Summary: The Taliban’s official announcement that the annual Spring operations will commence on Friday 24th April. In a routine and predictable statement, the Taliban urge additional efforts against Western and Afghan government military and official personnel while promising to avoid causing civilian casualties and never to target religious and educational institutions.
The Taliban website has just started to carry the Leadership Council’s official announcement that Spring Operations will commence on Friday 24th April.
The Spring offensive – a resumption of more sustained military activities – generally heralds the start of the annual “fighting season” stretching from April/May to October/November in which operations are not hampered by the cold weather.
The title of this year’s operations is “Azm” or “Resolve” and the Taliban also link the choice of date for the announcement to the battle of Yarmouk, a decisive “victory for early Muslims”, in the year 636.
Treading a well-worn path (official announcements began in 2008), the Taliban declaration highlights the need to continue the Jihad and singles out Western forces (“their permanent bases, their intelligence and diplomatic centers”) and Afghan security and government personnel (“especially their intelligence, interior ministry and defense ministry officials”) as their primary targets. Tactics offered are similarly a repeat of previous years: “martyrdom” (ie suicide) attacks, “infiltration” (ie “Green on Blue”, “insider” or dressing as Afghan security members), “heavy and long-range missiles” and “guerrilla attacks in all major cities”.
A paragraph is dedicated to explaining that the Taliban will not target civilians, neither will they target mosques or schools, Any mujahideen transgressor will be punished according to Sharia.
There is a small suggestion that NGOs, perhaps the Red Cross, might be permitted to operate in Taliban-controlled areas “…if some welfare organisations or individuals want to help the masses, we will support their activities according to our procedures in the light of Islamic rules…”.
Afghan government and security personnel are again exhorted to desert and promised “secure and peaceful living conditions for all the officials and individuals who quit the enemy ranks”.
Statement by the Leading Council of the Islamic Emirate regarding the inauguration of Spring Operations called ‘Azm’ (Resolve)
In the name of Allah, the most Gracious, the most Merciful.
Allah Almighty says in the Holy Quran:
And fight them until there is no persecution and religion is wholly to Allah. But if they desist, then surely ALLAH is Watchful of what they do.)
O our devout countrymen and Mujahidin!
Due to your previous thirteen years of pious Jihad, the crusader invaders led by America were compelled to withdraw a major part of their invading forces from Afghanistan.
Though the occupying forces have announced the termination of their military operations inside Afghanistan but in reality they have preserved the control of our land and air-space under the spiteful ‘Bilateral Security Agreement’ and similarly, their occupation in political, cultural, educational, propaganda and other spheres has not ceased. The foreign occupiers are still carrying out drone strikes and night operations against the civilian people and have absolute control over the military and fighting command and control system of the heterogeneous regime under the so called ‘Bilateral Security Agreement’.
Since our vigilant people have been expert in detecting the occupation and they can easily discern it in all its visible and invisible forms therefore the foreign occupiers cannot divert the devout Afghan nation from their mission of Jihadi struggle by merely changing their fighting tactics. If the foreign occupiers really want to relieve themselves from this nuisance of fighting, they should immediately withdraw all their remaining forces and military, intelligence and special operation units from Afghanistan and should abandon both the illegitimate occupation and interference in the affairs of our country.
For the complete liberation of our beloved homeland from the yoke of foreign occupation and for the implementation of Islamic rule throughout the country, the Islamic Emirate is determined to prolong the ongoing Jihad against the foreign invaders as well as their internal stooges.
For this purpose, the Islamic Emirate is going to launch the spring operations under the inspirational name of ‘Azm’ (i.e. Resolve, Perseverance or Determination) with the chants of ‘Allah-o-Akbar’ (Allah is the Greatest) at 5 a.m. on the following Friday, 5th Rajab 1436 A.H (lunar), 4th Taurus 1394 A.H. (solar), 24th April 2015.
The name ‘Azm’ and the date 5th Rajab are adopted for good omen as ‘Azm’ means resolve or determination and those messengers of Allah Almighty who showed perseverance against His enemies have been celebrated as ‘Determined Messengers’
(Have patience, then, as the Messengers, possessed of high resolve.)
Similarly, Allah Almighty has advised perseverance and trust in Him after consultation regarding virtuous deeds.
(And when thou art resolved, then put thy trust in ALLAH. Surely, ALLAH loves those who put their trust in Him.)
Hope that Allah Almighty will bestow our Muslim masses with an even stronger Jihadi ‘Azm’ and fervor in these operations against the infidels and their debaucheries. As 5th of Rajab (seventh lunar month of Islamic calendar) has been decided the inaugural date for these operations as this was the date of a historic victory for the early Muslims and an admonitory defeat for the western infidel forces on fifteenth year of Hijra (i.e. migration) in the battle of ‘Yarmouk’. We trust in Allah Almighty that these spring operations will be a fatal blow for all western infidel forces who invaded our country.
