afghan president to comment on what she had heard from people in Afghanistan: “If the US pulled out, your government would collapse in three days.”
“From the resource perspective, they are absolutely right. We will not be able to support our army for six months without US support, and US capabilities,” President Ghani responded.
In a report titled “Kabul under siege while America’s longest war rages on”, the US news channel noted that “in 16 years, the Afghan war has cost 2,400 American lives and $1 trillion. But with the country’s capital under siege, the end still seems far away.”
“Did you just say that without the US support your army couldn’t last six months?” the journalist, Lara Logan, asked again. “Yes. Because we don’t have the money,” Mr Ghani said.
The US contributes around 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s defence budget and observers in Washington say that in 16 years the US and its allies have only made some moderate gains. They claim that the Taliban still control large chunks of land in the Pashtun belt and the government in Kabul has so far been unable to dislodge them.
In the interview, President Ghani also acknowledged the threatening presence of 21 international terrorist groups in his country, adding that dozens of suicide bombers were also being sent to Afghanistan.
“There are factories producing suicide bombers. We are under siege,” he said. “By terrorising the people, the Taliban have sown deep doubts about the government.”
This campaign of terrorism, he added, brought out “angry protesters in the capital chanting death to Ashraf Ghani”.
“If you can’t secure the capital, how are you going to secure the rest of the country?” the journalist asked. “You tell me. Can you prevent the attack on New York? Can you prevent the attack on London?” Mr Ghani replied.
Unlike President Ghani, Gen Nicholson appeared confident that he could still win the war. Asked if he had everything he needs, the general said: “Yeah, with the new policy I do … this is the end game. This is a policy that can deliver a win.”
Last week US officials said the Pentagon would deploy an estimated 1,000 new combat advisers to Afghanistan and would send additional drones and helicopters.
Published in Dawn, January 18th, 2018
Taliban inflict major loss of life on ANA in Kandahar
Summary: A pre-dawn suicide bomber-led attack wipes out an Afghan army unit, killing over 40. Increasing Taliban confidence and ANA failings are the likely causes.
The Taliban conducted a coordinated and powerful attack on an Afghan military base in the Maiwand district of Kandahar province in the pre-dawn of Thursday 19 October. Information is still coming in but the Afghan Ministry of Defence has reportedly stated that 43 Afghan soldiers were killed, nine wounded and six unaccounted for. The attack, including one or two suicide bombings, armed gunmen and captured armoured Humvee cars. A firefight lasted several hours. The Afghan army unit was approximately 60 strong and it appears that only two men were unharmed. Some Taliban fighters were killed, reports suggest nine or ten.
![Six Afghan soldiers remain missing after the overnight attack [File: AP Photo]](https://i1.wp.com/www.aljazeera.com/mritems/imagecache/mbdxxlarge/mritems/Images/2017/10/19/54abcc0f3f5c412c91627b1a116f69ae_18.jpg "Taliban attack kills dozens of soldiers in Kandahar")
Comment:
The Afghan army is suffering many casualties and struggles with morale and capability. In late April 2017, it suffered well in excess of 100 killed (some reports talk of closer to 200) in a single attack led by Taliban suicide bombers against an army base in Balkh province, northern Afghanistan. That is still the highest loss of military life in one attack since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and looks to have been due largely to incompetence from the army and skilled planning by the Taliban.[1]
This is another major physical blow for the Afghan security forces, perhaps only surpassed by the Mazar-e Sharif attack, last April. The Minister of Defence and several high level military commanders resigned as a result. Analysis is likely to focused on the increasing confidence and ability of the Taliban – including their ability to access modern armoured cars almost certainly donated by the US to the Afghan army – and the Afghan army’s weaknesses at protecting its static bases.
Tolo News, 18 Oct 2017: In September alone, 480 Afghan army soldiers and almost 300 police force members were killed. In most of the attacks that killed these security force members, the Taliban has seized uniforms and military equipment including weapons and vehicles.
There is no obvious evidence that the Afghan army is crumbling: the army is likely to broadly remain in the field and in control of key cities and communication routes. But the numbers of casualties each year are very high and with little sign they will slacken. Earlier this month, President Ghani suggested that international forces coul dwithdraw entirely in four years.
Ooooh, look at the pretty colours…
Summary: Billions of dollars are spent in Afghanistan, much of it with little oversight or even sensible thinking…
The US government’s Special Inspectorate General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is dogged and relentless in its tracking down of waste, corruption and poor procurement. If you want a soul-destroying snapshot of how money is wasted in Afghanistan, just look at the summary here of how the type of camouflage uniforms for the Afghan army were decided. But first let me summarise the summary:
“…neither DOD nor the Afghan government knows whether the ANA uniform is appropriate to the Afghan environment, or whether it actually hinders their operations by providing a more clearly visible target to the enemy.”
Today, SIGAR released a Special Projects Report on DOD’s procurement of Afghan National Army (ANA) uniforms.
Key Points:
— DOD’s decision to procure ANA uniforms using a proprietary camouflage pattern was not based on an evaluation of its appropriateness for the Afghan environment.
— Procurement costs to the U.S. government were 40–43 percent than similar non-proprietary patterned uniforms used by the Afghan National Police (ANP), which potentially added between $26.65 million and $28.23 million to the costs of the ANA uniform procurements since 2008.
— In 2007, responsible DOD officials stated that they “ran across [HyperStealth’s] web site and the Minister [then Minister of Defense Wardak] liked what he saw. He liked the woodland, urban, and temperate patterns.”
— CSTC-A, in consultation with the Afghan MOD, decided to adopt the camouflage pattern containing a “forest” color scheme for ANA uniforms, despite the fact that forests cover only 2.1 percent of Afghanistan’s total land area.
