Summary: Mark Duffield’s talk at DIIS bemoans the slow loss of “ground truth” in humanitarian operations and introduces new thinking and concerns over the role new technology (e.g. GPS, Geospatial technology, computer-based mapping, satellite…) is playing in increasing the distance between aid workers and the realities of those in need of aid.

Mark Duffield, Emeritus Professor of Development Politics at Bristol University, has provided much provocative analysis and critique on the evolution and current issues surrounding the application of development aid by (predominantly) Western nations operating in failed state areas of the (predominantly Third) world.  In his “Development, Security and Unending War”, he looked at the macro-level; the post-colonial concepts behind, and the diverse applications of, development aid across large parts of the world.  I took his ideas and those of Peter Uvin to look at the militarisation of development in Afghanistan.

Cyber management

At DIIS he gave a talk about what he described as the rise of “cyber-management” in humanitarian affairs.  He said that this was a new area that he had started to look at and was just developing his ideas.  He sketched out the notion that aid workers were increasingly confined (or confining themselves) to protected compounds and making greater use of high tech tools to map, understand and solve humanitarian problems, such as a refugee crisis.  He suggested that “Remote Management” was in part due to the desire to reduce exposure to risk and leads to an increasing the number of layers of local intermediaries between the humanitarian worker and those in need of aid.  International managers of humanitarian aid were increasingly based outside the country of concern and working through locally recruited staff and other intermediaries.  The result is an increasing dependence on technology over “ground truth”.

human beings not featured…

Geo Spatial information: The concept for collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth’s surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation and precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling databases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributed centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also includes instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. Also called GI&S.

Duffield presented the idea of “resilience” – the ability of Third World communities to be self-maintaining and self-repairing in a crisis – as a “neo-liberal business plan”.

Duffield noted the increasing emergence of military technology into the public domain.  It was becoming easier, with the Web 2.0 revolution, for organisations to cheaply access technology that was developed in the end of WWII and during the Cold War by the military – particularly satellite imagery:

• 1993 saw military GPS systems opened up to the civil sector
• 1994, Bill Clinton declassified much military imagery (with DOD retaining “shutter control”)
• Late 1990s – UNHCR started to use satellite imagery to look at refugee camps
• 2001 –  US military agreement with civilian sector

But humanitarian sector lacked funding and expertise to take full advantage of Geo-Spatial Technology (GST).  Duffield is concerned that people in a humanitarian crisis are now being reduced to the role of an environmental problem – technology now mapping the nearness of water, firewood, viable transport routes, etc.  Refugee camps and refugees are now part of the environment and human beings as biological organisms.

IDPs part of the environment

He noted, as an example, Darfur, which was increasingly dangerous for aid workers, with a volatile IDP population.  GST was reducing the need for ground truth in areas that were too dangerous.  Duffield’s major concern was that this new technology was normalising the absence of ground truth – it was becoming increasingly acceptable.  In this way, GST was simultaneously “solving” the problem of remoteness by providing an alternative solution but also reinforcing remoteness.

There is therefore a tension here – GST is clearly helpful – it helps international organisations predict IDP patterns, identify suitable sites for refugee camps, routes in and out, resources to aid and assist (water, firewood…).  The vision midway through the first decade of the 21^st century was of increasing command and control centralisation – now perhaps this is giving way to decentralised control.  Google Earth emerged in 2005 and is a viable planning tool for most humanitarian planning needs (UNHCR collaborated with Google Earth Outreach – Darfur was the biggest visualisation project thus far).  The public are now able to access information as well – but does it really give people a genuine “intuitive understanding” of what is happening on the ground?

“Face to Face” is being replaced by “Face to Screen”

There is a “cyber-optimism” being pushed by technological experts (Silicon valley expertise that does not understand humanitarian issues and sees the state as absent) that it is possible to create self-managing, self-organising aid efforts at the local level.  “Big Data” was now a major part of the Military/Industrial/Academic complex.  But the “cyber business plan” was now having to deal with a data deluge – information was getting “younger” – the humanitarian community and the general public are now able to access near-real time information – paralleling the military desire for and efforts towards “Total Battle Space Awareness”.  There is a growing assumption that “face to face” is equal to “face to screen”.

