Afghanistan: Prospects for 2024

Summary

With the violent and oppressive Taliban now fully in charge of the country, Afghanistan continues to travel down a dark and isolated road.  As almost every political, humanitarian, economic and societal indicator continues to show a downward trajectory, there are minimal signs for optimism this year.

Overview

The Taliban remain isolated from, and unrecognised by, the international community.  Even the handful of countries that were prepared to recognise them in the 1990s are reluctant to do so again. A serious economic downturn and man-made humanitarian crises have been compounded by natural disasters – not least the recent and devastating series of earthquakes in Herat and western Afghanistan in October last year.  There is no realistic prospect that the situation will improve for Afghanistan in 2024. The security, social, economic and humanitarian conditions for the country will remain at critically low levels which can worsen over the coming twelve months.

One recent comment by Heather Barr, a director at Human Rights Watch, strikes an important tone when considering this post-August 2021 trajectory.

“What’s tragic is that now you could look back to the situation in April of 2021 and feel like it’s some kind of halcyon vision of the past, when, in fact, it was very, very grim.  It’s just that we didn’t realize then how much worse things could get.”[1]

But many of the societal and individual human tragedies underway in Afghanistan now go under-reported – or not reported at all. Other global events, not least Ukraine, the Middle East and the Trumpian turbulence of US domestic politics, pull attention away from Afghanistan. Getting access to reliable information about developments in Afghanistan is tricky.  The Taliban themselves are very hostile to journalists who fail to present the Taliban in a good light.  Many media outlets have been clamped down on, hounded out or brought under Taliban control.[2]

“An Afghan journalist detained by the Taliban’s intelligence service has been released amid increasing concerns over mounting Taliban harassment of Afghan journalists.  The Taliban detained Ruhollah Sangar, a correspondent for the independent Tolo TV, on December 17 while he was reporting from Charikar, the capital of the northern Parwan Province… On December 12, the Taliban handed down a one-year sentence to journalist Sultan Ali Jawadi in the central province of Daikundi.

He headed the local broadcaster Nasim Radio and was convicted for “propaganda against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and “espionage for foreign countries” by rebroadcasting the programs of banned international media.  The Taliban has also been holding journalist Abdul Rahim Mohammadi in the southern Kandahar Province since December 4. He works for independent Afghan broadcaster Tamadon TV.”[3]

Political

There is no evidence of serious fractures or division within the Taliban, although the internal workings of the Taliban will remain opaque.  As with the original Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, who died in 2013, the decision-making process is focused around an inaccessible leadership group based in Kandahar under Haibatullah Akhundzade, who appears to have an inflexible and more or less absolute control over Taliban policies.  It is likely that his prime criteria for entry into his inner group of Taliban is for them to have strong religious credentials. 

Over the decades, international efforts to understand the Taliban and find viable ways of entering into a workable dialogue have regularly come unstuck in the quest to find a group of “moderate” Taliban.  With the absolute power that the Taliban now wield in Afghanistan, there is no evidence that they are open to any appeals to moderation on religious matters, their attitudes to women or the specifics of the application of Sharia law, which has now replaced all aspects of the previous government’s legislation.  What schools they are building are religious ones.  The Taliban madrassas will offer a narrow curriculum intended to produce radically indoctrinated students in their own image.[4]

Security

By the standards of terrorism that the Taliban themselves set in the last twenty years, the levels of of political violence are low.  Internal resistance groups – primarily the National Resistance Front and the Afghan Freedom Front – are certainly active and attacking isolated Taliban targets.  But their actions are small in scale and limited in impact.[5]  They do not currently present as powerful, nationwide movements capable of unseating the Taliban – crucially, there is little strong international backing for them.  But this is not to say that they cannot capable of challenging the Taliban in the future.  It took the Taliban in the region of four to five years to develop a credible guerrilla capability after their defeat in 2001.  Local anti-Taliban groups will not cause the Taliban any significant concern this year. 

Despite several reverses, Islamic State are still active in Afghanistan, targeting the Taliban and also the Hazara local ethnic group who do not share the views of Islam that Islamic State do.[6]  The Taliban, similarly aggressively opposed to the Shia Hazara, will do little tangible to protect this group.[7]  Islamic State will continue to seek to conduct terror attacks against the Taliban.[8]

The borders are volatile.  Along poorly defined boundaries, ill-disciplined Taliban border guards have traded shots on many occasions with Iranian and Pakistani counter-parts.  Sometimes this has led to artillery exchanges.  This unpredictability – which has often caused border crossing points to be closed – will continue.[9]

International relations

The international community is distracted.  When it does pay attention to Afghanistan in 2024, it will likely stay cautious and critical of the Taliban, but largely lack the leverage to affect real change.  The United Nations has started using the term “gender apartheid” to describe and condemn the Taliban’s violent, restrictive and discriminatory approach to women. 

The Taliban feel that they are entitled to international recognition and a seat at the United Nations. They purport to represent the will of the Afghan people.  There is no evidence of this and neither is any likely to be forthcoming – the Taliban have abolished the concept of political parties.  It is difficult to see any form of election ever being held under a Taliban regime. 

The Taliban need international recognition – it will gain them access to credit, aid and economic and trade deals. At some levels it will endorse their policies and practices. But the leadership shows no evidence of serious willingness to jump through the hoops of humanitarian compromise necessary to secure the cautious co-operation of the international community. For now, the Taliban look prepared to press on with a repressive agenda, regardless of the social and economic cost. 

Pakistan – deportations

The Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan – their former sponsors – is mired in dispute and friction.  Pakistan seems to be getting little return for its efforts in bringing the Taliban into power.  Pakistan has over-reacted to its own security problems with the Pakistani Taliban – the TTP – by declaring, last November, that hundreds of thousands of “illegal” Afghans would be ejected from Pakistan and deported to Taliban controlled Afghanistan.  This has uprooted generations of Afghan refugees who had fled to Pakistan in the eighties and nineties from earlier waves of violence in Afghanistan.  They settled there, married – many children have never visited their parent’s country – and many contributed to the economy of Pakistan.  The forced return of Afghans from Pakistan has caused major disputes between the Taliban and the Pakistani government – and some economic difficulties in Pakistan at the sudden departure of a substantial workforce. 

Some Pakistanis fear that the Afghan Taliban might be minded to support their comrades in the TTP as they conduct terror attacks in Pakistan.  Many recent Afghan refugees include those who worked with or for the international community or for the previous Afghan government.  If returned to Afghanistan they will be in real danger from a revenge-minded Taliban regime that has spent the last two and a half years detaining and killing “collaborators” from the previous government. Most Afghans being returned to Afghanistan have had to abandon jobs, property and possessions.  Prospects of starting from scratch in Afghanistan without capital, a family support network and property will be very limited.   

Economic

The Afghan economy is flat-lining.  This is due in large part to the Taliban’s ban on women having employment. Occasional photo shoots of provincial Taliban leaders cutting ribbons on a local bridge or road repair project do not conceal the fact that serious investment is not coming to Afghanistan.  Many educated Afghans – doctors, engineers, scientists and scholars – have either left or are seeking to leave.  This “brain drain” will continue.

“The Afghan economy is expected to hover around no-growth territory this year, amid uncertainty after contracting by 25% since August 2021 and adjusting to significantly lower demand, while the interim Taliban administration’s restrictive policies on women’s education and work will further lower Afghanistan’s growth prospects says the World Bank”[10]

The international community is highly circumspect about investing in Afghanistan.  For most countries it requires diplomatic recognition first.  China, largely indifferent to the human rights abuses of other nations, was expected to jump in with both feet to snap up raw material bargains from a Taliban desperate for hard cash.  But China has been cautious and the Taliban have been wary.  Regional enthusiasm for China’s Belt and Road Initiative looks to be waning – Pakistan has little to show beyond a large debt.  Previous Chinese investment in Afghanistan has proven less than successful – and tinged with fraudulent activities. 

Humanitarian

There are any number of statistics demonstrating Afghanistan’s stark humanitarian crisis, caused by decades of conflict, the destruction of infrastructure, widespread unemployment, long-term poverty and the collapse of the healthcare system.  Around 30 million Afghans – about three quarters of the entire population – are in need of humanitarian assistance.[11]  The Taliban regime shows no signs of concern or capability to address these challenges, choosing to blame the international community. There are reports that the Taliban are taking aid money for their own purposes.[12]  The Taliban’s bizarre approach to the female half of the population – including restricting women’s access to employment, education and the use of women healthcare workers – means that death rates of women and children from treatable health issues are starting to creep upwards.[13]  More women are now dying in childbirth.[14]  Other health issues, such as mental health and suicide rates – particularly amongst women and girls – will remain major and under-reported problems.[15]

Women’s rights

The Taliban’s views are based on a very strict interpretation of Sharia.  Any group – ethnic, gender or religious – can expect harsh treatment if they do not conform to the Taliban’s vision of the world.  Any action or policy that attempts to promote women’s equality is considered Western ideological interference and is to be resisted.  Attitudes to women are harsh and violent – women are now prevented from accessing work and education.  The United Nations is now describing this as “gender apartheid”.[16] 

Women and girls appear to be making some progress with accessing online education after the Taliban’s ban on female attendance at school.  But the Taliban are likely to try and suppress this.  Women’s public protests against the Taliban have been inspiringly brave in the face of harsh repression.  The Taliban have no compunction about meeting unarmed and peaceful women demonstrators with automatic weapons, whips and clubs.  There are credible reports that some women have been forcibly married to Taliban officials.[17]  Many women have been arrested and are held, without visiting rights or legal representation, in low grade prisons where it is highly likely they are subjected to mental, physical and sexual abuse.[18] 

Conclusions

Are there any causes for optimism?  It is hard to see anything with real potential in the coming year.  The Taliban continue to demonstrate a lack of ability and interest in running a country effectively or coherently attempting to alleviate the many societal problems.  Many of Afghanistan’s problems could be at least begin to be addressed if there was substantial international engagement.  But this would require the Taliban to make concessions and the international community to generate more funding and enthusiasm than it currently has.  It seems that the Taliban would rather that the population continued to suffer rather than they should walk back any aspect of their ideology.