The main targets of these operations called ‘Azm’ which have been planned by the Leadership of the Islamic Emirate and the professional and skilled specialists of our ‘Military Commission’ will be the foreign occupiers especially their permanent military bases, their intelligence and diplomatic centers, officials of the stooge regime, their military constellations, especially their intelligence, interior ministry and defense ministry officials and other pernicious individuals. As usual, advanced fighting techniques will be exercised in these military operations of ‘Azm’. Martyrdom seeking attacks for the devastation of infidels, infiltration attacks among the enemy ranks, attacking the huge and relatively fortified centers of the enemy with heavy and long-range missiles, confrontational attacks against the already demoralized mercenary forces of the enemy and guerrilla attacks in all major cities are among the main tactics of these operations.
Mujahidin will execute their plans with great care and deliberation in all parts of the country during these spring operations called ‘Azm’ in which top priority will be given to safeguarding and protecting the lives and properties of the civilian people. And those Mujahidin who are negligent and careless in preserving the lives and properties of the civilian people and their operations result in the civilian losses or casualties, will be panelized according to Jihadi and Sharia rules and regulations. Similarly, consistent with its policies, the Islamic Emirate has never and will never target religious and other educational institutions like mosques, madrassas, schools, universities, health centers like clinics and hospitals, public buildings and other projects of public welfare.
The Islamic Emirate reverently anticipates from the whole Muslim nation to even more inclusively support Mujahidin for the success of these virtuous operations as they have done in the past. Similarly they are advised to remain at a considerable distance from the military constellations and centers so that they are not hurt while operations are executed. The Islamic Emirate is quite considerate in resolving your issues in the light of Islamic Sharia system and in the prevailing circumstances, if some welfare organizations or individuals want to help the masses, we will support their activities according to our procedures in the light of Islamic rules and regulations.
Similarly, we once again call upon all the military and civilian officials and workers of the stooge regime to depart the invaders for fulfilling their Islamic and Afghani obligation and to unite with their own Muslim people. Mujahidin are ready as ever to provide secure and peaceful living conditions for all the officials and individuals who quit the enemy ranks.
In the end, we want to remind our courageous Mujahidin that Jihad is a type of worship and the purity of intention plays a crucial role in it. Instead of status, fame, boon or any other mean worldly benefits, the objective of your Jihad should be wholly and solely the elevation of the Word of Allah. Religious obligations, the training rules and regulations of Jihad and its procedures should be strictly observed. You should obey your elders and leaders. You should deal with and respect your masses just like a part of your own body. Live like brothers among yourselves. Do not be deceived by the enemy propaganda. Remain steadfast and consistent in adversities. Only trust in Allah and rely upon people’s support as the Holy Quran says:
(But if you show patience and fortitude and act righteously, that indeed is a matter of high resolve.)
The Taliban seem to be stuck with this formula now – to significantly change timing, style, content or intent would be unusual and would likely fuel speculation that something was amiss. I have analysed previous annoucements here, and here. The announcement is a little earlier than usual (the earliest since the 2008 beginning of these statements) and, with a word count of just over 1,000, is the longest thus far, although I would be wary of assigning any real significance to this. The choice of the title for the year, “Resolve”, seems more conservative and less ambitious than previous years – perhaps a recognition that 2009’s “Victory” and 2010’s “Success” might be a little open to the critique of hindsight. In fact, perhaps the reverse is occurring: words like “patience”, “resolve”, “determined”, “determination” and “perseverance” have crept into the statement this year. Is there a sense amongst the Taliban that an ISAF withdrawal does not guarantee government collapse or that there is some understandable war-weariness amongst the ranks and leadership?
I have a simple table here, compiling a list of all previous official announcements:
There is no reference to politics or diplomacy – and certainly no hint of new rivals (Islamic State). The security dynamics remain unremarked other than to reiterate that a small number of US soldiers in Afghanistan is as bad as a large number, in terms of Jihad. This is a straightforward declaration that the fight continues. If the format remains the same, we should expect to see some “complex attacks” – multiple suicide and guerrilla attacks, particularly in population centres, on or around the 24th and the days and weeks afterwards. Attacks into Kabul will remain a strong Taliban goal – the media profile of an assault into the capital is still prized – but the Afghan security forces have had quite a lot of experience in dealing with incidents here. Other population centres – Kandahar, Mazar, Jalalabad, Herat, for example, might provide a more fruitful way of expending Taliban martyrs. But Taliban operations over a given year of operations generally resemble a gradual rising tide through the summer, rather than a torrent, with occasional “spikes” of activity.
Summary: Georgia’s relationship with Russia has been complex, intertwined and fraught. A brief 2008 conflict between the two shows that these problems still remain. Georgia’s bid to join NATO is highly provocative to Russia and will likely provide more friction (and perhaps even more conflict) into the future
Georgia, in the Caucasus region, has as much right to describe itself the crossroads between East and West as other places I have visited – Bosnia, Turkey, Afghanistan. In fact, if you draw a straight line between the Balkans and Afghanistan, Georgia seems to be more or less right in the middle. This perhaps explains the mash of cultures, language, cuisine that is so immediately evident when you hit the ground. I was in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, over the first week of April. It was an excellent introduction to the region, courtesy of the Malmö University Association of Foreign Affairs.
We had a selection of meetings lined up, including European embassies, the UN and Georgian government representatives, as well as our own unofficial explorations of the city, people and surrounding area. The theme of the trip was to explore perspectives on the desire and prospects for Georgian membership of NATO and the EU.