Technology is now promising immediate and nuanced information to assist policy decisions for humanitarian aid – but the humanitarian community needs to think carefully before buying into it.

Anders Ladekarl (Sec Gen for Danish Red Cross) was the discussant and made the following observations:

• These tools have thus far been under-utilised
• Loss of innocence with the bombing of the UN compound in Baghdad
• Will it really make traditional humanitarian work redundant?  GST might improve the way we do things
• Syria is now the most prominent example of remote humanitarianism

Questions, Answers and Discussion

How to distinguish between civilian and military data is difficult

Duffield: “Post Language cultures” – with these new technologies we are moving into an environment where move and more issues are primarily visualised – we are losing the value of language.  Neo-liberalism is aiming for the Third World to be totally self-repairing

An NGO representative noted: we are using remote management because we have to, as a last resort before closing down a relief operation as too dangerous.

Duffield was asked – what is your point?   Should NGOs be using this technology or not?  I suggested to him that the technology is already here, like it or not – it might be instructive to look at the positive and negative experiences of the military – given they have had the lead in this field – to extract lessons.  Duffield said he was not a Luddite (i.e. resistant to technology) but suggested there were alternatives.  He drew parallels with the period of colonial rule, where political officers lived in the country for years, learnt the language and understood the culture.  He contrasted this with the modern aid worker, who did a six month tour and was required to have PR and IT skills but not language.  Six month tours are not sufficient.

Duffield is interested in the history of camouflage – camouflage techniques got better in response to improvements in aerial photo reconnaissance.  In this modern GST environment it is possible for people to hide (terrorists?) or get lost (refugees?) in “data exhaust” – in cities people can disappear into the data environment if GST is relied upon.

One comment suggested that surely the hope and object of the humanitarian aid effort was not to have to still be there in five years and therefore language skills were not so necessary.  Duffield replied that the aid “industry” (I am pretty sure that was the word he used) needs to acknowledge that it is in these countries for the long haul and start learning languages.

Very interestingly, he cited an example of an Afghan NGO working in Afghanistan for civilians and military alike.  He said that the Afghan NGO confessed they preferred working with the military because the civilian NGO was much too interested in finding the data that fitted their narrative!

Duffield: “I am exercised by these issues of remoteness”.

DIIS will apparently put out the notes from this brief conference as a paper shortly.

Summary:  More evidence of poorly planned, un-sustainable and wasteful international reconstruction activity in Afghanistan

I have documented a few examples of where the construction, development and aid have been spent poorly in Afghanistan over the 12 years since 2001.  In essence, money has been thrown into the country with apparently little understanding of the longer-term sustainability of such projects, which include, roads, schools and, now, hospitals.  Although such projects look good and feel good, after international attention moves on, the projects start to look precarious – too expensive, not suited to the needs of local Afghans, high maintenance costs or no planning for maintenance requirements, and corruption and contractors both skimming off huge chunks of the value of the project.

I mentioned Canadian overall efforts in southern Afghanistan here (“All the projects have failed. None of them have been successful,”)

and here, British efforts (“…buildings in Helmand were constructed without enough consultation with the Afghan government and without thinking through how they would be maintained.”)

and here, USAID handing out biscuits in Afghan schools

A new report has arrived from the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) – who

“…provides independent and objective oversight of more than $89.5 billion provided to implement reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. SIGAR’s core value of excellence, independence, and integrity guide its audits, investigations, and inspections.”