It is always possible to look at less likely “wild card” possibilities, such as a successful Islamic State strike against the Taliban leadership.  There might be a surge in support for the NRF after a Taliban excess, perhaps a more brutal than usual dispersal of human rights protestors.  Or perhaps a genuine change of heart – or, more likely, a grudging concession – within parts of the Taliban, perhaps on something as basic as education for girls and women.  But such developments would probably lead to more violence. 

At a talk at the end of last year, the veteran expert, Thomas Barfield, made two interesting points.

Afghanistan can seem stable – until it suddenly isn’t.  Events can suddenly bring Afghanistan back to the top of the international agenda, but not in a good way.  If there was another return to violence, given the large urban populations, an anti-government resistance might more likely resemble an Iraq or Syria-style city-based insurgency, rather than guerrillas moving around the mountains and valleys of far-flung provinces.  

But 2024 will be another grim year for the people of Afghanistan.   

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[1] https://msmagazine.com/2024/01/09/afghanistan-women-maternal-mortality-taliban/

[2] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-jailing-journalists/32729256.html

[3] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-journalist-sangar-released-taliban-harassment/32738979.html

[4] https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-secular-schools-converted-madrasahs-education/31914672.html

[5] https://www.afintl.com/en/202401032099

[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/8/isil-claims-credit-for-kabul-bus-attack-targeting-shias

[7] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/afghanistan-taliban-torture-and-execute-hazaras-in-targeted-attack-new-investigation/

[8] https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/can-taliban-contain-islamic-state-afghanistan

[9] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/12/afghanistan-and-pakistan-trade-blame-as-key-border-crossing-remains-closed

[10] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/10/03/afghanistan-s-contracted-economy-faces-uncertainty-afghan-families-are-struggling

[11] https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023

[12] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-un-aid-profits/32650430.html

[13] https://www.passblue.com/2023/12/19/in-afghanistan-women-are-dying-on-the-way-to-the-hospital-or-inside-it/

[14] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231221-dying-every-two-hours-afghan-women-risk-life-to-give-birth

[15] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-women-suicides-taliban/32586222.html

[16] ‘Afghanistan: Taliban ‘may be responsible for gender apartheid’ says rights expert’, United Nations, 19 June 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137847

[17] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-woman-accuses-taliban-rape-forced-marriage/32015852.html

[18] https://8am.media/eng/families-worried-as-taliban-arrest-girls-the-girls-are-imprisoned-in-homes/

Thomas Barfield on Afghanistan

16 November notes from Conservative Friends of Afghanistan discussion with Thomas Barfield, hosted by Shabnam Nasimi

I listened in to a fascinating discussion with a true Afghanistan expert, Thomas Barfield, hosted by the UK based Conservative Friends of Afghanistan. Here are my rough notes from the discussion – with my highlights in bold. But two key points to highlight from it:

• Afghanistan will seem stable – until it suddenly isn’t. Afghanistan always finds a way to suddenly surprise the world – ignore Afghanistan at your peril.
• If there is to be a new revolution/uprising/insurgency, it may look a lot more like the Arab Spring, focusing on protests and unrest in the cities, than guerrilla war in the mountains of Badakhshan…

Introduction – SIGAR notes the Taliban are scooping off aid money.  UN nation states noting Taliban engaged in ethnic cleansing of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras.  Much arbitrary imprisonment – mainly Tajiks.

Pakistan deportation policy

Af/Pak relations complicated and subject to tensions.  Afghanistan never recognised the Durrand Line that cuts Pushtun tribes in half.  They accept the de facto border but it is not the same as a legitimate one.  After 1947, Afghanistan felt the border should be renegotiated.  Pakistan never fully established control over NWFP and still trying to get Afghans to recognise the Durrand Line.  Remember that the Afghan borders with Iran and Central Asia are also not formally recognised.

It has been shock for Pakistan, having spent over twenty years arming the Taliban in the hope of getting the Durrand Line recognised only to find the Taliban are a potential enemy – and one that is allowing the TTP into Afghanistan as a safe haven.  The Pakistani regime has not got what it wanted.

The Taliban are not recognised by any country – not even Pakistan – and Pakistan is now using crude levers to try and influence the Taliban by deporting 1.5 million Afghans.  It is hard to define the Afghans in this deportation – there are different types – three million came over in the 1980s – the most recent refugees came over post-August 2021.  Their asylum status was never formalised so they stayed as refugees.  Some are now grandfathers who have never known Afghanistan.  Most are ethnic Pushtuns – from an Afghan perspective the border is not recognised, so who is Pakistan to decide that they should be moved?

For Pakistan, the deportation represents a policy failure.  For the Taliban, perhaps they will ultimately shrug their shoulders as “not our problem” and expect the UN to solve it.  Also, the Taliban may respond by helping the TTP – perhaps even as the TTP undertake a jihad against Islamabad?  That would be a new, bigger problem.

Humanitarian aid

Afg governments historically have always survived non international aid, particularly since the 1950s Cold War time – a long tradition of seeking outside aid.  This was exacerbated post-2001 – the World Bank estimates that 42% of Afg GDP was foreign aid, so after August 2021, Afg was plunged into an immediate crisis of food, aid and healthcare.  During the Afghan civil war from 2001 – 2021, the Taliban retained government employees in the districts and provinces they had captured – they outsourced the functions of government so they could focus on the war.  In 2021, they wanted the foreigners to go but leave their money behind.  Even if the Taliban were not stealing aid money, they are still dependent on the international community to keep Afghanistan stable

Now the Taliban are much more hardline and they do not understand how to keep the population fed  – in a sense they are “playing chicken” with the international community – expecting the UN to feed the population rather than allow mass starvation.

Dynamics of the Taliban

Barfield cautions that it is very hard to know the inner workings and thinking of the Taliban so his comments should be seen as speculation only.  The Taliban have factions like every other Afghan government (eg Parcham/Khalq or Ghani/Abdullah) – divisions are nothing new.

The speed of the Taliban takeover upset a potential long-term strategy – a fast military takeover of Kabul meant the Taliban had little interest in negotiating and no question of them sharing power.

There are Taliban factions –

Taliban old school – Quetta Shura/Kandahar

Haqqani Network – Zadran Pushtuns who were not formed based on religion – their leaders were not mullahs

Northern Taliban – Kabul fell in Aug 2021 to Taliban forces from the north, not Taliban from Kandahar or Jalalabad – northern Afghan Taliban are more diverse (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pushtuns) – some slightly more liberal – ok to have girls in school

Herat – Herati Taliban

Right now the situation in Afghanistan is stable and the group mainly calling the shots is the older, Kandahar group and not the Zadran-influenced Kabul government (who might be more open to compromise over issues like girls education in exchange for aid).  Instead of moderating once they came to power, the Taliban have become more radical – if the Taliban are defining themselves purely as Pushtun nationalists, then they make their group even more narrow.  Kandahar is the Taliban’s spiritual heartland – we may see some internal disputes between the Kandahari Taliban and those in Kabul

Nothing is happening as yet – but it can be really stable until suddenly it isn’t (and then we academics will explain ten years later what happened and why it was quite obvious)!!

Women’s rights

The Taliban’s fixation with these policies is hard to explain – it is having a big impact on the economy (particularly after the Afghan economy has lost so many men to war) – educated women had been able to work and were significant “breadwinners”.  More generally, the attitude of Afghans to women has gradually changed – but the Taliban’s view never did.  It is partially explained by religion (but Iranian women have a massive role in education and work).

The Taliban leadership is mainly old – but still hard to explain the fixation – they could be “separate but equal” – this would still be a form of gender apartheid but perhaps more workable?  The Taliban’s approach is destructive – but confused – even the Taliban Ministry of Education doesn’t know what the policy is.  The Taliban greatly misunderstand the nature of the Afghanistan they are taking over – the population is very young – most were born post-2001 and the Taliban have now effectively “destroyed the future of the majority of the young generation”

The country is no longer predominantly rural – most of the growth and progress has been in the cities.  Historically there has been modernising progress – in the 1920s under King Amanullah, Afghan women got the vote before American women.

So the situation looks stable at the moment – so at what point might we see a crisis?

Many of the Taliban have daughters – Afghanistan will need women doctors even with gender segregation.  It is counter-productive internally and externally – with an absolute ban on women working it makes it easier for the international community to drop the Taliban.

Question – does the international community have the leverage to compel the Taliban in anyway? 

No – for the Taliban “God feeds people”.  The Taliban are “pre-modern” – “they really don’t care”

We have been hearing about the idea of “moderate Taliban” since the late 1990s!  This is wishful thinking – the government has zero inclusivity – it is almost all Pushtun.  But the hardline line Taliban do not necessarily cover all of Afghanistan – perhaps it is possible for the international community to work with some of the more pragmatic Taliban in the north and west?  For example giving aid to Herat if some schools are opened? Avoid dealing with central Afghan government.

Question – what about the resistance groups in Afghanistan, any legitimacy to them?

US did not assist resistance groups in the 1990s – US policy blows hot and cold – the US does nothing and then is suddenly diving in feet first – and we should not expect the US to understand a complex situation.  The Afghans in country have their own basic survival problems to deal with – food, aid, work, education – doesn’t make them well placed to join a revolution – if anything, history of the world shows that revolutions start once the situation has improved slightly

Resistance groups may get the opportunity in future to exploit a situation that suddenly occurs inside Afghanistan – but the diasporas are too ideological – they have agendas and programmes, eg communism, Islam, democracy, Presidency (even in the 2001-2021 period, people were not allowed to choose their own governors).