But let’s get the essentials out of the way first – the food and wine (Georgians will explain that it was they who “invented” wine and vineyards around 7,000 years ago) was excellent and cheap. The people were extremely welcoming and friendly. Get there for your holiday before it becomes Pragueified… :)
A very tiny, very orthodox Christian, country, Georgia has been squashed between larger empires for thousands of years: Greeks, Romans, Mongols, Russians/Slavs from the north, Turks/Ottomans from the south-west and Iranian/Persians from the south-east. It first appeared as a “Georgia” in the 9th/10th centuries. It had a “Golden Age” around the 12th and 13th centuries under King David “The Builder” and his great grand-daughter, Queen Tamar. Georgia’s relationship with Russia has been very complex and intertwined – and very much “love/hate”. In the aftermath of the First World War, Georgia became a democratic country. But this lasted only three years, from 1918 to 1921, when a Russian (Red) Army occupied the country.
The permanent exhibition in the Georgian National History Museum focus on this period of brutal repression “The Soviet Occupation of Georgia, 1921 – 1991”. A key feature was list upon list of the intelligensia, artists, priests, teachers and academics imprisoned and executed during this time. The entrance to this exhibition plays on a large screen, accompanied by menacing music, a looped five minute video of the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia.
We sat down with a Georgian professor of history at the Tbilisi National University, and I always find it helpful to set down my notes, so here is a non-comprehensive and subjective overview of Georgian past, present and a little future. I have augmented as necessary, to keep the narrative and historic flow.
The ancient Greeks, Romans, Mongols, Ottomans and Persians were all over the region until medieval times and then the expanding Russian empire also added its interest. Georgia has been Christian since the 4th century AD. There were many periods of fragmentation as a result of much fighting and there were many ethnic sub-groups emerging as a result. In the late 18th century (1783) a peace treaty was signed with Russia in which Georgia became a Russian protectorate. (I guess you can already see where this is going, can’t you?).
In 1795, a Persian invasion reached and burned Tbilisi and in 1800 the Russian Tsar Paul I announced that Georgia was a part of Russia (although apparently, the Georgians only found this in in 1801).
In 1918, for the first time, Georgia elected a democratic government and fought a short conflict with Armenia offer disputed regions. In 1920 a short-lived Transcaucasus Federation attempted to pull together the region now covered by Armenia, Abkhazia and Georgia. This was opposed by Turkey. In May 1920, Georgia declared independence. German troops had been based on Georgia to deter Turkish aggression. These were replaced by British troops for a period after Germany’s First World War defeat.
Although in 1920, the Soviet government recognised Georgia’s declaration of independence, this was revoked in 1921 and a Red Army sent into Georgia. Although initially rebuffed with losses, Russian occupation of Armenia and Abkhazia permitted attacks on several fronts and Georgia was defeated and occupied. A Georgian government in exile fled first to Batumi on the coast, then to Turkey and then Paris. From 1921 to 1991, Georgia was a Soviet Republic whose most (in)famous son still seems to be Joseph Stalin.
There is still “nostalgia” for the Soviet Union time – things were much more stable and predictable with rule of law.
The death of Stalin, in 1953, heralded the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union, with corruptions of various sorts beginning to emerge in the 1950s and 60s. Russia remains suspicious of “democracy”. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw the emergence of extreme forms of nationalism and “complete turmoil”. Where Western analysts were talking about the “next wave of democratisation”, in its place there was organised crime, corruption and failed states.
Security, conflict and NATO
In 1991/92, as a result of the confusion and turmoil of the Soviet Union’s break up, Georgians fought South Ossetian separatists in a brief conflict. A similar conflict broke out in Abkhazia in 1992/93 with similar results. This left Russian-backed forces effectively (and still) in control of two parts of Georgia. Concerned for its security, Georgia has been reaching out to NATO and NATO-led institutions since 1992, when it joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994. Official discussions about NATO membership began in 1998, with joint exercise in Poti in 2001. In 2004, Georgia contributed troops to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. More discussions and cooperation followed over 2005 and 2006. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, Georgia failed to receive a consensus to receive a concrete Membership Action Plan and has been pressing for it ever since. Georgia claims that NATO membership is the essential guarantor of its security and for ensuring stability in the region. Russia claims that the aggressive expansion of NATO is a provocation and a threat to Russian and the region.
In 2008, Georgia and Russia fought a five day conflict over South Ossetia. Georgia lost it, but Russian military capability was exposed for its weaknesses. The Georgian government was criticised for poor judgement in its response to initial cross-border shelling and provocation from South Ossetia and the poor levels of preparedness of its NATO-style military.
Georgian society is still divided after this conflict and NATO seems very reluctant to bring in Georgia plus its two frozen conflicts.
Unemployment and poverty are still the top problems inside Georgia. Organised crime was rampant in the 1990s. This was brought under some level of control in the 2000s but now seems to be slipping back again.
I shall feed in some more specific thoughts and discussion from the other meetings in due course.
Summary: The Taliban are likely to announce the commencement of Spring operations in a couple of weeks time.
If the Taliban are true to their behaviour, they will announcement the beginning of a Spring Offensive to take place in Afghanistan. This generally heralds the onset of the “fighting season” which lasts somewhere into October/November.