SIGAR is becoming adapt at spotting the longer-term problems with reconstruction work – has now focused on the construction by USAID of two hospitals.  Their website is worth a look.  The report, sub-headed: “Health Services in Afghanistan: Two New USAID-Funded Hospitals May Not Be Sustainable and Existing Hospitals Are Facing Shortages in Some Key Medical Positions”, looks damning:

“WHAT SIGAR FOUND – The Afghan government may not be able to sustain two hospitals—

Gardez in Paktiya province and Khair Khot in Paktika province—currently being built with USAID funds. USAID’s $18.5 million investment in these new hospitals may not be the most economical and practical use of these funds. First, USAID did not fully assess MOPH’s ability to operate and maintain these new facilities once completed. Second, construction began on the new hospitals about 1 year before USAID coordinated the final design plans with MOPH. USAID’s late coordination resulted in the construction of facilities that are larger—Gardez hospital is 12 times larger than the facility being replaced—than can be sustained, and increased estimated operating costs for the new facilities that are disproportionate to current costs…

…maintenance costs could be over five times more than the annual operating costs for the hospitals they are replacing…neither USAID nor MOPH has committed to provide funding to cover the additional operating costs of the new hospitals. SIGAR also found that some provincial hospitals are experiencing staffing shortages for certain key medical positions. Specifically, four of the five provincial hospitals that SIGAR reviewed to determine whether they met medical staffing standards reported persistent vacancies, some lasting several years…”

Analysis and Outlook

The Time article that carried the hospital story plausibly suggests a major cause of the problem.  In the last 10 years, in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq, USAID had a 30% staff cut combined with a massive increased allocation of funding for development.  The result was that money had to be spent via contractors with little oversight applied.  Doubtless more of these stories will continue to emerge.  Over 12 years there ought to have been plenty of opportunity for lessons to be identified, learnt and applied.  I can’t help worrying about the Afghan army which is expected to carry the burden of holding the state together for the next decade – how much of the billions invested there have been thrown in without real thought to sustainability in the long-term?

By Tim Foxley

Summary:  AAN report on the possibility of unpleasant insurgent leader Hekmatyar running in the 2014 Afghan elections – change of heart or cynical repositioning?

All credit to the excellent Afghanistan Analysts Network in Kabul for having noted and written about the possibility of warlord and insurgent leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his faction of Hezb-e Islami, running in the Afghan 2014 elections.  It is something I hadn’t picked up on, but is potentially quite significant and certainly very interesting.  I shall have a read and a think…

Borhan Osman and Thomas Ruttig

In a dramatic change of mind, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar recently announced that his Hezb-e Islami will participate in next year’s election to ‘defeat the enemy’ in the political arena, too. With this statement, he is relinquishing his original position that foreign troops must leave the country prior to any political accommodation between his party and the Afghan government. AAN’s researcher Borhan Osman has talked to Hezbis from Hekmatyar’s party and its splinter groups to learn why this shift in Hekmatyar’s approach has arisen now and what it means for the military and political landscape ahead of the upcoming election. He concludes that Hekmatyar, whose faction has been weakened both militarily and politically over the past twelve years, has no viable option but to gather the scattered former loyalists he once condemned for ‘surrendering to the Americans’ in order to lead them into the election. If Hekmatyar really were to stage a return to non-violent politics, it is in fact highly likely that this would unify the different groups and politicians who were once part of the original Hezb-e Islami. (With additional reporting by Thomas Ruttig.)

My own very brief thoughts: Hekmatyar is a nasty piece of work (and a former Prime Minister), responsible for much of the destruction of Kabul – many war crimes potentially to be laid at his door (I think the Americans still have him down as a terrorist and narrowly missed blasting him with a Hellfire rocket in 2002).  He and his group have undertaken many attacks against Afghan and ISAF forces.  Hekmatyar has been playing the system very carefully – judging what steps he needs to take to keep one step ahead of a drone strike – promising unending jihad and also hinting at the potential for talks.  If he is now calculating that the ballot box is the best way to maximise his chances, it is most likely because he recognises his weak (and weakening) efforts at being an insurgency leader are not bringing him the power and influence that he believes he should have had all along.  It is less likely to be because he has had a change of mind and now believes free and fair elections are the way ahead for a bright new Afghan future.  Do. Not. Trust. Him.

My other, even less digested, thought, is whether this means anything for the Taliban.  It would be nice to think that they might also now follow the lead of HIG and at least be considering some form of ballot box route.  But the Taliban remain a powerful and credible insurgency force.  Unlike Hezb-e Islami, which has, as AAN notes, a foot in the Afghan government anyway, Mullah Omar has remained true to his commitments thus far and rejects the “puppet” state.  It will be interesting to see if the Taliban make any comment.