If there is some opposition in Afghanistan, they might become a focal point for opportunities of others – remember issue of rural vs urban.  Kabul is now a city of 4-5 million and a very young population.  If there were to be an insurgency in the future, perhaps it is more likely to resemble the Arab Spring, building on a frustrated youth (perhaps without an agenda).

In such a situation the Taliban would either have to make a deal or try and clamp down on Kabul with only 10,000 fighters.  This could lead to an urban insurgency – Afghanistan has never had cities before – a revolt now looks less likely in the mountains of Badakhshan – but think about the cities of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar…and Governments tend to fall instantaneously.

Economy

Countries like China have sent ambassadors – but no recognition by the international community.  People think/assume China will get involved – Belt and Road Initiative – but maybe the BRI is “past its sell-by date”?  Many countries have racked up debts due to the BRI – Pakistan has spent millions trying to protect Chinese development projects in north west Pakistan.

China is very sensitive to Chinese citizens being attacked – if China was in Afghanistan, could the Taliban guarantee security? Islamic state attached Chinese workers hotel in Kabul.  Afghanistan has a mass of resources under the ground – none of which has been developed – even in the twenty years of western involvement in 2001-2021 no Western country has invested in Afghanistan.

China will be calculating – will the security hold for the 5-10-20 years necessary?  Would a new regime stand by the deals signed with the Taliban?

The China BRI problem also involves dealing with Islam when it is committing genocide of Uighurs – how to square the circle? “The Taliban are the stuff of Xi Jinping’s nightmares”.  The cynical Chinese view might be that the US has abandoned Afghanistan and left the mess with China.  China cannot even get good security from Pakistan – these are all dilemmas for China.

Afghanistan’s neighbours also showing little interest – no one is speaking out about the Taliban or on Muslim issues – hard to define Afghanistan’s location – is it eastern-most Middle East?  Is it Central Asia? Or South Asia?  But is a link – a “marshalling yard” for the Silk Road.

Iran barely recognises that Afghanistan is its neighbour – Iran more focused on Middle East, Iraq, Russia.  Iran has enough other problems (and it is also deporting Afghans).

Central Asia has been part of the Russian Empire for so long – same ethnic groups but very different thinking.

Pakistan is now at odds with the Taliban – and worried about the encroachment of India.

India – strangely, Kabul might find it easier to deal with Delhi than Islamabad, so we may see the return of India influence – there is potential in the Chabahar port and route with India/Iran collaboration.

Two years ago it was possible to envisage a Pakistan-dominated Taliban government in Kabul – but now even the Taliban are hostile to Pakistan: “Afghanistan has been constantly surprising Pakistani governments” After 9/11, Pakistan was desperate for the Taliban to ditch Bin Laden in case the Americans arrived in force.  Mullah Omar refused to do so.

Pakistan therefore sees the Taliban as very ungrateful – Pakistan invested heavily – they were a major factor in bringing the Taliban to power, but now the Taliban are able to jettison Pakistan.  It is relatively easy to bankroll an insurgency but Pakistan is not able to rebuild a country…

Question: In international affairs Afghanistan is dropping off the radar – what are the consequences?

Afghanistan both benefits and suffers from international intervention – in the 19^th century, Afghanistan had always been written off as an inconsequential issue – but somehow it would always come back to the centre of world attention

In 1923 Afghanistan was the only independent Muslim country in the world.

Post 1945 Cold War – 1980s – Afghan blood being spilled over non-Afghan issues.

Now in 2023 there is a danger of forgetting about Afghanistan – but it could always come back in some new and surprising way.  It is an unstable area, but a lot more modern and advanced now in some ways – iPhones, WhatsApp for communications – a mix of modern and old-fashioned but with much stronger connections to the outside world.

Don’t ignore Afghanistan.

The deterioration of the situation facing women and girls in Afghanistan

More bleak polling shows another lurch downwards in the mood of the country.

With the publishing of new Gallup polling from Afghanistan comes another very stark reminder of the societal turmoil and challenges facing Afghanistan’s women and girls – and indeed the country as a whole – since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. 

The polling results points again to the suffering faced by women and girls and the bleak future ahead.  This quote is particularly stark:

“Just 11% of Afghan women interviewed in July said they are satisfied with the freedom they have to choose what they do with their lives, which is a new record low, not just for Afghanistan but for any country or population that Gallup has ever polled.”

This is a significant and very noticeable drop, from a low score of 29% in 2022, down to 11%.  A Life Evaluation Index shows 93% of men and 96 % of women judge their current and future prospects to in a category of “suffering”.

Afghanistan still suffers from major humanitarian, security, economic and societal problems.  A series of earthquakes in western Afghanistan in October have caused further hardship.  Pakistan’s recent and sudden mass deportation of over a million Afghans from Pakistan from November has increased tension between the Taliban and Pakistan and will exacerbate the problems of Afghanistan’s economy and the needs of thousands of newly displaced persons.

As long as the harsh and unskilled Taliban regime continues to embrace a brutal form of gender apartheid, where women are prevented from working, receiving education and travelling without a chaperone, many nations will remain reluctant to fully engage diplomatic, economic and humanitarian activities with the countries.

“Notably, 2021 marked the first time in the history of Gallup surveys in Afghanistan that the majority of both men and women agreed that women in their country are not treated with respect and dignity. Before then, the majority of men felt women were treated this way.”

Pakistan government clamping down on Afghan cross-border movement

Summary: The Pakistan government is making it harder for Afghans to enter Pakistan and stay there.  This will increase the risks facing Afghans who have reasons to fear the Taliban.

The Pakistani government is clamping down on Afghans attempting to move into Pakistan and also on those Afghans already in Pakistan. 

This will have worrying implications for Afghans in fear of the Taliban and who are seeking to leave Afghanistan – including to those hoping to move to UK as part of arrangements with the British government.

Recent Pakistani government statements appear to declare that Afghans will soon now only be allowed into Pakistan if they hold an Afghan passport, rather than a travel visa which has been the most common method of access.

“Pakistan has decided that all citizens of neighboring Afghanistan will be required to enter the country with a valid passport and visa starting next month, similar to travelers from other countries, VOA learned Monday.

The landmark “one document regime” policy will replace the decades-old practice of granting special travel permits to individuals with divided tribes straddling the nearly 2,600-kilometer border between the two countries.

The “passport as the only traveling document is going to be implemented from November 1, 2023,” according to an official federal directive sent to immigration authorities at all Afghan border crossings and seen by VOA.

“No other document shall be accepted to travel from Afghanistan to Pakistan,” the document said. It instructed relevant authorities to make necessary arrangements and advertise the decision in “visible places” at all crossing points along the border.

The government has yet to make a formal announcement about the new policy. Pakistani Interior Minister Sarfaraz Bugti said Monday that he would discuss in detail Afghan-related policy matters at a news conference on Tuesday.

A senior Pakistani official confirmed the new travel rules for Afghans to VOA, saying Islamabad hopes Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities will cooperate in implementing the decision. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.”[1]

It is not yet clear the extent to which the Taliban have been consulted yet, whether they will automatically agree with the move and even whether they have the resources to implement this.  The Taliban have struggled with the passport issue for a range of reasons.  Although Afghan passports are now available for issue – and, in theory, includes an online application facility – the process for Afghans to gain passports has been confused and unclear since the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021.  Procedures and access to passports are variable, fluid and subject to disruption and closure for a range of security and “technical” reasons. 

From October 2022 to the end of February 2023, all passport offices were shut for “technical reasons”.[2]  The new Taliban regime has limited governmental skillsets and is struggling to operate machinery and application processes, which include biometric systems.  Forgery and other forms of corruption still look to be significant problems.  This is likely to increase now, given that the Taliban intend to have authorised passport offices to open in each province of the country – processing passports are seen as a valuable money-making operation. 

By March 2023, after a five month pause, the Taliban reportedly began issuing passports again.[3]  Given the current confusion and complexity surrounding the Taliban’s ability to issue passports, it is quite difficult to give a confident indication of the likelihood of securing passports.  Access to passports is likely to remain uncertain and unreliable.  In August 2023, crowds of Afghans rushed to a passport office in Herat when they heard more passports had become available, causing the Taliban to shoot into the air to disperse them.[4]

In another move to restrict and return Afghans in Pakistan, The Independent is reporting that the Pakistani government has arrested Afghans temporarily in Pakistan who were awaiting British government permission to travel to the UK.  Many of these Afghan families are in genuine fear of the Taliban and of being returned to Afghanistan:

“Afghans promised safe haven in Britain but trapped in Pakistan have been arrested by police amid fears refugees could be returned to the Taliban… Hundreds of Afghan families, many of whom worked for the British army, have been stranded in Islamabad for months after the UK stopped chartering flights last year and demanded refugees find their own housing in Britain before travelling. The families were invited to come to Islamabad and were put up in UK government-paid hotels after they were found eligible for Britain’s resettlement schemes.

Stuck in limbo with expired visas, the Pakistani police targeted these groups this week, arresting several. The Afghans were only saved when the British High Commission (BHC) on the ground intervened. Those still trying to get to the UK say they are terrified the same thing will happen again and that they will be deported back to Taliban-run Afghanistan… Pakistani authorities have already deported thousands of Afghans from their country, including Afghans eligible for resettlement in the US based on their work with the American government… Police arrested seven Afghans who did not have in-date visas, rebuffing protests that they were under the protection of the UK government, Afghans staying in the BHC hotels told The Independent.