It is useful to note the timing and content of their official statement. Any significant deviation or variation from previous notifications could well be of interest. If previous years are adhered to, we should expect:
- An official announcement in the last week of April or first week of May
- The operation will be given a name, sometimes after a historic battle or event from early Islamic history, perhaps including the prophet Mohammed took part (eg “Badr”), or a statement of intent (eg “victory). I think names like “victory” and “success” are less likely now – they are slight hostages to fortune when they declare victory to be imminent and do so each year…
- The text will specify targets – foreign forces (although there are much less of those now). government officials and security forces and any Afghan who supports the work of either of these.
- The text will specify tactics generally, but martyrdom attacks (ie suicide bombers) will likely be mentioned
- It will call upon Afghans supporting the regime to defect and promises fair treatment if they do so.
- It may refer to Taliban efforts to limit civilian casualties
There are usually two or three significant “complex attacks” that come in the days and weeks after the announcement, in order to demonstrate capability and credibility. I would expect some combination of suicide attacks and targeting of Afghan government or US military/political buildings – a barracks, an embassy. Kabul is a favoured area in which to operate as it guarantees good media coverage. It may be that these targets are now harder to penetrate inside the capital, however and other regional targets (Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar, Nangarhar…) and personalities might form viable alternatives to be struck.
I shall await with interest. This is the first year after ISAF has closed down and there are no foreign forces on the ground in combat operations. It would be significant if they:
- did not annnouce an offensive
- shifted the tone and content significantly – eg towards new tactics or towards a more politicised statement
lets see what happens.
Summary: Veteran Afghanistan expert, Anders Fänge, gives some thoughts and some words of caution on the current prospects for dialogue with the Taliban.
An interview with Anders Fänge has appeared via RFE. It is worth reading in full as Mr Fänge has some genuine and long-term experience with working in Afghanistan, particularly with the Swedish Afghan Committee. He cautions against assumptions that talks are now likely, worries that other powerbrokers may not have an interest in peace and warns that the act of talking does not mean that anything productive will come of it. He senses that the Taliban themselves are divided on talks and their long-term objectives. Although President Ashraf Ghani and second in command Abdullah Abdullah are both capable and competent, Fänge is worried that the government will not perform effectively and that friction between the two camps will become a problem.
RFE/RL: The Afghan national unity government’s leaders have made some optimistic statements about holding peace talks with the Taliban. Are they going to begin anytime soon?
Anders Fange: There has been some talk — official statements and stuff — for quite some time, but I still haven’t seen someone sitting down at the table and starting a discussion. So it is obvious there are some problems. You don’t enter into negotiations on a banana peel.
Both the Afghan government and the mainstream Taliban have problems. Within the Taliban, the questions is to what extent the leaders who are in favor of talks represent the movement and to what extent they represent the leadership. These are the questions that should be asked.
We can also presume that within the Afghan political elite there are people who aren’t necessarily interested in peace because any peace — the end of armed conflict in Afghanistan — would mean a big step in the direction of a better functioning state and that would diminish these people’s prospects. The opportunities for the narcotics trade and corruption would certainly be diminished.
RFE/RL: Even if the Taliban talks with the Afghan government, what is it actually that the two sides will be haggling over?
Fange: I doubt the Taliban itself even has a single view on these things. I can imagine that if the talks become a reality it will start with things like the exchange of prisoners and other trust-building measures. The other question is that it is difficult to know what is going on among the Taliban leadership, but I can imagine that some people who are in favor of talks won’t abandon their strategic objective of reestablishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the formal name of the Afghan Taliban regime).
They might go into talks to make the Americans and the government relax into thinking everything is going in a positive direction. You might have people in the Taliban leadership who are genuinely wanting peace to stop the suffering of their people.
RFE/RL: But do you see these pragmatic Taliban leaders abandoning their main objective of reestablishing their regime?
Fange: The Taliban is more fragmented now compared with the 1990s, when it ruled Afghanistan and was a very organized and coordinated movement. I am quite convinced that within the Taliban, possibly among the leadership and definitely out among the field commanders, there are people who are not in favor of any peace talks. They want to continue the struggle until they have reestablished their Islamic emirate.
RFE/RL: How would you characterize this fragmentation within the Taliban? Is it a friction between the fugitive Taliban leadership in exile in Pakistan and the field commanders and foot soldiers operating inside Afghanistan?
Fange: With their leadership in exile and foot soldiers and field commanders inside the country, the commanders have more authority now than they had before. There is also more room for expressing different opinions. Previously, and I suppose now, Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) is moving in, and [it] is trying to create links with commanders who oppose the leadership for whatever purpose of trying to control the Taliban movement in a better way.
RFE/RL: You have known the Afghan government leaders President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah personally. I think Abdullah even worked for you in the Swedish Committee in the Panjshir Valley in the 1980s. How different are they, and what is your assessment of their working relationship so far?
Fange: If you listen to these two individuals and what they express publicly, it indicates they have a good cooperation. If you listen to their teams and followers, there are signs of differences and even quarrels. There is reason for hope; there is reason for optimism. Although I must say I was more optimistic in November than I am now. The absolute pre-condition for any success of the national unity government is that this cooperation between Ghani and Abdullah lasts and functions.