By Tim Foxley

Summary: Many reports highlight the problems of the Afghan army. Underwritten with Western support, it is perhaps unwise to assume the ANSF is doomed, but it should lose its obsession with high-tech weapons until it really understands what it needs and can afford. The ANSF needs better combat support skills above all, but the real risk to the ANSF is more likely to come from less readily identifiable issues of loyalty and political control.

The Afghanistan Analysts Network highlighted an article by the Wall Street Journal about the problems of the Afghan Army, as it struggles to prepare itself to be able to take on the not-inconsiderable burden of providing for the security of Afghanistan. The article makes some points regarding particular problems, which I would summarise thus:

• The ANSF feel they do not have sufficient high-tech weapons
• The ANSF suffers from poor planning, logistics, communications and coordination
• The ANSF struggle to fight in difficult terrain against guerrilla forces

Analysis and Outlook

Fast jets not featured

I don’t get the feeling that high-tech weapons are the answer, despite the Afghan government’s obsession with them.

“Top Afghan officials have long complained that the U.S. and its allies failed to provide Kabul with enough high-end weaponry to tackle the insurgency. When Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Washington earlier this year, he arrived with a wish list of military equipment. The recent fighting in the north could help bolster their argument that Kabul needs more warplanes, better artillery and sophisticated surveillance equipment before the coalition is no longer around to call on for support.”

In fact, if anything, low tech seems to be better for the ANSF, given the undeniable low quality of its recruits. I think this is a very misleading distraction from the fact that the ANSF needs, above anything else, to focus on training in all the elements that support combat (ie logistics, command and control, communications, intelligence, medical, planning). I think it is an unhelpful distraction for several reasons:

1. Karzai is a little “overboard” on proving Afghan sovereignty these days. Hi-tech stuff that you can parade around of the “Victory Day” of your choice simplistically and artificially boosts your national confidence

2. Perhaps this is evidence of the “culture of dependency”

3. Perhaps this is evidence of what Thomas Barfield, a highly-recommendable cultural and political historian of Afghanistan, described as the attempt to gain favour, funding or resources by threatening collapse.

4. There is quite macho “war of words” with Pakistan on-going, including border skirmishes – do we really need more weapons floating around the border?

5. I don’t think the Afghan government really knows what it wants for its armed forces, but it is prepared to ask for everything, perhaps with little thought about the future (ie paying for it and all future training and maintenance costs). And many members of the international community will be quite happy to provide whatever weapons Afghanistan wants, perhaps at an initially low cost, particularly if they know that the international community is probably funding it in some way

High tech equipment is for people qualified and trained in its use – in particular how to maintain it. Once you buy in to high tech stuff, you also have to buy in to very long logistics trails of equally hi-tech spares and maintenance packages from which ever nation you are dependent upon. Afghanistan needs an army that maintains, trains, sustains and understands itself first, before asking for bigger and more expensive stuff. I struggle to see that the ANSF and air force will be any better at avoiding civilian casualties than Western troops if they are given the capability to deliver higher payloads. Come back for the high tech stuff in ten years – if they need it (and once they have done a proper defence plan).

But I am not quite sure that the ANSF is doomed – which seems to be the general thrust of the media reports. If your benchmark of quality and capability is measured by a short timeframe and in comparison to Western forces, the ANSF will be found lacking, of course. But surely this force is better placed than Najibullah’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) army that the Soviets left him with in the late 1980s. I don’t have the best sense of DRA capabilities, but, from what I have read, it seems morale was low, equipment poor, low tech and poorly maintained, with high desertion rates. But it held out – after some early wobbles in confidence – against a much larger and more motivated jihad than anything the Taliban are able to generate. My understanding is that it was the collapse of the Soviet Union that caused the demise of the DRA, when the millions of dollars worth of food, salaries and equipment simply stopped coming from Moscow.

Isn’t it fair to work on the assumption that Western funding, training and support will probably not collapse spectacularly in the way that the Soviet empire did – even if NATO nations are now counting the pennies much more closely? And we will probably expect to see something like 10,000 Western troops remain in Afghanistan for some years to come, which will provide some credible bracing against collapse.