The Afghans were freed on Tuesday afternoon and returned to the hotel after BHC officials lobbied for their release. The Foreign Office is working to resolve issues around expired visas and undocumented eligible Afghans with the Pakistani government.”[5]

It is not clear if this latter incident is a one-off mix-up that can be corrected through diplomatic action or a shift in Pakistan policy as part of a wider programme to forcible remove Afghans back into Afghanistan. The Pakistani government has been aggressively and indiscriminately deporting Afghans in Pakistan and returning them to Afghanistan.[6]  Many have legitimate documentation allowing them to be in Pakistan. Many Afghans in Pakistan have fled Afghanistan and the Taliban because they genuinely fear being targeted as the basis of having worked for the previous government or armed forces.

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• [1] Gul, A., Pakistan Tightens Entry Rules for Afghan Travelers’, VoA, 2 Oct. 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-tightens-entry-rules-for-afghan-travelers/7294362.html

 [2] ‘Passport Distribution Process Resumes Across the Country’, Afghanistan Times, 2 Mar. 2023, https://www.afghanistantimes.af/passport-distribution-process-resumes-across-the-country/

[3] Guler, B., ‘Afghanistan resumes passport distribution after 5-month hiatus’, Anadolu Agency, 1 Mar. 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/afghanistan-resumes-passport-distribution-after-5-month-hiatus/2834794

[4] Zhang, Z., ‘Taliban authorities shoot bullets into the air to disperse passport office crowds’, SCMP, 30 Aug. 2023, https://www.scmp.com/video/asia/3232739/taliban-authorities-shoot-bullets-air-disperse-passport-office-crowds

[5] Bancroft, H., ‘UK shame as Pakistani police storm hotel and arrest Afghans promised sanctuary in Britain’, Independent, 1 Oct. 2023, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/afghanistan-pakistan-hotels-uk-foreign-office-islamabad-b2420976.html

[6] ‘Pakistan Is Planning To Deport More Than 1 Million Illegal Afghan Refugees’, RFE/RL, 29 Sep. 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-deport-afghan-refugees/32615541.html

UN: Taliban target and kill ex-Afghan military

There has been much reporting since August 2021, when the Taliban came to power, that the Taliban have been detaining and killing former members of the Afghan government and military, despite the Taliban claiming to have issued an amnesty.  A new UN report from August 2023 adds more credible and troubling detail.

Since the Taliban’s seizure of power in August 2021, the Taliban have maintained a campaign to track and kill former members of the Afghan security forces and intelligence communities.[1]  There have been multiple credible reports that the Taliban are pursuing former members of the government in violation of what the Taliban leadership declared was a “General Amnesty” to all former officials.[2] 

“Taliban forces in Afghanistan have summarily executed or forcibly disappeared more than 100 former police and intelligence officers in just four provinces since taking over the country on August 15, 2021, despite a proclaimed amnesty, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.”[3] 

A New York Times study in 2022 developed this research and judged that the figure was closer to 500:

“The revenge killings were widespread, touching every region of the country, shattering families and communities, and giving a lie to the Taliban’s promises of tolerance and moderation.  After initially denying that such killings were occurring, the Taliban leadership has come to acknowledge some of them, though has insisted that those acts were the work of rogue commanders and not an authorized campaign.  But the number of killings, and their ubiquity, might suggest otherwise. So would their ruthlessness, including summary executions that were captured on video…”[4]

For twenty years the Taliban fought a violent insurgency against the Americans and other international military forces.  The Americans were primarily responsible for the creation of the ANA, providing equipment, uniforms, logistic support and intelligence support.  American forces would routinely conduct joint operations alongside the ANA and otherwise accompany them into battle as advisors.  The Taliban see the Americans as infidel invaders who killed and wounded thousands of Taliban fighters. 

“An Afghan army officer and a Taliban commander were insulting each other over their radios while shooting back and forth.  The Taliban commander taunted: ‘You are puppets of America!’ The army officer shouted back: ‘You are the puppets of Pakistan!’ The Taliban commander replied: ‘The Americans are infidels. The Pakistanis are Muslims.’ The Afghan officer had no response.”[5]

The Taliban actively and aggressively target anyone they deem to be a collaborator with the previous Afghan government, the American military and the international community that supported them.[6]  They made threats and took direct and violent action against Afghans, including translators, drivers, contractors, cooks and others who directly supported international military operations.[7] 

The UNHCR noted in August 2018 noted that:

“AGEs [Anti-Government Elements – i.e. the Taliban] have reportedly threatened and attacked Afghan civilians who work for the international military forces as interpreters or in other civilian capacities.  There are also reports of AGEs targeting former employees of the international forces and the government.”[8]

The Taliban continue to target such Afghans – including translators, but also politicians, members of the military, intelligence personnel, judges, civilians, human rights and women’s rights activists.  In essence, anyone who is believed to have supported the Americans and Western values.[9]

“Zar Mohammad Stanikzai remembers the promise made to him when he became a translator supporting the United States military in 2012: Help us, and we will keep you safe.  Four years later, his fear of Taliban reprisals has made him a prisoner in his Afghan home, he said…he first applied in 2013 for one of the visas, writing to American officials later that year that an imam had warned his father that his son must stop working for the Americans or be killed.  He then described how he came under fire as he drove home from his mosque, his car hit by three rounds from an AK-47, he said.  If the Taliban find him — or any of the Afghans hoping the United States will grant them visas — ‘they will kill us,’ he said in an interview…”[10]

The Taliban view pro-American Afghans – and their families – as collaborators and traitors.[11]  Since the Taliban seized power, they have become better placed to trace and target Afghans:

“The Taliban is intensifying a search for people who worked with US and NATO forces, a confidential United Nations document says, despite the militants vowing no revenge against opponents.  The report by the UN’s threat-assessment consultants says the group has ‘priority lists’ of individuals it wants to arrest.  It corroborates testimonies from dozens of Afghans inside the country, including a former employee of EUPOL, a European Union agency training Afghan police, and a former staffer at the Dutch embassy, both of whom told Euronews Taliban fighters were going door to door in Kabul to identify people who had worked for the international community.”[12]

Former members of the Afghan military remain at risk of violent treatment, including illegal detention, beatings, interrogation, torture and even execution. 

“The Taliban are going door-to-door searching for “foreign collaborators”, a former minister and a journalist have said.  Interpreters, diplomatic staff, humanitarian workers, and holders of Special Immigration Visas (SIVs) to travel to the US are being targeted, they said.

‘A SIV holder was beaten and tortured by the Taliban, SIV holder was working closely with the US embassy in Kabul,’ Canada-based Afghan journalist Bilal Sarwary tweeted on Monday.

‘An American citizen’s home was raided, he was questioned and verbally abused. Multiple sources with direct knowledge of incidents tells me.’

Former deputy defence minister Tamim Asey said the Taliban had active search operations in several districts in Kabul.

‘Taliban have started mass house to house and door to door search operations in districts 4,6,8,10, 13 and 18 of Kabul since two days now looking for ‘foreigner collaborators’ i.e. interpreters, SIV holders and staff who worked for embassies, contractors, NGOs et al.’

He added that they were also searching for ‘apostate regime members of security forces and officials’, i.e. previous govt officials.”[13]

This month, the United Nations published the findings of a new document investigating Taliban targeting of former members of the Afghan Army.  The findings are highly credible and extremely damning:

“UNAMA has documented at least 800 human rights violations against former government officials and ANDSF members between the Taliban takeover on 15 August 2021 and 30 June 2023. This report focuses on extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill-treatment and threats experienced by former government officials and ANDSF members.  Cases are only included in overall figures where UNAMA has obtained credible reports that a member or members of the de facto authorities were responsible for the incident.”

The report emphasises that the risks are borne mostly by former members of the military (my highlights are in bold):

“Between 15 August 2021 and 30 June 2023, former Afghan National Army members were at greatest risk of experiencing human rights violations, followed by police (both Afghan National Police and Afghan Local Police) and National Directorate of Security officials.  Human rights violations against former government officials and ANDSF members have been recorded across all 34 provinces; with the greatest number of violations recorded in Kabul, Kandahar and Balkh provinces.  While the groups set out above are at risk across all provinces, there does appear to have been increased targeting in some locations…UNAMA has documented at least 218 extrajudicial killings of former government officials and ANDSF members since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. The most targeted groups affiliated with the former government were ANA members, Afghan National Police, National Directorate of Security officials and Afghan Local Police.  In most instances, individuals were detained by de facto security forces, often briefly, before being killed. Some were taken to detention facilities and killed while in custody, others were taken to unknown locations and killed, their bodies either dumped or handed over to family members.”

It is highly likely that many other deaths and disappearances have taken place that remain unaccounted for.  The Taliban, despite weak denials, look likely to continue a violent approach to members of the previous government.

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[1] Marcolini, B., Sohail, S., and Stockton, A., ‘The Taliban Promised Them Amnesty. Then They Executed Them’, The New York Times, 12 Apr. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/12/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-revenge.html?te=1&nl=opinion-today&emc=edit_ty_20220412

[2] Payenda, S., ‘Ex-Military Personnel Face Rising Number of Executions’, Hasht-E-Subh Daily, 16 Mar. 2023, https://8am.media/eng/ex-military-personnel-face-rising-number-of-executions/

[3]  ‘No Forgiveness for People Like You’, Human Rights Watch, 30 Nov. 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/30/no-forgiveness-people-you/executions-and-enforced-disappearances-afghanistan

[4] Marcolini, B., Sohail, S., and Stockton, A., ‘The Taliban Promised Them Amnesty.  Then They Executed Them’, The New York Times, 12 Apr. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/12/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-revenge.html?te=1&nl=opinion-today&emc=edit_ty_20220412

[5] Malkasian, C., ‘What America Didn’t Understand About Its Longest War’, Politico, 6 July 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/07/06/afghanistan-war-malkasian-book-excerpt-497843

[6] ‘Taliban call to kill collaborators’, Al Jazeera, 20 July 2010, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2010/07/2010719718766960.html

[7] ‘Germany’s Afghan Staff Fear Reprisals’, Speigel online, 16 Apr. 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/afghan-employees-of-german-military-face-threats-from-taliban-a-894494.html

^[8] ‘UNHCR ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NEEDS OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS FROM AFGHANISTAN’, UNHCR report HCR/EG/AFG/18/02, 30 Aug. 2018, p.43.