In many ways, they complement each other as political figures. Ashraf is the person who wrote the book “Fixing Failed States,” and he obviously has ideas on what to do. Both of them are highly intelligent people. They are knowledgeable.
Of course, they have weaknesses, too. Ashraf is slightly impatient and wants to do things fast, and wants to see quick results. Perhaps Abdullah is a product of the old [anti-Soviet] mujahedin elite, which means he will have to do a lot to fend off criticism from that old elite.
RFE/RL: Since taking office, Ghani has made extraordinary overtures to Pakistan. He is trying to transform the Durand Line border between the two countries into an arena of friendship and cooperation instead of hostility. Is he likely to succeed?
Fange: It is too early to make a conclusive assessment. Some things are happening, obviously. Whether they will result in actual talks or even peace talks, it’s too early to say. What one can say is that Ghani – and, to quite an extent, Abdullah — has jointly gone into this new diplomatic approach toward Pakistan, and there is a growing impatience among Afghan political observers and ordinary people. They want to see results. So I would say the unity government is playing cards with very high stakes, and it is still uncertain what kind of cards they will finally throw on the table.
RFE/RL: Finally, after working in Afghanistan for decades, how optimistic are you about the future of the country?
Fange: I was very optimistic after the emergence of the national unity government. I said that cooperation between the two leaders is an absolute must. If that can work, then I am more optimistic. If it doesn’t, then I will be less optimistic. These two individuals have the potential of lying the foundation and creating the possibilities for a new Afghanistan.
Summary: For no particularly convincing reason, a short, bland and uninformative “biography” of the Taliban leader has now emerged from Taliban official sources. This looks like a failed attempt to regain dwindling relevance and boost profile. The ability to blow up a tank appears to be his highest qualification for running a country. This is a media “fail” by the Taliban.
From official Taliban sources comes a “biography” of Mullah Mohammad Umar (aka Omar). Yes, I have had to use inverted commas almost immediately to describe this 5,366 word document, posted up on the official Taliban website. The apparent trigger for this is “for the prevention of false propaganda” and to celebrate the 19th anniversary of the appointment of Mullah Omar as the “Amir ul Momineem” (Leader of the Faithful) in Kandahar on 4 April 1996. The basic information we are offered here can be summarised:
- Mullah Omar was born in 1960 in Kandahar province, part of the Hotak tribe. His family “comprises scholars and teachers of religious studies”. Omar follows the Hanafi school of religious thought.
- In 1965 the family moved to neighbouring Oruzgan province.
- In 1968 he started religious education. In 1978, at eighteen years of age, he abandoned his religious education during the communist coup and the subsequent Soviet occupation in order to conduct jihad.
- From 1983 to 1991 he fought the Soviets in Oruzgan and Kandahar provinces with the Harakat-e Inquilab-e Islami faction as a local commander of a “front”. In the process he became proficient at using the RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launcher and was wounded three or four times, losing his right eye.
- In 1992, after the withdrawal of the Soviets he returned to his religious studies, setting up a madrassa in Kandahar province.
- With the rise of local warlord groups he became concerned – along with other like-minded former jihadists – at the increasing levels of looting, corruption and exploitation of the local population.
- In 1994 Mullah Omar became the leader of the Islamic Movement, liberating Kandahar and then larger areas of Afghanistan.
- On 4 April 1996, Mullah Omar was confirmed as leader and the title of Amir ul Momineem conferred upon him.
- Mullah Omar has a simple and plain life, without personal wealth or property. Omar “even now does not own an ordinary residence neither has he any cash deposits in any foreign bank accounts”. He supports the claims of Palestinian Muslims “and obligation of every Muslim to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque”.
- He apparently has a “special sense of humour” and “in most of his meetings, he usually speaks about Jihad”. In his free time he studies the Koran and his favourite weapon is the RPG-7.
- He is “still the leader in the present hierarchy of the Islami Emirate of Afghanistan”
Analysis and Outlook If you want to read a good solid biography about a senior Taliban leader, then you should still stick with Mullah Zaeef’s ghost-written work: “My life with the Taliban”. The Omar biography here is significant, but not, I suspect, for the reasons the Taliban might have hoped. What fascinates me is the number of levels on which this fails and I shall try and suggest a few here.
Fail 1: Uninformative The surprising thing is how short, uninformative and lacking the piece is. I cannot think of anything significant that is newly offered here although perhaps there have been a few interpretations of his early origins floating around so we now at least have it officially from the Taliban where and when he was born, underwent religious education and fought. No mention of Al Qaeda or 9/11. The international community “including the United Nations” simply could not tolerate Sharia-based peace and stability in Afghanistan and therefore invaded.
Fail 2: Weird and unexplained timing It is intriguing to contemplate why the Taliban have taken years before they felt it necessary to release what you might consider a basic staple of organisation information. Equally fascinating is the “19th anniversary” justification. I could understand a 5th anniversary, or a 10th and a 15th. A 19th anniversary suggests they feel they need to rush something out. I suspect very strongly that other factors are causing problems for the Taliban. First and foremost that they might be worrying they are drifting off the radar and losing relevance and media profile. The steady flow of references to Islamic State in Afghanistan – from the Afghan government, the media, the UN and analysts point strongly to the idea that the Taliban might be nudged aside.