I am starting to think that the insurgency against the Taliban, although painful, could be manageable for the ANSF, as long as its loyalty and political control remain viable and intact. And this is an area much less focused upon.

By Tim Foxley

Summary:  With meaningful dialogue with the Taliban still looking remote, perhaps it is time to question some of the main assumptions…

There has been much debate and comment, supported by very little information, on the subject of dialogue with the Taliban.  The talks still appear to be going nowhere – lack of clarity on most issues appear likely to blight the prospects – who is talking, on whose behalf, for what agenda, etc…

It strikes me that there are a few assumptions being made by the media, by governments and even by very prominent regional experts, which it might be worth questioning.  I would really welcome any thoughts…

Assumption 1:  Why do we assume that a political settlement has to be achieved by 2014?

The deadline is artificial, based on Western desire to get the hell out.  If anything, the race for settlement before the end of 2014 highlights two very big, fat, unhelpful negatives:

1.       US desire to create something that resembles a settlement in order to declare “victory”.  A Bush-ian “mission accomplished” gesture that will almost guarantee a lack of longevity.

2.       It confirms, almost by definition, that the Afghan government left behind will be too weak to organise a political solution – or even hold together – all by itself.

Assumption 2: Why do we assume that imposing humiliating talk pre-conditions upon the Taliban, to the effect that, amongst others, they must denounce Al Qaeda, renounce violence and recognise the current constitution, is likely to get the Taliban to the negotiating table?

Shame is surely not a reliable or constructive emotion to rely upon when it comes to delicate peace talks, particularly when it is not really clear to anyone except the ISAF media team that the Taliban have actually been defeated.  NATO is the one pulling out and is no longer trumpeting “failure is not an option”.    Incidentally, the “avoid humiliating your opponent” motif is something that the Taliban would also do well to pay close attention to…

Assumption 3: Why should we assume that a myriad of local, regional and international actors must all be involved in any settlement and all agree at the same time?

I am thinking of warlords, Afghan government, political factions, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian States, India, China, ISAF, NATO, United States, NGOs, UN, etc.  Ahmed Rashid said recently it was encouraging that the Taliban were now also talking to the former Northern Alliance.  Why should we think that multiple separate dialogues are a good idea?  Trying to get multiple actors to align themselves into the correct permutation might take years.  I have much sympathy for Karzai’s complaint that structures parallel to the Afghan government are greatly undermining government prospects.  Is there any way it might be possible to press for the exclusion of all except Afghans and a very small team of neutral, recognised international mediation experts?  So we have the Afghan government talking to the Taliban with a handful of neutral experts in the room to facilitate.  Why is it a good thing that the Taliban are talking to the US (and openly stating that they talk to the US because the Afghan government is a puppet) and not the Afghan government?  How is this “Afghan-led”?  Isn’t the international community merely confirming that the Afghan government is not legitimate?   

Assumption 4: Why should we assume that a political settlement has to be achieved at all?

Or, at any rate, within the next ten years.  The conflict is complex and intractable.  Perhaps Galtung’s concept of “negative peace”, i.e. an absence of conflict, should be the more minimal goal to be aspired to for the time being?  Maybe an absence of fighting might be enough for the first few years, to enable society to rebuild and humanitarian development to take place.  Let tempers cool and time heal things a little, before we address decisions about governments, constitutions, balance of power etc. which could be (should be?) postponed on the grounds of too painful, too difficult, too likely to re-trigger conflict.  Let’s leave that difficult bit for a decade.  Perhaps it would be better if fighting were allowed to die down gradually, amidst various local truces and an absence of western “infidels” to fight.  No one has to admit defeat but, after 5, 10 years (or whatever) the incentives for violence have been significantly reduced after significant injections of international economic assistance and efforts to develop the political components of the Taliban.

By Tim Foxley

Summary:  Worry indications of growing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Seems like a military engagement between Afghan and Pakistani border troops took place on 1^st May.