[9] De Luce, D., ‘’”We will kill you”: Thousands of Afghans who helped U.S. want to evacuate before the Talban finds them’, NBC News, 10 May 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/we-will-kill-you-thousands-afghans-who-helped-u-s-n1266744

[10] Huetteman, E., ‘”They Will Kill Us”: Afghan Translators Plead for Delayed U.S. Visas’, The New York Times, 9 Aug. 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/politics/afghan-translators-military-visas.html

[11] Shinwari, J., et al, ‘Over 300 Afghan Translators and Family Killed While Serving the U.S.’, Real Clear Defence, 19 Sep. 2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/09/19/over_300_afghan_translators_and_family_killed_while_serving_the_us_577997.html

[12] ‘Taliban “intensifying” search for Afghans who worked for the US – UN report’, Euro News, 20 Aug. 2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/08/19/taliban-checkpoints-ring-kabul-airport-as-imf-suspends-funds-to-afghanistan

[13] ‘Taliban going door-to-door searching for “foreign collaborators” in Kabul’, The New Arab, 15 Sep. 2021, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/taliban-kabul-searching-foreign-collaborators

“Zero hope”: Afghanistan’s prospects for 2023

Summary: In 2022, Afghanistan suffered at turbulent year in the aftermath of the Taliban’s armed takeover in August 2021.  The security situation is still volatile.  The country is affected by extensive humanitarian and economic crises.  A repressive and unrecognised Taliban regime is bent on enforcing its interpretation of Sharia law.  The Afghan people will not be consulted or allowed to express their views.  Local media is being suppressed. There is no significant resistance that currently could threaten the Taliban regime – and no strong appetite from any quarter for a widespread return to fighting.  Women are now prevented from working, receiving education or otherwise engaging in society in any meaningful way.  In 2023 we should expect more of the same.

A version of this article appeared on the European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS) website in February 2023

Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated.  In the immediate aftermath of the Taliban’s return, in late 2021 and early 2022, there was perhaps some slight optimism that the Taliban could be negotiated with to some degree, simply in order to restart the economy.  But now, as we move into 2023, it is easier to get a sense of where the Taliban are going and what their intentions are.  And it does not look good.  The international community have appealed, exhorted and dangled financial and diplomatic concessions in front of the Taliban.  To no avail. 

The Taliban were encouraged – and likely surprised – by the speed and totality of the collapse of the previous government.  The absolute power they have gained across the country has given them the confidence to move quickly – at the exclusion of more or less all other social and humanitarian considerations.  They have established their own interpretation of an Islamic Emirate and Islamic Sharia law.  The Taliban’s regime is inflexible, with a narrow and inaccessible leadership based in Kandahar.        

The humanitarian situation has deteriorated rapidly in a variety of ways.  This has been exacerbated by the Taliban’s general lack of administrative skills – they prefer to appoint senior officials based on religious credentials rather than skills, education and competence for the job.  They have alienated many humanitarian and aid agencies and have banned Afghan women’s involvement in humanitarian activities.  The United Nations estimates that 97% of the population are living in poverty.[1]  Population displacement, unemployment, famine and food shortages are impacting hard on the population, with approximately 20 million judged to be acutely food-insecure.[2]  Healthcare facilities are limited and deteriorating.[3]  The 2022/2023 winter has been brutal: with multiple reports of people and animals freezing to death.[4]

The Taliban’s leadership will remain elusive, making them difficult to analyse effectively.  Haibatullah Akhundzade, the “Leader of the Faithful”, looks to be following the model of the original Taliban leader, Mullah Omar.  He shuns public exposure, remains based in Kandahar (he has visited Kabul only once) and is surrounded by a small group of approved local religious leaders.  Information about him is closely guarded.  There appears to be only one official photograph of him.  His age is uncertain, but he may be in his 70s.  There doesn’t appear to be any clearly designated successor to Akhundazade.  When Mullah Omar died (of natural causes) in 2013, it was not until 2015 that the Taliban announced it.

There is no significant evidence of opposition groups or rival factions inside the Taliban.  Some within the international community believe that there are “moderate” Taliban within the regime who are open to a “softer” approach to societal issues, perhaps in exchange for international recognition or economic assistance.  There are certainly Taliban with different views from the leadership in Kandahar.  In particular, many are uneasy with the ban on women’s education.  Some Taliban leaders are open to charges of hypocrisy, being happy to send their daughters to school in the Gulf.  But there does not currently appear to be a body within the Taliban with aspirations to confront or otherwise challenge the senior leadership.

The Taliban are in the second year of what amounts to a “Year Zero” social experiment.  Women will have no place in society – no education, no employment, prohibitive travel restrictions and no say in the governing of the country.  Political parties and the electoral process have been banned.  On 23 January 2023, the United Nations highlighted the ongoing and extreme risk to Afghan former law-makers:

“’The ongoing collapse of the rule of law and judicial independence in Afghanistan is “a human rights catastrophe”’, UN-appointed independent human rights experts warned on Friday… ‘We are gravely concerned by the extreme exclusion of women from the legal system’, the UN experts underscored, calling on the international community for ‘urgent support’…‘Many women judges have fled the country or gone into hiding’, the Special Rapporteurs added.  Prosecutors have been ‘systematically side-lined’, the statement continued, noting that their previous work in investigating, and prosecuting Taliban members under democratically-elected Governments, have put them at ‘grave risk’.  ‘More than a dozen prosecutors, the majority men, reportedly have been killed by unknown individuals in Kabul and other provinces. Many remain in hiding’.[5]

Moral, economic, humanitarian and diplomatic arguments look unlikely to have significant impact on the Taliban’s calculations and decision-making in the coming year if they are judged to clash with the interpretation of Islam as determined by Haibatullah Akhundzade and a small group of religious elders.  Protest, dissent and even simple vocal disagreement with the Taliban will be met with censorship and violence.  Women demonstrators – and the journalists reporting the demonstrations – will be beaten.  The Taliban do not intend that the Afghan population will be consulted or be permitted to otherwise express their views on Taliban governance.  A violent, retributive Taliban interpretation of Sharia will continue to be enforced.  Public executions, amputations and floggings are already taking place.[6]  Other forms of violence will continue to include the assassination or “disappearance” of members of the previous government and its security forces.[7]  There are numerous and highly credible reports of Taliban revenge attacks and killings against a wide range of groups and individuals, in particular those who are perceived to have opposed them or worked for the previous government.[8] 

The murder of the former Afghan member of parliament, Mursal Nabizada, has been extensively covered in the media.  She was shot dead by two “armed gunmen” at her home in central Kabul, on 15 January 2023, where she was living openly.  Her bodyguard also died in the gunfire.

“A former Afghan MP and her bodyguard have been shot dead at her home in the capital Kabul, Afghan police have said.  Mursal Nabizada, 32, was one of the few female MPs who stayed in Kabul after the Taliban seized power in August 2021.  Her brother and a second security guard were wounded in the attack on Sunday.

Former colleagues praised Ms Nabizada as a ‘fearless champion for Afghanistan’ who turned down a chance to leave the country.

Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, women have been removed from nearly all areas of public life.  Kabul police spokesman Khalid Zadran said security forces had started a serious investigation into the incident.”[9]

But the one thing the Taliban still have in their favour is the absence of wide-spread fighting.  With the Taliban’s sudden and decisive victory, opposition groups fled and remain in disarray.  There is no appetite for a return to fighting, even if the National Resistance Front will continue to offer sporadic resistance in and around the province of Panjshir.  Islamic State, thriving on any form of failed or failing state, will also remain active, particularly through terrorist attacks in Kabul.  But neither the NRF nor Islamic State look likely to unseat the Taliban on their own.  I do not expect any significant anti-Taliban armed resistance this year.

Although widespread fighting has demonstrably stopped, other indicators suggest that societal problems are still extensive.  Suicides, forced marriages and killings attributed to “armed gunmen” are regularly reported.  Levels of pessimism and hopelessness are staggering.  A Gallup poll of Afghanistan in December 2022 concluded:

“Suffering in Afghanistan rocketed to a record high last year after the Taliban took over, but Gallup’s latest surveys in the country show Afghans’ lives are even more miserable now, and they’ve fully lost hope that their future will be any better.

One year after the Taliban returned to power, almost all Afghans — 98% — rate their life so poorly that they are considered suffering. This percentage tops the previous high of 94% in 2021, measured as the Taliban seized full control and the U.S. withdrew its troops.  Gallup classifies individuals as ‘thriving,’ ‘struggling’ or ‘suffering’ according to how they rate their current and future lives on a ladder scale with steps numbered from zero to 10…Zero is the worst possible life rating on this scale. On average, Afghans rate their current life at a 1.3 and their life in five years at a 1.0 — illustrating the loss of hope that most Afghans are feeling. But for many Afghans, the situation is even worse than that: More than one in four (26%) rate their current life a zero, and nearly four in 10 (39%) expect their life in five years will be a zero.”[10]

During the Taliban’s previous regime, in the 1990s, the Taliban were recognised by just three countries: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.  This time, no other country has yet stepped forward to endorse the Taliban’s legitimacy.  The Taliban do not appear to be unduly troubled.  And it is likely that countries in the region will be pragmatic, seeking to engage economically regardless of the Taliban’s poor humanitarian stance.  China is not known for its humanitarian scruples.  It has already signed an oil extraction deal with the Taliban.[11]  Hard cash may convince the Taliban that international recognition is a luxury that can be dispensed with.  But young and educated Afghans (and those that seek education) will probably leave the country in increasing numbers, through legal and illegal methods.  The EU is now accepting Afghan women and girls as refugees purely on the basis of their gender because of the levels of persecution at the hands of the Taliban.[12]

The future looks bleak.     