— Determining the effectiveness of a uniform pattern for a specific environment requires formal testing and evaluation.
— According to a technical paper prepared for the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army, the spatial characteristics and color palette of a camouflage pattern should be tailored to the specific environment. Matching a camouflage pattern “with background texture, color, and contrast is essential to all levels of visual processing.”
— CSTC-A, however, made the decision to procure 1,364,602 ANA uniforms and 88,010 extra pairs of pants —totaling approximately $94 million—using HyperStealth’s Spec4ce Forest camouflage pattern without conducting any formal testing or evaluation.
— As a result, neither DOD nor the Afghan government knows whether the ANA uniform is appropriate to the Afghan environment, or whether it actually hinders their operations by providing a more clearly visible target to the enemy.
— CSTC-A recommended a sole-source award to HypersStealth but the DOD contracting office believed that, because there were so many available camouflage patterns in the world, a sole-source award would be hard to justify.
— Instead of issuing a sole-source award, DOD issued a local acquisition solicitation that included the requirement that the uniforms use HyperStealth’s proprietary Spec4ce Forest camouflage pattern.
— CSTC-A initially estimated that the new ANA uniform would cost $25–$30 per set. The actual cost ranged from $45.42–$80.39 per set.
— Our analysis found that changing the ANA uniform to a non-proprietary camouflage pattern could save U.S. taxpayers between $68.61 million and $72.21 million over the next 10 years.
— SIGAR suggests that DOD conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the current ANA uniform specification to determine whether there is a more effective alternative, considering both operational environment and cost, available.
So not only incompetence – the Minister likes forest rather than desert tones. But this costly decision might even be costing the lives of Afghan soldiers.
Which is the easier target?
Taliban announce 2017 Spring Offensive
Summary: The Taliban announce their annual Spring Offensive. This will see an uptick in attacks as they attempt to wrest more territory from the control of government forces. This year the Taliban place new emphasis on political and social efforts in areas they consider under their control.
The Taliban Spring Offensive promises more “insider attacks”
On their official website, the Taliban today announced the commencement of the Spring Offensive for 2017. The operation is named “Mansouri”, after the Taliban’s leader from 2013-2016 and who was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan. The announcement presents the idea of the Taliban now holding control over most of the country and thus developing a political as well as military strategy:
With the help of Allah Almighty and the infinite sacrifices of our Mujahid nation the foreign forces have suffered a historic defeat having been forced to admit that the Mujahideen control more than half of Afghanistan. Hence, keeping the evolving situation in mind, this year’s Mansouri Operations will differ from previous ones in nature and will be conducted with a twin-tracked political and military approach.
Analysis and Outlook
The declaration of a Spring Offensive is now an annual and predictable part of the Taliban’s media playbook. It does tend to be followed by a few complex and suicide attacks over the coming days and weeks, usually focusing on cities, including the national capital as a good means of attracting media attention. We may now also see larger attacks against government security positions in the outlying provinces, particularly after their spectacular and deadly attack in Mazar-e Sharif that killed well over hundred Afghan soldiers. Recently, the Taliban have become emboldened by the idea that they are now starting to control major swathes of territory. They make some ambitious and implausible claims. But it remains difficult to sift through what the Taliban and the Government forces do in fact control: this often comes down to who passed through the area last or whose flag is flying in the village police station.
And some reports say that the Afghan government effectively now only controls 60% of Afghan territory, with the Taliban controlling 10% and 30% contested. This New York Times report, from December 2016, draws on senior US military sources and summarises the difficult situation at the end of 2016:
“Afghanistan’s security crisis is fueling new opportunities for Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and other extremist groups, Afghan and American officials say, voicing concerns that the original American mission in the country — removing its use as a terrorist haven — is at risk.
As intense Taliban offensives have taken large portions of territory out of the Afghan government’s hands, those spaces have become the stage for a resurgence of regional and international militant groups… Gen. Joseph L. Votel, the chief of the United States Central Command, said the Afghan government now controls only about 60 percent of the country, the Taliban hold sway over about 10 percent, and the remainder is contested. Which group or groups fill those voids of increasing ungoverned territory in Afghanistan ‘is something we’ll have to contend with’, he said… Over all, Western and Afghan officials estimate that 40,000 to 45,000 militants are active across Afghanistan. The Taliban are estimated at 30,000 fighters, some of them seasonal. But the rest are foreign militants of different — and often fluid — allegiances, at times competing but mostly on the same side against the Afghan government and its American allies… The immediate existential threat to the Afghan government has been a resurgent Taliban, who officials say have been killing 30 to 50 members of the security forces each day in recent months. The insurgents are directly threatening important provincial capitals and have again made important roadways hazardous or impassable to government forces.”[1]
Other than the attempt to present a formal distinction between political and propaganda efforts in areas under Taliban control and an intention to intensify the battle against international and government forces, the tone and content offers neither anything particularly new or any detailed clues as to intention.
These operations will involve conventional attacks, guerrilla warfare, complex martyrdom attacks, insider attacks, and use of IEDs to achieve their objectives…
There is a now standard reminder to fighters that they should try and minimise civilian casualties.
the Mujahideen will be required to scrutinize their targets and places so as to minimize civilian casualties paying heed to the principles of necessity and proportionality.
We should expect to see an uptick in Taliban attacks in the coming weeks: they will be keen to press home any perceived advantage against the regime, whether territory controlled, casualties inflicted or government instability. The lack of a coherent Trump policy regarding Afghanistan probably also gives them a wedge to drive into government stability. But it also remains possible that the Taliban get caught out by over-confidence. For the moment, peace talks between protagonists remain a pipe dream – the Great Game continues.