2 May 2013: …a dispute over a border post grew into a firefight Wednesday night, causing deaths on both sides.  The overnight clash between the U.S.-funded and U.S.-advised Afghan security forces and troops from nuclear-armed Pakistan brings a dangerous new complication to American efforts to wind down the Afghan war. Thursday’s fighting followed weeks of complaints from Kabul about the new border outposts, which were erected by Pakistan across from the Goshta district of eastern Nangarhar province.  The British-drawn boundary between the two countries is disputed by Afghanistan, which doesn’t recognize as an international frontier the so-called Durand Line that cuts through the ethnic Pashtun heartland. The line is also not properly demarcated and, while the Pakistani government says the new fortifications are on its side of the border, Afghan officials claim that they are as much as 30 km inside Afghan territory. U.S. military maps also show that the disputed outpost lies on the Afghan side of the Durand Line, officials say.

Apparently it was declared “resolved” earlier:

15 April 2013: ISLAMABAD — Pakistan says it has “amicably resolved” a dispute with Afghanistan over the construction of a controversial border gate, the latest in a series of incidents straining an already fragile bilateral relationship that many consider vital to promoting the Afghan peace process.

In addition to a growing war of words between the two countries, military tension has also been evident.  What makes the dispute more complex (and perhaps inevitable) is that the Durrand Line, although notionally acting as the formal border between the countries is not recognised by Afghanistan or accurately marked out.  I also understood that, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Pakistan effectively moved many of its border posts back into Pakistani territory (sometimes by kilometres) to avoid clashing with the Soviet Army.  Nowadays, insurgent groups such as the Taliban, HIG, LeT etc are bouncing across it more or less at will.  The US has accused Pakistani border guards of collusion with these group.  So much ambiguity, not to mention some recent history of past offences.

Analysis and Outlook

This has the character of a playground dispute (which will be of no comfort to anyone caught in the middle) probably brought on by wider strategic issues.  Accurate information (who did what to whom) will not be easily accessible in this part of the world – government spokesmen will trade barbs and call on the other to stop provocations and a slightly less impartial organisation – like ISAF in this case – is increasingly winding down its presence and actions on the peripheries.

I am not clear whether the border clashes are the cause of the tensions themselves or the symptoms of wider issues.  I suspect the latter.  The most recent clashes seem connected to reports of the Pakistani military attempting to build, rebuild or strengthen border positions.  Theoretically this might allow a better control over who crosses between the countries, perhaps enhancing security over a very porous border.  But if the border demarcation is not agreed by either side (the Pushtun tribal region straddles this line) and two nations are not liaising or coordinating coherently (or at all) this could clearly lead to perceptions of encroachment and even territorial ambitions.

Now that the Afghans have a big army, perhaps they feel a little less insecure about a more muscular assertion of the “sovereignty” that Hamid Karzai seems so concerned with these days.  The wider strategic issues fuelling suspicions are the overall uncertainty besetting the region with ISAF withdrawal and a significant insurgency ongoing.  More particularly, the desire for talks with the Taliban and standard accusations from the US and the Afghan government that the Pakistani regime is more concerned with maintaining support and control over the Taliban than genuinely pushing them into credible dialogue.  A view that I still struggle to find fault with.

Future clashes are likely as part of this “ebb and flow” of the strategic dialogue – “posturing” is the word.  A rocket strike here and there might be ignorable, but pitched battles and casualties amongst ground forces of the respective countries would elevate this into a bigger problem amidst an area that already has more problems than it can cope with…

Summary: Bags of cash from the CIA to Karzai, although not demonstrative of good and stable governance merely illustrate an old practise in Afghanistan.  Many other actors will be buying influence in this way and not just with the central government part of Afghanistan…

Stories breaking about the secret (well, secret up to last week, it would appear) payments of cash being made by the CIA to Karzai and his government.  I am merely struggling to understand why people seem to be surprised by this.    You may recall a while back when the story broke in relation to Iran making payments to the Afghan government:

The Guardian, 25 October, 2010

Hamid Karzai has admitted that his chief of staff collects “bags of money”, containing hundreds of thousands of euros, from the Iranian government each year.

The Afghan president told a press conference that the cash was used to pay his office expenses and that he was happy to take large sums from Iran, Afghanistan‘s most important ally and the main regional enemy of the US.