Fail 3: Mullah Omar comes over very poorly indeed There is no attempt to present Mullah Omar as relevant, capable or even actually doing anything at present. We learn nothing of his skills and competences, leadership or future vision for Afghanistan. He has one international area he seems slightly aware of – the Palestinian issue. Do the people of Afghanistan really want someone who feels it necessary to list his favourite weapon in his biography as a leader of their country? Perhaps better to stick with Ashraf Ghani, who has at least worked for the World Bank. Even the limited anecdotes of his time fighting against the Soviets fail to impress on a military level, emphasising little more than an ability to knock out a few armoured vehicles. Leadership ability? Planning? Strategy? Tactics?
Fail 4: This is weak propaganda The Taliban do not seem to recognise that they have produced something that is limp, uninteresting and highly unlikely to advance any aspect of their cause. The world has greeted this announcement with resounding indifference and perhaps a hint of mild confusion. If you want to see a modern, creative and potent use of traditional and social medias for aggressive propaganda purposes, you should go to Al Qaeda, Islamic State and Russia for examples but probably not the Taliban. The Taliban made significant advances in the field of propaganda since 2001. This was only because their baseline was exceptionally limited, caused by their suspicion, lack of understanding, antipathy and active hostility to media, TV, radio and all forms of communication (barring hand-delivered notes) in the 1990s. But looking back on such progress there was, I sense they probably “plateaued” somewhere around 2008 and haven’t really gone anywhere since with a media strategy. How excited we all got when the Taliban started tweeting. But take a look at their website now for evidence of a continual stream of bland and repetitive nothingness. List upon list of minor combat actions and bodycount. No coherent reach out to anyone, no expansion or development of plans for the country. No political agenda or flexibility of any form (and, believe me, I really have searched over the years for signs of ideas, engagement and a political stance). No recognition that anything has changed in Afghanistan with the withdrawal of ISAF from the battlefield other than to repeat the claim that they have made several times over the years – that victory (however they actually define this) is imminent.
Fail 5: Afghanistan is moving on However slowly and painfully, the Afghan people are moving on – reconstruction, technology, culture, politics, interaction with the world community. The Taliban are showing no evidence here that they recognise this. They are getting left behind. If they do sense anything is wrong, they either have no strategy or, as I suspect more likely, they simply do not care and expect that the virtues of Mullah Omar to speak for themselves and the principles and practice of their previous (mis)rule during the 1990s will suffice.
Fail 6: No proof of life… Is he alive? More information about the role of his second in command is offered than Omar’s command activities. No new photo?
Right now I am in Georgia on a small introductory visit to get a better sense of the country and get a feel for the regional geo-politics. Georgia is extremely keen to join NATO and the EU and is making much progress in these directions.
You perhaps cannot blame them after a trip to the “Soviet occupation of Georgia, 1921 – 1991″ exhibition at the National history museum. A recent (5 day) conflict with Russia in 2008 and recent Russia land grabs in Ukraine spur on this ambition. More reports later – just thought I’d check in to let you know I wasn’t slacking off.
Summary: US to extend the 10,000-soldier post-ISAF deployment to the end of 2015.
The US government has announced a long-anticipated decision to extend the deployment timeframe of the 9,800 US troops still in Afghanistan (USA Today, Washington Post, Tolo). Instead of downsizing by half this year, they will stay in entirety to the end of 2015. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani lobbied the US to achieve this (“deadlines should not be dogmas”). The fate of the residual presence (we can I think call it that – at the peak of ISAF there were something like 110,000 troops, predominantly American, inside Afghanistan) into 2016 is unclear but President Obama seems clear that he will withdraw American forces by the end of 2016 and his presidency.
I am not clear what the impact this slight deadline extension of only a few thousand troops will be. It is another gesture of support to the Afghan regime – a mending of the fences that were broken during the last period of President Hamid Karzai’s tenure. It seems sensible to have a shallow “glidepath” to the process, given so much uncertainty over the security situation inside Afghanistan. There is a high likelihood of a (soon-to-be-announced) Taliban “Spring Offensive” and concerns over the number of Afghan National Security Force casualties.
On 17 March, the analyst Max Boot tweeted
But this was also where the international community was in 2009, when Obama announced that the 2010 surge would be followed by the 2011 withdrawal. Admittedly talks came to nothing, but we did at least see several attempts to talk with the Taliban, including establishing a Taliban office in Qatar.
But does a small US military presence make things better or worse? I guess there are at least two schools of thought about the US presence now. The US boots on the ground act as inflammable materiel to the Taliban’s cause – the Jihad continues as long as one American remains. That is certainly their official line. Alternately, a small continuing US presence does not pose so much risk or cost to the US government and is more or less sustainable indefinitely, depending on the wishes of the Afghan president of the day. In the meantime, the Taliban will simply be killing Muslims. This also presents the Taliban with a harsh reality of a further 10+ years of Jihad in front of them. Might this actually guide the Taliban towards a realisation that a stalemate is inevitable and talks are the only way ahead?
A key consideration should be the issue of “humiliation”. In order for talks to become more plausible, no party should be pushed into a position where they are demonstrated to have “lost”. In this respect, it could be very constructive to have a point in time where US boots are no longer present on Afghan soil in order for the Taliban to be satisfied that they have achieved what they set out to do. Never mind the rights and wrongs of this, as long as it presents a breathing space for Afghans to talk to each other.