[1] Mashal, M., and Schmitt, E., ‘Afghan Security Crisis Sets Stage for Terrorists’ Resurgence’, The New York Times, 2 Dec. 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/world/asia/afghanistan-security-terrorism-taliban.html?_r=0
Sangin, bloody Sangin
Summary: The Afghan government appear to have lost control of Sangin district in Helmand, retreating in some disarray. The failure of the Afghan security forces is matched only by the failure of the international military force’s media spin: scorched earth does not equal victory…
Reports coming in that the Afghan Army – doubtless with stand-off support and advice from the US and other international military personnel – have had to withdraw from the district centre of Sangin, a key strategic piece of Helmand province that was bitterly fought over by US and UK troops before the ISAF drawdown in 2014. Nearly 1,000 international soldiers died fighting in Helmand. Or rather, in a slightly bizarre twist, they have simply relocated the district centre. The successor to ISAF, Resolute Support, has made a statement which makes pessimistic reading. The media team appear to have intentionally selected and highlighted the last two sentences from this press release as some kind of positive:
“The ANDSF defended the district center for two months and left on their own terms. The only thing they left to the Taliban is rubble and dirt”
Analysis and Outlook
Judging “who controls what” is a hazardous art form. Some reports say that the Afghan government effectively now only controls 60% of Afghan territory, with the Taliban controlling 10% and 30% contested. This New York Times report, from December 2016, draws on senior US military sources and summarises the difficult situation at the end of 2016:
“Afghanistan’s security crisis is fueling new opportunities for Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and other extremist groups, Afghan and American officials say, voicing concerns that the original American mission in the country — removing its use as a terrorist haven — is at risk.
As intense Taliban offensives have taken large portions of territory out of the Afghan government’s hands, those spaces have become the stage for a resurgence of regional and international militant groups…Gen. Joseph L. Votel, the chief of the United States Central Command, said the Afghan government now controls only about 60 percent of the country, the Taliban hold sway over about 10 percent, and the remainder is contested. Which group or groups fill those voids of increasing ungoverned territory in Afghanistan ‘is something we’ll have to contend with’, he said… Over all, Western and Afghan officials estimate that 40,000 to 45,000 militants are active across Afghanistan. The Taliban are estimated at 30,000 fighters, some of them seasonal. But the rest are foreign militants of different — and often fluid — allegiances, at times competing but mostly on the same side against the Afghan government and its American allies… The immediate existential threat to the Afghan government has been a resurgent Taliban, who officials say have been killing 30 to 50 members of the security forces each day in recent months. The insurgents are directly threatening important provincial capitals and have again made important roadways hazardous or impassable to government forces.”[1]
The Afghan army is suffering many casualties and struggles with morale and capability. But it is likely to broadly remain in the field and in control of key cities and communication routes. There was increasing concern that the Afghan security forces were now contributing to a high proportion of civilian casualties: they are significantly less well-trained than the Western ISAF forces, who largely departed at the end of 2014. The emergence of IS is likely to continue to complicate matters, as disgruntled local Taliban fighters weigh old loyalties against a new and potentially better resourced form of jihad. Even by the low benchmarks of Afghanistan, genuine progress on any form of peace dialogue looks unlikely in 2017.
The arrival in the White House of Donald Trump – known to be opposed to an interventionist American role in the world – may well herald a new period of declining US military support and dis-engagement in 2017. There is much uncertainty as to what the US policy will now be in the coming years. A significant reduction of US political, military and financial support could cause the country to collapse.
The security situation is quite fluid and we should be careful about attempting to judge who controls what at any given point in time: both the government and the Taliban are prone to giving out inaccurate information. Taliban group can dominate particular routes, towns and villages over prolonged periods, simply by setting up a few checkpoints or mobile Sharia courts, without necessarily formally controlling a district. Conversely, government forces often define “control” of a village or district simply by the fact that they having their flag planted on the roof of the police or local government headquarters.
But, after sixteen years of international military engagement, making a virtue out of “scorched earth” just doesn’t cut it, somehow…
[1] Mashal, M., and Schmitt, E., ‘Afghan Security Crisis Sets Stage for Terrorists’ Resurgence’, The New York Times, 2 Dec. 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/world/asia/afghanistan-security-terrorism-taliban.html?_r=0
Hurting stalemate? Are the Taliban weary and ready for peace?
Summary: Very interesting RUSI report based on interviews with seven key current and former Taliban figures suggesting significant fragmentation and low morale amongst the Taliban as they attempt to prosecute a costly war against fellow Muslims. Military gains cannot be built upon and commanders are serving their own interests, eroding the pure values of Mullah Omar. The writers suggest this opens up opportunities for new peace initiatives with the Taliban. I am not yet convinced.
Background
There was a time, certainly embracing a ten-year period of the post-2001 period of Afghanistan’s troubled history, when you couldn’t move for new Afghan papers being launched. Political, military, thinktanks, government, NGOs were clamouring to push their old and new solutions. Some of these ideas were attempted “in the field”. Occasionally (and sometimes unwittingly) they were attempted two or three times. It is much quieter these days. I attended a very useful RUSI presentation from Michael Semple and Theo Farrell earlier this week. They have a new paper out based on interviews with key Taliban commanders. The meeting was well attended – particularly given we only had an hour. What they came up with was very interesting. In essence they give the clear sense that the Taliban leadership is weakening, morale is flagging and there are many indicators of dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war. Lets go through some of the key points from the presentation:
Interviews based on long-standing contacts. Seven quality one-to-one interviews with well-connected current or former members.
- The conflict has dragged on and is very costly for all sides.