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[1] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-181284

[2] https://reliefweb.int/disaster/dr-2021-000022-afg

[3] Roberts, R., ‘Taliban ban on female NGO staff is deepening Afghanistan’s public health crisis’, Science, 16 Jan. 2023, https://www.science.org/content/article/taliban-s-ban-female-staff-ngos-deepening-afghanistan-s-public-health-crisis

[4] ‘More than 160 Afghans die in bitterly cold weather’, Reuters, 26 Jan. 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/more-than-160-afghans-die-bitterly-cold-weather-2023-01-26/

[5] ‘Afghanistan: Collapse of legal system is “human rights catastrophe”, United Nations press release, 23 Jan. 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132662

[6] ‘Afghanistan: Taliban leader orders Sharia law punishments’, BBC News, 14 Nov. 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-63624400

[7] ‘Former Local Police Officer Assassinated by Unidentified Gunmen in Sar-E-Pul Province’, Hasht-e Subh Daily, 19 Dec. 2022, https://8am.media/eng/former-local-police-officer-assassinated-by-unidentified-gunmen-in-sar-e-pul-province/

[8] Marcolini, B., Sohail, S., and Stockton, A., ‘The Taliban Promised Them Amnesty.  Then They Executed Them’, The New York Times, 12 Apr. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/12/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-revenge.html?te=1&nl=opinion-today&emc=edit_ty_20220412

[9] Mursal Nabizada: Gunmen kill former Afghan MP at home in Kabul’, BBC News, 16 Jan. 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64285789

[10] Ray, J., ‘Afghans Lose Hope Under the Taliban’, Gallup News, 1 Dec. 2022, https://news.gallup.com/poll/405572/afghans-lose-hope-taliban.aspx

[11] ‘Taliban and China firm agree Afghanistan oil extraction’, BBC News, 6 January 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64183083

[12] ‘Afghanistan: Taliban restrictions on women and girls amount to persecution’, EUAA press release, 25 Jan. 2023, https://euaa.europa.eu/news-events/afghanistan-taliban-restrictions-women-and-girls-amount-persecution

Taliban continue to target former members of the previous government.

Summary: Since the Taliban took power in August 2021, former members of the previous government have been hunted and targeted for revenge attacks, including illegal detention, violence, torture, “disappearance” and execution.  A very difficult environment for journalists limits the amount of reliable information available and makes the risk of reprisals difficult to assess.  It is highly likely that such persecutions will continue.  The risk of aggressive targeting looks to include relatively low profile former officials as well as family members.

In August 2021, when the Ghani government collapsed and the Taliban took control over Kabul and, de facto, the rest of the country, Taliban media representatives were quick to offer “amnesty” for former members of the government and of the security forces.  Many analysts and observers were sceptical.  The indications from Taliban soldiers during the fighting over the previous summer were not encouraging.  During fighting in June 2021, before the capital fell, the Taliban executed 22 Afghan Special Forces soldiers (who were a component of the NDS) who had surrendered after running out of ammunition.[1] 

The amnesty was never adhered to.  Many members of the government and armed forces – including those at particularly high risk – interpreters, air force pilots and members of the NDS, the former intelligence service – managed to escape abroad.  Many others, however, were unable (or chose not) to escape and remained in Afghanistan.

Since the Taliban took power, former members of the previous government have been hunted and targeted for revenge attacks.[2]  Former members of the government, therefore, continue to be at very high risk of illegal detention, torture (to extract information or as punishment), “disappearance” and summary execution.[3] 

In November 2021, Human Rights Watch noted:

“Taliban forces in Afghanistan have summarily executed or forcibly disappeared more than 100 former police and intelligence officers in just four provinces since taking over the country on August 15, 2021, despite a proclaimed amnesty, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.”[4] 

In April 2022 a New York Times study developed this research further and put the figure at closer to 500.  It is highly likely that many other deaths and disappearances remain unaccounted for:

“The revenge killings were widespread, touching every region of the country, shattering families and communities, and giving a lie to the Taliban’s promises of tolerance and moderation.  After initially denying that such killings were occurring, the Taliban leadership has come to acknowledge some of them, though has insisted that those acts were the work of rogue commanders and not an authorized campaign.  But the number of killings, and their ubiquity, might suggest otherwise. So would their ruthlessness, including summary executions that were captured on video…”[5]

A UNAMA report, ‘Human Rights in Afghanistan, 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022’, summarised the human rights situation since the Taliban came to power.  With regard to the plight of former members of the Afghan armed forces it stressed the following findings:

“On 17 August 2021, the de facto authorities announced an amnesty for former government officials and Afghan National Security and Defense Force members. This amnesty does not, however, appear to have been consistently upheld, with UNAMA recording at least 160 extrajudicial killings of former government and security officials by members of the de facto authorities between 15 August 2021 and 15 June 2022.

UNAMA is concerned about the impunity with which members of the de facto authorities appear to have carried out human rights violations. UNAMA’s report details extrajudicial killings of individuals accused of affiliation with armed groups, as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments and extrajudicial killings of individuals accused of ‘moral’ crimes and the excessive use of force by law enforcement officials…Over the reporting period, UNAMA documented…160 extrajudicial killings, 178 arbitrary arrests and detentions, 23 instances of incommunicado detention and 56 instances of torture and ill-treatment of former ANDSF and government officials carried out by the de facto authorities.”[6]

In September 2022, Afghan media reported the following case:

“A former member of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) has died after being detained and severely tortured by the Taliban in a prison.  According to sources, the victim’s name was Khan Mohammad and he was a resident of Surobi district of Kabul.  About a week ago, he was arrested near his home in Kabul and taken to the prison of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate.

Mohammad’s body was handed over to his family members at 9:00 pm on Wednesday night this week.  The victim’s friends confirm that he died of deep wounds just two hours after being released.  So far, the motive behind his detention is not yet reported and the Taliban have not commented on the case either.

Previously, many cases of arrest, torture and even killing of former military personnel by the Taliban have been reported.”[7]

A similar incident against a former NDS officer was reported in December 2022:

“A former national security officer was killed mysteriously in southern Kandahar province.  Independent sources identified the victim as Mujahid Barak, explaining that he disappeared last Thursday in the vicinity of the 4th police district of Kandahar city.  According to sources, the body of this person was found on Friday (December 16th) in Mianko mountains, PD9, Kandahar city.

Mujahid Barak served in the National Directorate of Security (NDS) of during the former republic government.  Mujahid’s relatives said that he was killed by the Taliban. But the Taliban in Kandahar have not commented on how this NDS officer was killed.

Mysterious killing of members of the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in Kandahar is not unprecedented. Not long ago, numerous ANDSF members were killed in Spin Boldak district.”[8]

There have been several similar reports in January 2023.[9]  The information environment in Afghanistan is extremely difficult: journalists are harassed and targeted if they report information that is perceived by the Taliban to be critical of them.  Humanitarian organisations will struggle to investigate reports because of the still volatile security situation. It is likely that there are many more incidents of harassment, illegal detention, violence and killings going unreported.

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[1] ‘Taliban executes 22 Afghan commandos who surrendered – witnesses’, TRT World, 13 July 2021, https://www.trtworld.com/asia/taliban-executes-22-afghan-commandos-who-surrendered-witnesses-48333

[2] Scollen, M., ‘Taliban Takes Revenge On Former Security Forces’, RFE/RL, 12 Oct. 2021, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-revenge-afghan-security-forces/31505696.html and  Rubin, T., ‘Afghans who helped U.S. face Taliban revenge if we don’t save them now’, Trib Extra, 22 Oct. 2021, https://triblive.com/tribextra/trudy-rubin-afghans-who-helped-us-face-taliban-revenge-if-we-dont-save-them-now/

[3] ‘Dozens of former Afghan forces killed or disappeared by Taliban, rights group says’, BBC News, 30 Nov. 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59474965

[4]  ‘No Forgiveness for People Like You’, Human Rights Watch, 30 Nov. 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/30/no-forgiveness-people-you/executions-and-enforced-disappearances-afghanistan

[5] Marcolini, B., Sohail, S., and Stockton, A., ‘The Taliban Promised Them Amnesty.  Then They Executed Them’, The New York Times, 12 Apr. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/12/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-revenge.html?te=1&nl=opinion-today&emc=edit_ty_20220412

[6] ‘UN releases report on human rights in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover’, UNAMA press release, 20 July 2022, https://unama.unmissions.org/un-releases-report-human-rights-afghanistan-taliban-takeover#_ftn1

[7] ‘Taliban Rebels Brutally Kill a Former NDS Member’, Hasht e Subh Daily, 9 Sep. 2022, https://8am.media/eng/taliban-rebels-brutally-kill-a-former-nds-member/

[8] ‘Former NDS Officer Mysteriously Killed in Kandahar’, Hasht-e Subh Daily, 17 Dec. 2022, https://8am.media/eng/former-nds-officer-mysteriously-killed-in-kandahar/

[9] https://www.afintl.com/en/202301055100

Kabul still very vulnerable to terror attacks.

On Monday December 12, a terror attack, including a suicide bomber, targeted a hotel in Kabul frequented by Chinese workers.  The attack was claimed by Islamic State and this seems to be the most likely explanation.  The building caught fire for a period.  The number of casualties are still unclear.  China has admitted to some injuries amongst its citizens.  But neither the Taliban nor Chinese regimes are known for openly sharing information.  One hospital reported three dead and 18 injured.  In other security incidents, the Taliban have prevented journalists from accessing the area, interviewing witnesses and assessing likely casualties. On some occasions after incidents the Taliban have reportedly beaten journalists to prevent the Taliban losing control of the media narrative.