Perhaps, by the time we get to mid-2016, we could see a clear signal from the US and Afghan presidents jointly to the effect that: the US forces are now leaving but the Afghan government reserves the right to call again for military assistance in the future if the security situation requires it. In the meantime, international development expertise – economics, finance, reconstruction, etc – is welcome. The Taliban are welcome to take part in this.
A breathing space for all?
Summary: US DoD release statistics for their air strikes against ISIS. Caution needed.
There are lies, damned lies and air campaign battle damage assessments…
Can a war by won by airpower alone? Many people have suggested “yes”, many of them airmen, I think. This has been a big debate since offensive airpower was introduced to the world in the course of the First World War. The US Department of Defense has released US Central Command (CENTCOM) statistics purporting to provide an update on the amount of damage done by US air attacks against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. The list is impressive:
During a daily briefing, Warren said that through yesterday, the international coalition had struck 5,314 targets since operations began Aug. 8. The coalition has conducted 2,893 airstrikes – 1,631 in Iraq and 1,262 in Syria. Total U.S. airstrikes numbered 2,320 – 1,151 in Iraq and 1,169 in Syria.
Several of the line items here are open to definitional query. And ironic, I guess, that they have to have a specific line item for the ISIS-owned but US designed and built High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle – the “Humvee”, much beloved of the US Army, the armed forces of at least 70 other countries and, er, rap stars.
My main point is to urge caution over such statistics. Final confirmation of the level of destruction is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, without “boots on the ground” available to climb over the destroyed equipment. Furthermore, it does not necessarily offer any guarantee that an enemy is necessarily being “defeated”. The NATO Kosovo bombing campaign in 1999 offers a salient lesson here, where targets reported by NATO as Serb Army military hardware destroyed turned out to be nothing of the kind:
The bombing, they discovered, was highly accurate against fixed targets, like bunkers and bridges. “But we were spoofed a lot,” said one team member. The Serbs protected one bridge from the high-flying NATO bombers by constructing, 300 yards upstream, a fake bridge made of polyethylene sheeting stretched over the river. NATO “destroyed” the phony bridge many times. Artillery pieces were faked out of long black logs stuck on old truck wheels. A two-thirds scale SA-9 antiaircraft missile launcher was fabricated from the metal-lined paper used to make European milk cartons. “It would have looked perfect from three miles up,” said a MEAT analyst.
The team found dozens of burnt-out cars, buses and trucks but very few tanks. When General Clark heard this unwelcome news, he ordered the team out of their helicopters: “Goddammit, drive to each one of those places. Walk the terrain.” The team grubbed about in bomb craters, where more than once they were showered with garbage the local villagers were throwing into these impromptu rubbish pits. At the beginning of August, MEAT returned to Air Force headquarters at Ramstein air base in Germany with 2,600 photographs. They briefed Gen. Walter Begert, the Air Force deputy commander in Europe. “What do you mean we didn’t hit tanks?” Begert demanded. Clark had the same reaction. “This can’t be,” he said. “I don’t believe it.” Clark insisted that the Serbs had hidden their damaged equipment and that the team hadn’t looked hard enough. Not so, he was told. A 50-ton tank can’t be dragged away without leaving raw gouges in the earth, which the team had not seen.
This process was known by NATO as Camouflage, Concealment and Deception (CCD). The Russians might recognise it as maskirovka. Major problems with generic “US/NATO/Western” bombing campaigns in the post-WWII past might include:
- Avoidance of risk to pilots. Aircraft will fly at high altitude wherever possible, reducing the risk of being shot down and limiting the chance that a target can be a) accurately identified b) struck.
- Over-reliance on “statistics” as a measure of effectiveness – the more numbers that can be thrown out, the more an artificial impression of “victory” will be achieved.
- Enemy forces evolve their tactics – camouflage, concealment and deception. A pram, two logs and a drain pipe can make for a convincing anti-tank gun to a pilot who is one, two or three miles high…
- Battle Damage Assessment – working out what you actually hit in the aftermath – is difficult without experts physically on the ground to check what has been hit.
- “Dig for Victory” – for every one potential target (ISIS tank, gun, checkpoint…) ISIS can minimise the risk by digging 10 fake positions in and around the area, making the decision-making process of a very fast moving US pilot even harder.
- The bombing campaign’s effectiveness is greatly at risk to media and popular opinion – it just needs one bomb to land on a school or one pilot to be captured and brutally executed. In the first instance, pilots will be required to be much more cautious before releasing weapons. In the second, pilots may fly higher to avoid being shot down, or missions will be limited by the number of rescue teams available to extract downed pilots.
- Human nature. Aside from the high level political drivers, other groups are under strong pressures to declare “success”. Air attacks mean medals and promotion for pilots and commanders. Combat also proves the value of very expensive bits of military hardware, including rockets, missiles, bombs. Billions of dollars are at stake for defence contractors if they can show how good their weapons are in real combat.
Analysis of ISIS’ goals by Graeme Wood earlier this month points to ISIS being very inflexible in their strategic approach – they know what is supposed to happen, who is good, who is bad and how the final conflict is supposed to come about. This rigidity makes them highly predictable and is potentially a significant weakness to be exploited by opponents of ISIS. At the tactical/battlefield level, this will not be the case – I am sure they are already learning from their mistakes and evolving.