- What is going on inside the internal Taliban political arena is a key and greatly neglected variable
- Although the Taliban are officially united, there are concerns over the quality of the current leadership which is poor – no Mullah Omar “magic touch”
- Current leader, Haibatullah, is struggling to stamp his authority – this is a leadership crisis
- The Taliban have had some “spectacular” military wins (Kunduz fell twice). But the gains come at great cost and have limited utility – they can overrun towns but cannot hold them
- Taliban morale affected by clampdowns in Pakistan, refugee movements: the Pakistan sanctuary is looking vulnerable and the military campaign has lost direction and purity of vision/values and purpose
- Discontent amongst mid and low level fighters – leadership is pursuing its own interests: “the Emirate no longer exists”, “the Emirate has become a mafia”…
Discussion
- Role of regional players? Iran and Russia happy to have their roles talked up but they lack the strategic clout as yet. And progress should not have to wait for Pakistan to take the first step
- Why is the war still being fought – poor Afghan Muslims being killed on both sides? Farrell – Taliban need a process that does not undermine or defeat them
- What kind of “defection model”? The Taliban still want to be able to assert their identity as “Taliban” – they will only come over if they can retain that credibility
- Haven’t we heard this all before? Why now? Semple: The Taliban interviewees are now saying the same thing – and more strongly – and this was very striking
- What does success look like? A trend of violence decreasing slowly over a period of 2,3 years to create the expectation of a political agreement. Socially the Taliban will continue to be an important force – only not a military one
Analysis and Outlook
This is all very tempting. It is very encouraging that there are such channels open between key Taliban members and Western analysts. At one point Michael Semple (rightly) cautioned us that local actors are very good at pretending to do and say what other groups want, eg, UK, Russia, Pakistan etc. Perhaps there is an element of this in the interviews he presents. But Christina Lamb’s “why now” question gets to the heart of it. Many of us have heard a lot of this before. The paper is mainly about the problems of a fragmenting Taliban and poor morale. This is very useful in itself. But there is much less about specific reach outs and evidence of a desire for peace talks. The concept of “insurgent peace-making” offered by the authors is attractive, but becomes quickly full of “ifs, woulds, coulds and shoulds”. The solutions are loose and quite optimistic.
For insurgent peace-making to work it would require a mechanism to assemble a broad Taliban pro-peace coalition…while participating in the peace process, [the Taliban] will necessarily have to assert their loyalty to the spirit of the movement and avoid any appearance of capitulation to government. This will require careful accommodation among Afghan stakeholders.
Well, absolutely. And good luck with that. Afghan stakeholders. Remember that, in the end this means handing the process to a disparate group of fractious actors: Afghans (and Pakistanis), with government, parliament, a host of factions, and even the population, all demanding input, including, I suspect, accountability for war crimes. Many of these actors are having their strings pulled by other actors. The question I wanted to ask but was thwarted by the time was whether there were any lessons from the – I hesitate to use the use the word – reconciliation of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. His name did not crop up, although it has been seen as a possible model for future deals with some or all of the Taliban. But the term “defection model” was used in the discussions, i.e. what kind of process do we use in order to get the Taliban to lay down their arms. It struck me that this is precisely the type of terminology (victory, defeat, surrender, defection) that has unhelpfully been employed in the past. With a thick layer of shame and humiliation dripping over these words, this accidental thoughtlessness surely works against encouraging those Taliban wanting to come back in.
I think it more likely that, with both government and Taliban forces still in the field and ready and able to fight, the fighting will continue. The ideas in the report are certainly valid, but my sense is that we could still be waiting for a breakthrough in 5-10 years time. And in many ways, the report suggests not that there is now a growing opportunity for peace, but, quite the reverse. Splintering and fragmentation of an insurgency doesn’t necessarily mean readiness – or even desire – for peace talks. Multiple competing factions can also point to new and more complex forms of warlordism, insurgency and civil war. I once asked Ahmed Rashid what would happen if Mullah Omar was killed in a drone strike. He replied “then who do you talk to?” If the Haibatullah leadership is on the way to decapitation and disintegration (albeit for different reasons of inability, factionalism and disobedient sub-commanders), maybe the problem is the same.
Afghanistan: Prospects for 2017
Summary: Whichever way you look at it, 2017 will be like any other of the last ten years for Afghanistan: bloody, volatile, costly and uncertain. The prospects for viable negotiations between insurgents and government look slim and the government will struggle to hold itself together. A significant risk to the Afghan regime’s stability would be a precipitate removal of American support by a Trump administration.
I realise that, since around 2002, I have annually been attempting to assess and summarise the prospects for Afghanistan in some way. When I first started professional analysis of Afghanistan, in November 2001, I did not have any concept whatsoever that I could still be doing this – and outside of government – a decade and a half later.
But this analytical exercise does not get any easier in the repetition. Often, the default setting has been to take refuge behind a metaphor. One of the most commonly deployed is “glass half full, glass half empty”, perhaps less a coherent analysis and more an expression of optimism or pessimism. Negatively-minded wags would add riders to compound a pessimistic vision: “… but the glass is cracked. And on a wobbly table. On the deck of the Titanic…”
When making these judgements within government analytical bodies, the order of well-worn phrasing couplets could play a part. “Challenges remain, but progress has been made” was often used to hint at optimism without overly committing. Alternatively, “progress has been made, but challenges remain”, generally meant “it has got a bit worse”…
Internally and externally, the 2001 post-Taliban optimism has been slowly eroded. The presidential and parliamentary elections, over 2004 and 2005 probably represented the high point of popular mood. After this, the Taliban began to gain in strength and confidence, ramping up a violent campaign that sucked more international troops into an extensive and complex insurgency campaign. Government corruption and international military mistakes brought many recruits for the Taliban. Neighbours interfered. Pakistan seemed unable to fully reject the Taliban, which had been its favoured proxy for some years. The casualties, cost and political discomfort increased. Many contradictory policies and practices aimed at fighting, reconstructing (or both) were debated and employed: “Another year, another Afghan strategy” indeed.