The attack on Chinese workers came only days after Chinese diplomats held talks with the Taliban regime.  China has been a serious investor in Afghanistan since 2001, notably with the Aynak copper mines, and may yet play a part in boosting the Taliban’s political credibility and developing the Afghan economy.  The Taliban cannot afford to embarrass the Chinese regime.  The Russian embassy had recently experienced a nearby explosion.  On 13 December China appeared to have advised its citizens to leave Afghanistan.

The city is still very vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  This time the Taliban have the role of defensive, anti-terrorist security forces, protecting the people and infrastructure of the city against insurgent groups such as Islamic State.  The Taliban security forces do not look particularly capable and protecting a large city is extremely hard – as the international community found out over a period of twenty years while the Taliban were the prime assailants.  International groups – NGOs, aid agencies, embassies, diplomats and associated infrastructure will remain viable targets for Islamic State.  The Taliban will struggle to match this terror threat and will give a harsh response to anyone who points out Taliban failings – journalists in particular.

Ethnic groups and minorities are also at risk from terror attacks.  Islamic State is believed to be deliberately targeting the Shia Muslim Hazara community in Kabul (and elsewhere).  From Islamic State’s perspective, anything that undermines the Taliban’s diplomatic, economic and social position is a worthwhile target.  Triggering a new internal conflict between ethnicities is a high priority for Islamic State.

A non-exhaustive list since 2021:

15 October 2022: “News sources reported Saturday evening that the blast was heard from the second security district of Kabul.  Kabul Police Command spokesman confirmed the blast and announced that the explosion occurred next to the wall of a security checkpoint in the second security district.”[1]

30 September 2022: “A suicide bomb attack on an education center in Kabul has killed at least 25 people, most of whom are believed to be young women, in the latest sign of the deteriorating security situation in the Afghan capital.”[2]

5 August 2022: “The Islamic State (IS) militant group claimed responsibility for a deadly blast on Friday in a Shi’ite residential area in Afghanistan’s capital Kabul.  Police said at least eight people were killed and 18 wounded in the blast.”[3]

19 April 2022: “At least six people have been killed and 11 others wounded, including students, in a suspected twin suicide bombing outside a boys’ school in western Kabul.”[4]

8 February 2022: “An explosion was reported in the Khair Khana area of Kabul late Feb. 8. Local news sources indicate the blast was caused by a bomb that targeted a Taliban vehicle. No casualties have been reported due to the explosion, though officials may provide updates in the coming hours. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the blast.”[5]

16 January 2022: “A child has died and four Taliban soldiers wounded after a bomb blast in the Afghan capital city of Kabul, the ministry of interior affairs has said.  A roadside mine targeted an Islamic Emirate military vehicle on Sunday in Kabul’s Bagrami district…”[6]

3 January 2022: “An explosion took place in limits of the 11^th police district of Kabul on Monday morning, an official said.  Aqil Jan Azam, deputy spokesman for the Ministry of Interior, said: ‘A landmine went off close to the 11^th police district but caused no life or financial losses.’”[7]

17 December 2021: “A bomb blast targeted the vehicle of a religious scholar, Mawllawi Abdul Salam Abid…three companions suffered slight injuries…the explosion was due to a magnetic bomb blast.  The incident occurred on Friday afternoon in the Parwan-e-Si area of PD4 of Kabul city.”[8] 

12 December 2021: “The Taliban fighters shot killed a boy who was attending an engagement function in Kabul…Eyewitnesses…said, they were directed to stop for check post and they did but were shot at in the next one.”[9]

10 December 2021: “Two explosions occurred in western Kabul city on Friday afternoon in which two people were killed and four were injured.”[10]

4 December 2021: “A bomb blast rocked Police District 4 of Kabul, capital of Afghanistan, on Saturday with no casualties confirmed, Interior Ministry spokesman Qari Sayed Khosti said…This is the third blast in Kabul since Nov. 30.”[11]

2 December 2021: “An armored vehicle of the Islamic Emirate was targeted by a sticky bomb on Thursday morning in Kabul’s Police District 4, General Mobin, spokesman of Kabul security department, told TOLOnews.”[12]

30 November 2021: “At least two people were injured in a blast that occurred in Kabul’s Police District 6 on Tuesday morning, officials said.  General Mobin, spokesman of Kabul security department, said the explosion was due to a mine placed in the area.  No group has claimed responsibility for the explosion.”[13]

17 November 2021: “At least four civilians were killed and two others wounded in a bomb attack targeting a public mini-bus in the western part of Kabul, capital of Afghanistan on Wednesday, an eyewitness said.”[14]

15 November: “At least two people were wounded in a roadside bomb blast that occurred on Monday morning in Police District 5 of Kabul city, officials said. Initially there was a report of no casualties, but the spokesman for the Kabul security department, General Mobin Khan, confirmed that two people were injured in the blast.[15]

13 November 2021: “A magnetic bomb attached to a passenger minivan exploded in a heavily Shi’ite area of the Afghan capital Kabul on Saturday, causing an unknown number of casualties…One Taliban official…said six people had been killed and at least seven wounded in the blast in the Dasht-e Barchi area of western Kabul.”[16]

2 November 2021: “More than 20 people have been killed and at least 16 injured in a gun and bomb assault on a military hospital in the Afghan capital Kabul.  An affiliate of the Islamic State group, IS-K, later said it had carried out the attack.”[17]

29 October 2021: “Gunmen on a motorcycle brandished small arms and fired on a broadcast journalist in his car in the Afghan capital of Kabul, lightly wounding him.”[18]

20 October 2021: “Interior Ministry Spokesman Qari Saeed Khosti confirmed that an explosion took place in PD3 in Kabul on Wednesday morning, adding that a grenade was hurled at security forces in the Dehmazang area…However eyewitnesses claim four people were wounded in the incident.”[19]

3 October 2021: “At least five civilians were killed in a bomb blast at the entrance to a Kabul mosque Sunday, a Taliban official said, describing the deadliest attack in the Afghan capital since U.S. forces left at the end of August.  There was no immediate claim of responsibility, but suspicion fell on Islamic State extremists…”[20]

22 September 2021: “Unidentified gunmen have shot dead a child and injured his father in limits of the 12th police district of Kabul.”[21]

30 August 2021: “The Islamic State (IS) group claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on Kabul airport on Monday as the United States rushes to complete its withdrawal from Afghanistan.”[22] 

26 August 2021: “The Islamic State in Khorosan Province (ISKP) has claimed responsibility for the deadly explosions which occurred on Thursday evening, local time, amid ongoing evacuations from the country in the wake of the Taliban takeover.  More than 160 people, including 13 United States troops, were killed, according to media reports.”[23]

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[1] https://iranpress.com/content/67564/blast-reported-afghanistan-kabul

[2] https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/30/asia/kabul-explosion-education-center-intl-hnk/index.html

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/blast-hits-afghanistans-capital-kabul-official-2022-08-05/

[4] https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/many-students-killed-and-wounded-explosions-outside-boys-school-kabul

[5] https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2022/02/afghanistan-explosion-reported-in-khair-khana-area-of-kabul-late-feb-8

[6] https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-01-16/One-child-dead-4-soldiers-wounded-in-Kabul-explosion-16S2zj6QZc4/index.html

[7] https://pajhwok.com/2022/01/03/explosion-rocks-kabul-causes-no-damage/

[8] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-175927

[9] https://www.khaama.com/taliban-guns-down-boy-in-kabul/

[10] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-175823

[11] https://oriental.news/2021/12/04/blast-rocks-kabul-no-casualties-confirmed/

[12] https://twitter.com/TOLOnews/status/1466280727474024449

[13] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-175685

[14] http://www.news.cn/english/asiapacific/2021-11/17/c_1310316812.htm

[15] https://tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan-175465

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/blast-hits-shiite-area-afghan-capital-kabul-residents-official-2021-11-13/

[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59133026

[18] https://www.voanews.com/a/journalist-survives-attack-by-gunman-in-kabul-/6292593.html

[19] https://ariananews.af/grenade-thrown-at-security-forces-in-kabul-city/

[20] https://www.npr.org/2021/10/03/1042830210/kabul-afhanistan-mosque-attack-taliban?t=1637225856922

[21] https://pajhwok.com/2021/09/22/6-year-old-gunned-down-father-wounded-in-kabul/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

[22] https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210830-rockets-target-kabul-airport-as-us-forces-rush-to-complete-afghan-pullout

[23] https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/08/1098602

The Taliban don’t know what to do about Afghanistan’s problems

A version of this article appeared in the Nine Dash Line Journal in September 2022.

Last March, I was preparing to grudgingly welcome the Taliban’s long overdue opening of Afghanistan’s education system to girls and young women. I was intending to advise caution: educational privileges for women could be stopped at any time, and receiving a viable curriculum would depend on many other factors that the Taliban still controlled, such as resources, subjects, access, chaperoned movement, and appropriate teachers. At the last minute, the Taliban reversed their decision, offering little clear articulation for their sudden change of plan and demonstrating spectacularly poor management of policy and presentation.

Afghanistan’s parlous state

After twelve months of Taliban rule, it is no surprise to find that Afghanistan remains in a parlous state. The Taliban inherited a weak and war-torn state (largely caused by themselves), and 75 per cent of their government budget is dependent on international community handouts. Although they had twenty years to come up with a concept of governance, the Taliban have flailed — they are cautious, incoherent, ineffective, lacking in transparency, and entirely devoid of inclusivity. They appear more concerned with maintaining internal cohesion and enforcing ‘morality’ than with establishing a competent government.