I am not arguing against airpower per se – it paralyses, channels, demoralises, pins down and, yes, destroys enemy forces. ISIS’s fighting capability is currently a loose but broadly “conventional” army, occupying terrain and deploying troops and tanks. It is probably easier to strike this sort of force than an enemy operating as small insurgent bands like the Taliban. Inexperienced fighters and those untrained or without the resources to resist air attack will likely find US bombing runs highly stressful. Other information, such as radio intercepts, and reports from the ground (eg social media) will provide vital clues as the status, problems and morale of ISIS forces.
I would certainly not presume to tell you that the US DoD statistics are wrong – or what the level of “wrongness” might be – but I would urge caution and consideration of some of the factors here that might be at play.
The Economist notes that cracks are appearing in ISIS. Beyond noting the damage done to oil revenue from air attacks against oil refinery targets, the air campaign does not get a mention. I wonder how many “Fighting Positions” were simply empty holes on the ground. We will never know. But bombing campaigns may not be as effective as they first look. The NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999 offers a stark reminder.
Summary: Mr Putin’s love of a good chess competition…?
I am a bit late into this “where is the President” story, but I just found this on Twitter. Apparently Mr Putin has opened the Women’s World Chess Championship in Sochi today. If the President’s spokesmen and media machine think this is going to dispell the excitement, I think they will be mistaken. This photograph looks, er, slightly unconvincing, and devoid of any date, time, locational clues, chess logos etc. Breath-taking in its blandness!
Summary: More talks about talks and denials of talks about talks…
The Taliban seem to be in full denial mode:
The media has been publishing false reports periodically over the past week asserting the heating up of negotiations and even fabrications about visits by the delegations of Islamic Emirate.
We reject all such claims. There is no such process taking place and neither can such matters shape up behind closed doors or be kept hidden.
If there was anything taking place in this regard, the Islamic Emirate would have informed the media and its countrymen through its official channels.
But there have been and are still continued hints that they might yet be looking at the possibility of talks in relation to Afghanistan:
ISLAMABAD: Mystery shrouds the much-anticipated talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban as the insurgents have once again dismissed all media reports of dialogue as part of ‘war propaganda’ against the group.
The Taliban have never officially indicated their willingness to join the intra-Afghan dialogue ever since the issue cropped up in the news in Afghanistan over the past few weeks.
Chief Executive Dr Abdullah Abdullah was the first one to officially confirm last month that talks would begin soon. However, Taliban insurgents are adamant in denying all such claims, casting further doubts on the peace process.
The Taliban have been quick in issuing a denial whenever the Afghan and foreign media talk about the process. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid issued yet another denial late Thursday amid indications that some of the Qatar-based Taliban negotiators had visited Pakistan for consultations. Mujahid insisted none of their leaders from the political office have been to any country.
Also this, which developes the plausible idea that China might be involved in some aspect of the deal brokering:
(Reuters) – China has held rounds of talks with the Taliban and asked the Islamist militants to hold direct talks with the Afghan government, the head of Afghanistan’s power sharing government said on Friday.
The Chinese have held “one, two or three” rounds of talks with the Taliban in the past few months, Abdullah Abdullah said at a conference organised by an Indian media group.
“They asked the Taliban to have talks directly with the Afghan government, that’s a good message,” Abdullah said, adding that he did not know what the outcome would be of China’s efforts. China’s foreign minister last month said during a visit to Islamabad that Beijing was willing to help mediate talks to end the Afghan war, but Chinese officials have not provided many details.
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said this week that reports its diplomats in Islamabad met last month with Taliban representatives “do not accord with reality”.
Abdullah, speaking at the India Today Conclave 2015 in New Delhi, did not say where the meetings took place.
He said Afghanistan had begun to improve relations with China under the previous president, Hamid Karzai, with the idea that Beijing could use its influence over Pakistan to help broker peace talks.
China has close ties with Afghanistan’s neighbour Pakistan, which is widely believed to harbour the Taliban’s top leaders and exert considerable control over the group.
In February, a Pakistani army delegation brought word to Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani that Taliban leaders had signalled they were willing to open talks, according to senior Pakistani and Afghan officials.
Since then, senior representatives of the militant group have visited Islamabad where they were told to end a rift between two leaders that could undermine a peace process, two Taliban sources said.
Abdullah’s backing of the nascent process to negotiate an end to the 13-year insurgency is crucial because many of his supporters represent the vehement anti-Taliban wing that fought against the hardline Islamists when they held power until 2001.
As ever it remains difficult to penetrate the smokescreens of this particularly sensitive issue and much of this recent flurry of rumour seems tp come from one source – Abdullah himself. The Taliban blame “secret agencies with sinister goals” for spreading baseless rumours. They will not want to give out any signs of weakness or compromise, particularly as it seems likely that their own ranks are divided as to what should be done – talk or fight. But, with the international forces gone, a new Afghan government, the apparent inability of the Taliban to take and hold viable slices of land and potentially even ISIS tapping them on the shoulder, 2015 might be a good time to at least develop contacts with the Afghan regime in a more coherent and constructive fashion.