Although Afghanistan remains intact as a functioning and endorsed member of the international community, multiple and fundamental challenges do still remain. International military and financial support remains a critical life-support system to keep the country functioning and stabilised. This year looks likely to be at least as fragile, destructive and costly as any other year in the last decade.
Many analysts judged that the violence would increase as the country moved beyond 2014.[1] Although, with the gradual reduction in Western forces, intelligence sources and information about the Taliban are starting to dwindle, terror attacks and civilian casualties are both on the rise.[2] The withdrawal of ISAF forces and Afghan government internal tensions ensured that 2015 and 2016 were turbulent. The Afghan armed forces struggled to resist Taliban military operations, suffering reverses and many casualties.[3] In March 2015, The Economist, while recognising the possibilities for talks with the Taliban, gave a pessimistic assessment:
“…prospects for lasting peace in Afghanistan look as bleak as at any time in the 13 years since NATO-led forces ousted the Taliban—only for them to regroup in a long, bloody insurgency. Last year a record 3,700 civilians died in the fighting. As America and other NATO countries pull out their troops, Afghanistan’s own army, less well trained and equipped, is being hammered. It has struggled to find enough recruits to replace those who die or desert. And now the Taliban and other insurgents are preparing for a spring offensive.”[4]
Fighting in Afghanistan remains at high levels. The state is weak and struggles to achieve economic growth, government stability or deal with extensive security and corruption problems. Internal displacement and external flight of Afghan civilians remain significant.[5] Despite 15 years of international and Afghan military effort, the Taliban have an extensive presence and capability in Afghanistan.
A United Nations report released in December 2015, made the following statements about the situation in the country which emphasise the increasing levels of violence (my emphasis in bold):
“The taking of Kunduz City by the Taliban over the period from 28 September to 13 October 2015 and the deterioration of security across the north constituted a major setback for the Government…The military setback in Kunduz City and attacks elsewhere in the country emboldened critics of the Government and saw the emergence of nascent opposition groupings…The overall level of security incidents increased and intensified during the period, as compared with the same period in 2014… From 1 August to 31 October 2015, 6,601 incidents were recorded by the United Nations in the monitoring of security-related developments related to the work, mobility and safety of civilian actors, with the potential to affect the delivery of mandated activities and programmes. The number of incidents represented a 19 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2014, when 5,516 incidents were recorded. The majority of these incidents (62 per cent) were reported in the southern, south-eastern and eastern regions… According to current assessments, control of approximately 25 per cent of districts remains contested throughout the country. The fall of Kunduz City provided the Taliban with significant material gains and had propaganda value. The development highlighted critical deficiencies in the capabilities of the Afghan security forces, including in the areas of logistics and planning, intelligence and air support, and also the need in some cases to strengthen the working relationships between security institutions and civilian authorities…The presence of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-affiliated groups remained a concern, particularly in Nangarhar Province, where their presence is the most significant relative to the country as a whole.” [6]
In the course of intensive fighting in September 2015, the Taliban managed to capture Kunduz city, the sixth largest city in the country. This was a highly public embarrassment for the Afghan government and points to serious flaws in the capabilities of the Afghan army.
“The sudden loss of Kunduz, the first major Afghan city to fall to the Taliban since 2001, says more about the weakness of the U.S.-trained government forces than the strength of the Taliban.
‘All those whispers we’ve heard in recent years about low morale and deep incapacities within the armed forces will now become very loud questions,’ said Michael Kugelman, a senior associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. ‘Why couldn’t, or why didn’t, Afghan troops do more earlier to forestall this offensive?’
The Taliban’s surprise, early morning offensive followed months of infiltration, leading critics to blame the government and security forces for failing to grasp the threat and respond effectively to it.
The government decision to retreat quickly to the airport, 6.5 miles south of town, rather than stand and fight was distressingly similar to the collapse of Iraq’s U.S.-backed troops in Ramadi this summer. In both countries, the U.S. spent billions of dollars to stand up military forces which are struggling against less well-equipped and trained insurgents.”[7]
In a bleak statement to the UN Security Council in September 2015, the UN’s Special Representative, Nicholas Haysom noted (with my highlights in bold):
“Afghanistan’s path to stability and self-reliance cannot be taken for granted. The current refugee exodus reflects the despondency of many Afghans. Afghans have clear memories of their recent but violent past, face an opaque future and now keenly monitor their environment for signs of international disengagement or, hopefully, of domestic stabilisation. A clear signal of continued international support will mitigate the uncertainty fuelling this exodus…The conflict continues to take a horrid toll on Afghan civilians. In the first eight months of 2015, UNAMA documented the highest level of civilian casualties since it began records…This year’s conflict has been one of the most intense faced by the Afghan National Security Forces. However, while they are, once again, proving their mettle and resilience, as a number of analysts have observed, insurgents have demonstrated a capacity to mass large numbers of fighters in isolated areas. This has challenged the ANSF’s ability to maintain the ground that they occupy or hold on to it once they have retaken contested sites. As predicated in earlier briefings, we anticipate the intensification of the violence in the country to continue through 2015.”