Afghanistan’s economic and humanitarian challenges have already been well-documented — unemployment, famine, and population displacement. Poverty levels have led to desperate measures, including selling children and body parts. Now, flash floods are compounding this tragedy. Although the information is harder to verify, ‘ugly’ stories concerning the impact on society (particularly the Taliban’s vision of the role of women) are also emerging, telling of suicides, self-immolation, disappearances, murders, rapes, and forced and child marriages.

A collapse back into civil war is not inevitable, but the Taliban are clearly struggling to move from an insurgency to a government.

Traditional approaches from the international community — offering aid in exchange for engagement and human rights concessions — have made little headway. Sanctions are hurting the population. The Taliban’s reprehensible approach to human rights has made dialogue difficult. The Taliban’s response to internal dissent has been brutal. Female demonstrators, protesting the education ban, are dispersed by whip or by gun, or, more ominously, have simply disappeared. Journalists are harried, beaten, and killed. There are multiple credible reports of killings of previous government members and of civilians suspected of supporting anti-Taliban groups. Armed resistance to the Taliban is developing in two forms: indigenous forces, such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), and international terrorist forces, such as the Islamic State. Neither yet controls significant numbers of fighters or territory.

A collapse back into civil war is not inevitable, but the Taliban are clearly struggling to move from an insurgency to a government. The implied direction of the country so far is not encouraging, but it is hard to make firm judgements. Analysis of conditions remains difficult: journalism is extremely hazardous, and the Taliban regime has harassed or violently targeted much of the Afghan media. Think tanks, NGOs, aid agencies, and other groups that might normally provide valuable and credible information are also experiencing difficulties operating. The Taliban have always been an exceptionally opaque and difficult-to-penetrate organisation — in that regard, nothing has changed in the 12 months since August 2021. The American drone strike that recently killed Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul reminded the Taliban leadership that they are never entirely safe, which is likely to keep them somewhat reclusive for purposes of self-preservation.

The Taliban’s approach to governance resembles a religious dictatorship. Women are not included in any form of public office. Religious credentials and status within the Taliban appear to be the key determinant of ministerial appointment or other positions of power. There is little evidence of development in terms of technology, modern skills, or experience in the government ministries, with the possible exception of technologies of intelligence and control (i.e., ID cards and biometric databases) and military capabilities (i.e., restoring the air force).

Factors in the Taliban’s favour are time-sensitive

Certain factors are operating in the Taliban’s favour. Fighting is largely absent across the country. They control the reins of government and 99 per cent of the country’s territory and borders. They are, for the moment at least, able to suppress anti-Taliban forms of protest and media. The Taliban look to find favour among parts of the population by placing blame on the international community, and the Americans in particular (e.g., twenty years of devastation, lack of humanitarian aid, and lack of financing for the Afghan banking system). These factors are, however, time-sensitive.

The Taliban’s religious dictatorship comes with a distinct set of problems. The regime appears reliant on a supreme leader, about whom little is known. His accessibility is closely guarded, surrounded by a narrow clique of ‘worthy’ Taliban members in Kandahar, from which he rarely ventures. Such a narrow authoritarian structure will be constantly looking over its shoulder to identify and suppress manifestations of dissent and protest, both within the ranks of the Taliban and across the wider population. Although the Taliban will press on with developing its intelligence service’s ability to monitor, trace, and target anti-Taliban sentiment, it currently relies on crudely violent, and often indiscriminate, forms of social control. Reaching out to the population through reason and conciliation looks beyond the Taliban.

Internal struggles

The Taliban’s self-representation as representing the infallible will of God prohibits doubt or uncertainty. The internal debates of the Taliban remain largely hidden. The Afghan ulema — religious scholars, mullahs, and mawlawi — may have a key role to play in moderating some of the Taliban’s harsher edicts and allowing engagement with the international community. A gathering of around 4,500 Afghan ulema took place in late June 2022, but it seems no real decisions were made, making the effort more of a rubber-stamp exercise to endorse the Taliban’s authority.

There are indications of division between hardliners and moderates, although the nature of the debates is unclear. Some — perhaps many — Taliban believe that women should receive an education. Many Taliban actually send their own daughters to school. There are many highly educated and respected Islamic scholars, inside and outside of the country, who could engage in forms of religious diplomacy to help broker constructive debate. But for the Taliban, to be perceived as losing a religious argument (about the hijab, women’s education, human rights, or application of Sharia law) would damage their credibility.

Religious performativity

This may explain some of the paralysis, caution with decision-making, and failure to explain themselves to the population. Perhaps this is why much of the Taliban’s religious engagement has varied from province to province and has focused on the ‘performative’ aspect — men with guns and whips, harassing, threatening, and beating the population for their choices of clothing, hair length, and music.

There is no evidence yet of a serious attempt to re-work the constitution or to implement Sharia law nationwide. The risk for the Taliban in moving towards their vision of Afghanistan under Sharia law is that they will place themselves at odds with Islamic scholars and Islamic extremists (for example, on the issue of the hijab, women’s education, or human rights in general). The Taliban’s interpretation of Islam (and their ability to explain and justify this interpretation) may be found wanting if they hold it up to public scrutiny. Perhaps this explains why the Taliban have been slow to move on substantive religious issues, focusing instead on beard lengths and clothing.

Over the next year or two, the risks of resistance to the Taliban rule appear to come from six possible directions. Ordered from most to least likely, these are:

• The National Resistance Front and other provincial armed resistance groups
• The Islamic State
• Passive/peaceful popular protests, with women’s protests as a key subset
• Organised political movements — protests organised around individual leaders may rally sizeable local portions of the population on given issues
• Breakaway Taliban groups
• A US (or other) external intervention, such as drone strikes or internal opposition support

At this stage, none of these poses a direct or imminent threat to the Taliban’s control. The absence of nationwide conflict is still greatly in the Taliban’s favour. If the Taliban could come up with a plausible compromise on the issue of women’s education, they might suddenly find themselves with a sizeable chunk of political breathing space. However, if the Taliban’s inertia and inabilities continue to manifest, and the default response to criticism remains brutal, they could be contending with various forms of popular resistance, both peaceful and violent, sooner rather than later.

Spike of violence across Afghanistan

Summary: The Taliban are being confronted with two distinct strands of violence – terror attacks from Islamic State and ambushes from an emerging collection of local anti-Taliban groups.  They will struggle to find the capacity to deal with either.

There has been a surge of violence in Afghanistan over the last few weeks.  This has two main forms, terrorist and guerrilla.  Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) emerged in eastern Afghanistan in late 2014.  They struggled to gain territory and influence, having to fight both the Taliban and the Ghani government.   By 2020 they had suffered significant reverses.  Since the return of the Taliban, they have made efforts to return to the fray – with, by their definition, some success.  Women, children, schools, mosques and civilians going about their daily lives are dream targets for ISKP.[1]  They have claimed responsibility for some recent bloody attacks against Sunni and Shia mosques.  The Shia Hazara community look to be bearing the brunt.[2]  ISKP thrive in failing states.  Their ambition in Afghanistan is to trigger inter-factional fighting between Sunni and Shia. 

The Taliban have no love for Shia Muslims either.  Their security forces, impressively equipped with US Army booty, but poorly schooled in the complex arts of counter-insurgency, do not look capable of dealing with terrorism.  They will struggle to convincingly demonstrate that they are protecting Shia citizens of Afghanistan.[3]  The Taliban appeared keen to minimise media reporting of security incidents by targeting journalists to preventing them from accurately reporting.[4]  If the Taliban are unable to protect Afghan citizens, Afghans may arm themselves.  Some Hazara groups look to be doing this, with the intention of defending themselves from ISKP and the Taliban.[5]

The second strand of violence comes from armed groups opposed to the Taliban’s seizure of power.[6]  Often these bands include former members of the Ghani government and its armed forces.  The National Resistance Front (NRF) declared itself as an anti-Taliban movement within days of the Taliban taking Kabul.  It is led by Ahmad Massoud, son of the legendary Tajik leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud and supported by Amrullah Saleh, a former government intelligence chief and a Vice President at the time of the government collapse.  The NRF have claimed several ambush-style attacks against the Taliban, with a centre of gravity around the provinces of Panjshir and Baghlan, in ideal guerrilla terrain just to the north of Kabul, but sometimes further afield.[7]  Other smaller local anti-Taliban groups appear to be emerging.[8]     

It is very early to gauge where this is going or whether either form of violence will cause the Taliban to falter.  After their own experience with rapid collapse, in late 2001, the Taliban took several years to emerge with a credible insurgency capability tied to a political and propaganda platform.  They had the crucial advantage of a safe haven in western Pakistan.  ISKP do not have any innate popularity in Afghanistan and have always struggled to dominate ground.  Their methods, always brutal, will work against them.  Local Afghan resistance groups may generate more credible momentum in the longer-term, particularly if the Taliban leadership maintain a highly oppressive reliance on religious stricture.  However, if history is any guide, resistance groups will lack focus, bickering over local issues and squabbling over resources.  This will likely dissipate their potential.  And this time, at least, it looks as if the appetite of international powers to invest in and sustain a long-term insurgency is minimal.    

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[1] https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/25/afghanistan-surge-islamic-state-attacks-shia

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61174991

[3] https://www.vox.com/2022/4/23/23038561/afghanistan-terror-attacks-targeted-afghan-minorities

[4] https://twitter.com/Reporterlyaf/status/1520635865089085440

[5] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/3/hazaras-fear-for-future-as-afghanistan-likely-to-slip-into-chaos

[6] https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-resistance-former-government-factions/31823881.html

[7] https://8am.af/eng/attack-claim-by-nrf-forces-on-taliban-base-near-balkh-international-airport/

[8] https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-fighting-season-ushers-in-new-anti-taliban-groups/6542148.html