“This is nothing hidden,” Karzai said. “We are grateful for Iranian help in this regard. The United States is doing the same thing. They’re providing cash to some of our offices.”

He said that once or twice a year Iran provided as much as €700,000 (£625,000) and that the money was handled by Umar Daudzai, the powerful chief of staff who is known for his anti-western views.

Not, it is not good, but this is the way it is done.  Hopkirk’s “The Great Game” noted the tendency of tribal leaders in the 19th century to sever the heads of colonial messengers moving from Indoa through to Kabul if their stipends (bribes to allow free passage) were cut back.  Boxloads of dollars were unloaded to warlords in 2001 to secure the fall of the Taliban.  It gets right to the heart of the “take a principled stance and not achieve anything, or make some messy compromises” debate.  Perhaps when Afghanistan has a competent and non-corrupt system, the money can be pushed in via more official means.

Political and cultural historian, Thomas Barfield, suggested that the successful Afghan rulers were the ones who were able to play off the international community and secure funds from all of them.

You can bet India, Russia, the Central Asian States, Pakistan and China are doing the same kind of thing, perhaps with slight variations.  And it won’t just be to Karzai – what about all the key regional, ethnic and political factions and leaders?  Everyone is pumping money into Afghanistan, with varying levels of conditionality attached.  Why should CIA be any different?

Oh – lets see what the Taliban spokesman has to say about this!

Summary: Standard Taliban annual announcement of a Spring Offensive, very similar to last year.

The Taliban officially announced the commencement of what they described as the 2013 Spring Offensive.  The 814-word statement introduced the “title” of this year’s operation as “Khalid bin Waleed”, a powerful Islamic general under Mohammed, also known as “the Drawn Sword of God”, giving the imagery of battles and conquest.   The Taliban promise “special military tactics”, insider attacks and suicide bombers.  Once again stressing the importance of its fighters avoiding civilian casualties where possible, Afghans were warned to stay away from foreign military and political bases and employees of the Afghan government were called upon to leave the regime and join the ranks of the Taliban.  The statement drew attention to a Taliban “Recruitment Commision” that would protect regime defectors and called upon religious, tribal and societal figures to stop Afghans joining military programmes such as the Afghan army and the militias.

Analysis and Outlook

The statement is very similar in length, style and tone to last year’s.  The Taliban have been formally announcing their spring offensives since 2008.  The validity and accuracy of the term has been disputed, but it is generally seen to refer to the slow increase in fighting that begins once the winter snows have melted, thus allowing more freedom of movement for fighters.  The trend of fighting increases through the summer, before starting to decline again in approximately October/November.  Many have argued that the Taliban’s increase in combat activity does not, by any stretch of the imagination, represent an “offensive”.

I have a lot of sympathy with the views of this US commander in 2008:

There is no such thing as a spring offensive”, Colonel Pete Johnson, the commander of a taskforce from the 101st Airborne Division…told Reuters.  “I think this year this myth is finally going to be debunked.  Last year was the same thing – it never materialised.  This year it has not materialised and it won’t materialise.”

“Will there be increases in fighting and insurgent activity.  Absolutely.  But it’s a weather-based construct, a seasonal construct, not a deliberate execution of an offensive.  Increased activity is not a coordinated offensive.”

I sense that the Taliban have gradually dragged the term into their jihadist lexicon because som amy western analysts and hournalists kept going on about it in the 2004 – 2008 period.  The Taliban did not ignore this gift of a propaganda opportunity.  It is unwise to totlly dismiss the Taliban’s claims to an “offensive”, as they do realise they have to launch a few attacks just to maintain credibility.  We should generally expect to see a handful of higher profile “complex” attacks aimed at political/military targets in Kabul, an ISAF military base or PRT in the provinces – Bagram, Helmand, Nangarhar.  Afghan security forces are hihgly likely to be targeted: ISAF is much less visible and the Afghan targets are less professionally procted than their ISAF counterparts.  If there is a risk, it is in the possible “window of opportunty” imbalances in security as a result of the ISAF withdrawal – perhaps a PRT or outpost is now actually more vulnerable than it was?  The Taloban have demonstrated some skill in combing groups to concentrate on small and isolated targets.