The emergence of small groups of Islamic State supporters within Afghanistan. This has been noted by many, including President Ghani and the United Nations, and is a new concern, although the threat level is as yet difficult to quantify.[8]
In 2016, the political, military and economic turbulence continued. Although President Ghani’s efforts are generating some piecemeal progressions in governance, society and the economy, there are traditional and enduring problems: insurgency, warlords, unhelpful neighbouring countries and corruption. The government remains dependent on international military and economic engagement. A UN Security Council report in February 2016 described the security situation in the country as “dire”.[9]
In a statement delivered on 9 February 2016 to the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, Afghanistan received its own section. The American Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, gave a highly pessimistic (and, ultimately, highly accurate) judgement, which I record in full here (my highlights in bold):
“The Kabul Government will continue to face persistent hurdles to political stability in 2016, including eroding political cohesion, assertions of authority by local powerbrokers, recurring financial shortfalls, and countrywide, sustained attacks by the Taliban. Political cohesion will remain a challenge for Kabul as the National Unity Government will confront larger and more divisive issues later in 2016, including the implementation of election reforms, long-delayed parliamentary elections, and a potential change by a Loya Jirga that might fundamentally alter Afghanistan’s constitutional order. Kabul will be unable to effectively address its dire economic situation or begin to curb its dependence on foreign aid until it first contains the insurgency, which is steadily chipping away at Afghanistan’s security. In this environment, international financial aid will remain the most important external determinant of the Kabul government’s strength. We assess that fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 2015, continuing a decade-long trend of deteriorating security that will compound these challenges. The fighting will continue to threaten US personnel, our Allies, and international partners—including Afghans—particularly in Kabul and other urban population centers. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the help of anti-Taliban powerbrokers and international funding, will probably maintain control of most major population centers. However, the forces will very likely cede control of some rural areas. Without international funding, the ANSF will probably not remain a cohesive or viable force.
The Taliban has largely coalesced and is relatively cohesive…The Taliban will continue to test the overstretched ANSF faced with problematic logistics, low morale, and weak leadership.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) announced in January 2015 the formation of its Khorasan branch in South Asia, an amalgamation of primarily disaffected and rebranded former Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members. Despite quick early growth in 2015, ISIL’s Khorasan branch will probably remain a low-level threat to Afghan stability as well as to US and Western interests in the region in 2016.”[10]
In April 2016, the Taliban announced the launch of their annual “spring offensive”, promising and bringing a spring and summer of suicide and guerrilla attacks.[11] On Tuesday 19th April, perhaps the biggest Taliban terrorist explosion yet struck the capital, killing over 60 and injuring hundreds.[12] In July, suicide bomb attacks claimed by Islamic State targeted a peaceful demonstration of the Hazara ethnic community, killing around 80.[13] The insurgency is likely to continue to prosecute its campaign of violence. This will ensure civilian casualties and internal displacement will remain high.
In the summer of 2016, UN and US assessments concurred that the Taliban were holding more territory than at any time since 2001.[14] Highlighting the fluidity of the security situation and the capabilities of the Taliban, in autumn 2016, the Taliban once again managed to break into Kunduz city, briefly seizing control of the city centre.[15]
Civilian casualties continue to rise, according to UNAMA.[16]
In July 2016, the United Nations reported that 5,166 civilians had been either killed or maimed at the halfway mark of 2016 – a record since counting began in 2009.[17] The 2016 third quarter figures were released in October 2016, confirming that casualties were still increasing.
“…latest figures released today by UNAMA for the first three quarters of 2016 show continuing high numbers of civilian casualties from the armed conflict.
Between 1 January and 30 September, UNAMA documented 8,397 conflict-related civilian casualties (2,562 deaths and 5,835 injured) representing a one per cent decrease compared to the same period in 2015. Ground engagements remained the leading cause of civilian casualties, followed by suicide and complex attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
‘Increased fighting in densely populated areas makes it imperative for parties to take immediate steps to ensure all feasible precautions are being taken to spare civilians from harm,’ said Tadamichi Yamamoto, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan…”[18]
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, commented in July 2016 on the reasons for Afghans to seek asylum and refuge in other countries:
“This report once again lays bare the suffering inflicted on civilians by parties to the conflict in Afghanistan and shows how the conflict deprives them of basic human rights protection, displacing Afghans within their own country and forcing many to seek refuge abroad. As recent events have shown, this sets in motion a cascade of potential human rights abuses and violations that stretch from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean and beyond. The violations documented by UNAMA and my staff must be used by the authorities to hold perpetrators to account if we are to see improvements in human rights protection for Afghans at home and to change the calculus that compels Afghan men, women and children to take enormous risks to flee their country.”[19]
Furthermore, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime announced in October 2016 that opium production in Afghanistan had surged, facilitated in large part by continued security problems in the country:
“Opium production in Afghanistan rose by 43 per cent to 4,800 metric tons in 2016 compared with 2015 levels, according to the latest Afghanistan Opium Survey figures released today by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics and the UNODC. The area under opium poppy cultivation also increased to 201,000 hectares (ha) in 2016, a rise of 10 per cent compared with 183,000 ha in 2015.
In a statement timed to coincide with the survey’s launch, UNODC Executive Director, Yury Fedotov, said that the new report shows a worrying reversal in efforts to combat the persistent problem of illicit drugs and their impact on development, health and security. Consequently, he urged the international community to lend their support to achieving the sustainable development goals in Afghanistan – including vital work on a peaceful and inclusive society, health, poverty, peace, and gender, among many others.”[20]
Some analysis suggests that the Afghan government effectively now only controls 60% of Afghan territory, with the Taliban controlling 10% and 30% is contested. This New York Times report, from December 2016, draws on senior US military sources and summarises the difficult situation at the end of 2016:
“Afghanistan’s security crisis is fueling new opportunities for Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and other extremist groups, Afghan and American officials say, voicing concerns that the original American mission in the country — removing its use as a terrorist haven — is at risk.
As intense Taliban offensives have taken large portions of territory out of the Afghan government’s hands, those spaces have become the stage for a resurgence of regional and international militant groups… Gen. Joseph L. Votel, the chief of the United States Central Command, said the Afghan government now controls only about 60 percent of the country, the Taliban hold sway over about 10 percent, and the remainder is contested. Which group or groups fill those voids of increasing ungoverned territory in Afghanistan “is something we’ll have to contend with,” he said… Over all, Western and Afghan officials estimate that 40,000 to 45,000 militants are active across Afghanistan. The Taliban are estimated at 30,000 fighters, some of them seasonal. But the rest are foreign militants of different — and often fluid — allegiances, at times competing but mostly on the same side against the Afghan government and its American allies… The immediate existential threat to the Afghan government has been a resurgent Taliban, who officials say have been killing 30 to 50 members of the security forces each day in recent months. The insurgents are directly threatening important provincial capitals and have again made important roadways hazardous or impassable to government forces.”[21]
The Afghan army is suffering many casualties and struggles with poor morale and low capability. But it is likely to broadly remain in the field and in control of key cities and communication routes. There was increasing concern that the Afghan security forces were now contributing to a high proportion of civilian casualties: they are significantly less well-trained than the Western ISAF forces, who largely departed at the end of 2014. The emergence of IS continues to complicate matters, as disgruntled local Taliban fighters weigh old loyalties against a new and potentially better resourced form of jihad. Even by the low benchmarks of Afghanistan, genuine progress on any form of peace dialogue looks unlikely in 2017.
It is difficult to give categoric and confident assessments of the security situation – particularly whether it has decreased or improved. Data is poor and sporadic: the international community – journalists and intelligence – has reduced its focus on the country. Terminology that might help us define “improving” or “deteriorating”(for example, the distinction between “controlled” or contested” districts) and criteria pertaining to fighting levels, casualties and level of “control” one side or another has is also debatable.
Nevertheless, despite some dispute over statistics, I believe the security situation has deteriorated overall since the international forces withdrew at the end of 2014 – and the situation was not good then. I would highlight the following as key indicators:
- “A state of continual emergency”: A significant increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of conflict – three times that of 2014 and six times that of 2012.[22] Over 600,000 Afghanistan were internally displaced in 2016 and the UN predicts another 450,000 on top of this in 2017.
- Increasing civilian casualty levels between 2009 and 2016.[23]
- A major downturn in Afghan public optimism according to opinion polls.[24]
- Increasing casualties amongst Afghan security forces.[25]
- Significant increase in drug production (by 43% between 2015-2016).[26]
- Increase in level of Taliban control across districts in Afghanistan:
“…the ANDSF [Afghan National Defence and Security Forces] has not yet been capable of securing all of Afghanistan and has lost territory to the insurgency. As of August 28, 2016, USFOR-A reported that only 63.4% of the country’s districts were under Afghan government control or influence a reduction from the 72% as of November 27, 2015.”[27].
Some Afghan officials have claimed that the key province of Helmand is now 85% controlled by the Taliban.[28]
Russia, legitimately concerned about this instability on its southern flank and likely emboldened by its diplomatic and military successes at the expense of the US in Syria, appears to be attempting to re-insert itself politically into Afghan security debates. Recent tri-lateral meetings between Russia, China and Pakistan have declared concern over the deteriorating situation and an interest in assisting with the reconciliation between the Afghan government and the insurgency. All well and good, but this looks like a competition to provide an “alternative” solution: the US, India, and even the official Afghan government, appear to be sidelined by these initiatives.
But perhaps the biggest concern is the arrival in the White House of Donald Trump. Mr Trump has made it clear that he intends to re-evaluate and radically downsize costly American international commitments – may well herald a new period of declining US military support and dis-engagement in 2017. The only thing that is clear is that we have very little real sense of how this American political realignment might play out in the context of Afghanistan. Mr Trump has expressed extensive frustration at the amount of money the US is spending on military commitments across the world, including scathing attacks on NATO members who fail to pay their way. The US is still spending billions of dollars in Afghanistan. Much of this, according to very credible reporting from SIGAR, is still be wasted through inefficiency and corruption:
History often repeats. The obvious historical parallel that would be thrown up by a rapid reversal of US political, military and financial support for Afghanistan is the abrupt 1992 Soviet termination of money and equipment provided to the Najibullah regime. Najibullah’s government, propped by the Soviets from a distance, managed to survive for three years, from 1989-1992, after the withdrawal of the Soviets (despite multiple predictions to the contrary at the time). Nature hates a vacuum: Russia, Pakistan, Iran, India and multiple insurgent and warlord groups would compete to fill it. This would be highly destabilising for Afghanistan and the entire regime.
[1] ‘Taliban aggression will increase as US withdrawal nears’, RT, 25 June 2013, http://rt.com/op-edge/kabul-taliban-attack-afghanistan-225/, ‘Afghanistan: Escalating violence brings increased suffering to war-weary Afghans’, ICRC, 9 Feb. 2015, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/afghanistan-escalating-violence-brings-increased-suffering-war-weary-afghans, Global Conflict Tracker, ‘Increased Violence and Instability in Afghanistan, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/?marker=3 , UNAMA, ‘Press release: Latest UNAMA figures show continuing record high civilian casualties,’ Reliefweb, 12 Apr. 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/press-release-latest-unama-figures-show-continuing-record-high-civilian
[2] ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, Report of the Secretary General A/69/801 – S/2015/151, 27 Feb 2015, http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=38629&language=en-US; Donati, J., ‘Afghan civilian deaths up in 2013 as war intensifies: U.N.’, Reuters, 8 Feb. 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/08/us-afghanistan-casualties-idUSBREA1706D20140208
[3] Gady, F-S, ‘Afghan Forces are Suffering Record Losses’, The Diplomat, 5 May 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/afghan-forces-are-suffering-record-losses/
[4] ‘Seize the day’, The Economist, 7 Mar. 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21645727-pakistan-helping-afghanistans-president-make-peace-taliban-other-powers-should-back
[5] Ayres, S., ‘”Everyone is leaving Afghanistan”: Refugees flee increasing violence’, Al Jazeera America, 3 October 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/3/refugees-flee-afghanistan-in-face-of-increasing-violence.html
[6] ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, Report of the Secretary General A/70/601 – S/2015/942, 10 Dec 2015, https://unama.unmissions.org/secretary-general-reports
[7] Smith, J., ‘Kunduz collapse biggest test yet for Afghan forces’, Stars and Stripes, 29 Sep. 2015, http://www.stripes.com/news/kunduz-collapse-biggest-test-yet-for-afghan-forces-1.370920
[8] Associated Press, ‘Suicide bombing kills at least 33 in Afghanistan; Ghani says Islamic State responsible’, The Washington Times, 18 Apr. 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/18/ashraf-ghani-islamic-state-responsible-suicide-bom/
[9] ‘March 2016 Monthly forecast – Afghanistan’, Security Council Report, 29 Feb. 2016, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-03/afghanistan_16.php
[10] Clapper, J., ’Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US intelligence Community’, Director of National Intelligence to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 9 Feb. 2016.
[11] Foxley, T., ‘Taliban Announce 2016 Spring Offensive’, Afghanhindsight blog, 12 Apr. 2016, https://afghanhindsight.wordpress.com/2016/04/12/taliban-announce-2016-spring-offensive/
[12] ‘Afghanistan attack: Kabul suicide blast deaths rise to 64’, BBC News, 20 April 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36091046
[13] Harooni, M., ‘Islamic State claims responsibility for Kabul attack, 80 dead’, Reuters, 24 July 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-protests-idUSKCN1030GB
[14] O’Donnell, L., ‘The Taliban now hold more ground in Afghanistan than at any point since 2001’, Military Times, 16 June 2016, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2016/06/16/afghanistan-nicholson-commander-pentagon-report-war/85972056/
[15] ‘Questions over Afghan defenses as troops clear Kunduz city’, Reuters, 4 Oct. 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-idUSKCN12406Z
[16] Press Release, ‘Civilian casualties hit new high in 2015’, UNAMA, 14 Feb. 2016, https://unama.unmissions.org/civilian-casualties-hit-new-high-2015
[17] ‘Afghan civilian casualties hit half-year record, with 5,166 dead or maimed- UN’, UN News Centre, 25 July 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54543#.V71Uuq1r-fE
[18] ‘UNAMA releases civilian casualty data for third quarter of 2016’, UNAMA press release, 19 Oct. 2016, http://unama.unmissions.org/unama-releases-civilian-casualty-data-third-quarter-2016
[19] ‘Afghanistan: mid-year report 2016, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, UNAMA, July 2016.
[20] ‘Afghan opium production up 43 per cent: Survey’, UNODC, 23 Oct. 2016, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/October/afghan-opium-production-up-43-percent_-survey.html
[21] Mashal, M., and Schmitt, E., ‘Afghan Security Crisis Sets Stage for Terrorists’ Resurgence’, The New York Times, 2 Dec. 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/world/asia/afghanistan-security-terrorism-taliban.html?_r=0
[22] http://www.irinnews.org/news/2017/01/10/updated-afghanistan-now-%E2%80%98continual-emergency%E2%80%99-war-drives-record-numbers-their-homes
[23] ‘Afghan civilian casualties hit half-year record, with 5,166 dead or maimed- UN’, UN News Centre, 25 July 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54543#.V71Uuq1r-fE
[24] https://afghanhindsight.wordpress.com/2016/12/14/the-asia-foundation-survey-of-afghanistan-not-as-optimistic-as-last-year/
[25] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-casualties-idUSKCN0ZQ04H
[26] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37743433
[27] ‘High Risk List’, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Jan. 2017.
[28] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/deploy-300-marines-afghanistan-helmand-170107135920651.html
Summary: a large poll of the mood of ordinary Afghans finds increasing pessimism over security, governance, unemployment and the economy
The Asia Foundation released in December their annual survey of the mood of the people of Afghanistan. The report interviewed over 12,000 Afghans from all ethnicities, checking their views on the progress in the country over a range of themes: security, governance, the economic and society.
Although all such large-scale opinion surveys have faults and flaws – accessing difficult and dangerous districts hamper understanding an accurate sense in key areas – this highly detailed report is generally very helpful in giving a sense of Afghanistan’s overall mood, particularly as it has now been going for over a decade.
The key messages appear to be that of increasing pessimism when compared to last year and longer:
- An ongoing downward trend in overall optimism from the highpoint in 2013: only 29% of the population think the country is going in the right direction.
- 70% fear for their own personal safety – the highest level in ten years – the main problem areas remain in the south, but concerns in the north are also creeping up.
- The Afghan government security forces do not inspire widespread confidence – 20% say the Afghan National Army’s performance is getting worse, 30% think the police are getting worse.
- 93% fear an encounter with the Taliban – but 45% of the population fear meeting the Afghan police.
- Corruption and unemployment are major concerns beyond the security situation – the belief that Afghans can influence their local government is the lowest (44%) for ten years.
This looks an accurate but depressing indicator of the state of play. The lurch downwards from 58% in 2013 to 29% in 2016 in those thinking the country is wrongly headed is a very stark warning. But there do not appear to be any early signs of improvement in 2017: a strengthened Taliban, a wobbling government and potential disengagement from a Trump-led America present worrying signs for the new year.
See also my comments on the 2011 and 2012 Asia Foundation surveys