On wider issues, I also sense that the Taliban have reached a plateau in their political and military imagination, both generally, and in their propaganda in particular.  There appears little in the way of creativity or proactive shift in communication direction, merely an ability to make use of modern tools of communication.  Maybe it is too much to expect nuance and creativity from a Spring Offensive statement, but this statement now has the feel of an annual “template”.  There is no political component here, no recognition that dynamics within the country are shifting as the ISAF withdrawal proceeds.  There is nothing beyond urging individual regime members to defect.  Does this suggest that the military faction still hold sway within the leadershhip?  The lack of imagination in their messages after many years of improving actually strikes me as surprising.

In fact, they may even have had to back away a little in these statements as a result of over-confidence in earlier years: in 2009 and 2010 respectively, their Spring Offensives were entitled “Nasrat” (Victory) and “Al-Faath” (Success).  And in January last year, they issued a “Formal proclamation of Islamic victory”.  Have they perhaps at least understood that they might be premature in their announcements and that there are inherent contradictions and credibility issues in declaring victory every year?

I think the Taliban “lack of imagination” argument probably fits the bill here.  But, as a parting analytical “long shot”, the “default setting” tone of the announcement could also be interpreted in a very different way.  What if the Taliban were expecting political changes this year – ie changes that they were planning to initiate?  They might therefore calculate that the annual announcement of Spring operations to which they are now more or less committed (it would be more noteworthy if the Taliban had called off the statement) needs to be made, but kept as bland as possible to keep the troops focused (“business as usual, fight the infidel”), but also to avoid giving anything away…

Finally, the Western intelligence agencies seem to still find the Taliban announcements so much of a threat that they need to be countered: it is surely no coincidence that the Taliban website was taken off-line at the same time the announcement was made?

Summary: New York Times report on some very frank and pessimistic thoughts from a departing French diplomat

I thought, rather than merely tweeting this forward, it deserves a proper read.  Easy to speak out (and not much help, more to the point) when you have moved on.  It reminds me of the former British Ambassador, Sir Sherard Cowper Coles, who would have us believe that he resigned in frustration.  His book emerged shortly afterwards, heavy with criticism of the (mainly US) strategy.  The views here appear to be echoed by many others.  The  “perfect storm” metaphor is also both striking and worrying.  How, after all this effort, did we end up here…?   Wonder what Anders Fogh Rasmussen will have to say when he moves on…?

“New York Times, 27 Ar 2013: Departing French Envoy Has Frank Words on Afghanistan

By Alissa Rubin

KABUL, Afghanistan — It is always hard to gauge what diplomats really think unless one of their cables ends up on WikiLeaks, but every once in a while, the barriers fall and a bit of truth slips into public view.

That is especially true in Afghanistan, where diplomats painstakingly weigh every word against political goals back home.

The positive spin from the Americans has been running especially hard the last few weeks, as Congressional committees in Washington focus on spending bills and the Obama administration, trying to secure money for a few more years here, talks up the country’s progress. The same is going on at the European Union, where the tone has been sterner than in the past, but still glosses predictions of Afghanistan’s future with upbeat words like “promise” and “potential.”

Despite that, one of those rare truth-telling moments came at a farewell cocktail party last week hosted by the departing French ambassador to Kabul: Bernard Bajolet, who is leaving to head France’s Direction Génerale de la Sécurité Extérieure, its foreign intelligence service. After the white-coated staff passed the third round of hors d’oeuvres, Mr. Bajolet took the lectern and laid out a picture of how France — a country plagued by a slow economy, waning public support for the Afghan endeavor and demands from other foreign conflicts, including Syria and North Africa — looked at Afghanistan. While it is certainly easier for France to be a critic from the sidelines than countries whose troops are still fighting in Afghanistan, the country can claim to have done its part. It lost more troops than all but three other countries before withdrawing its last combat forces in the fall.

The room, filled with diplomats, some senior soldiers and a number of Afghan dignitaries, went deadly quiet. When Mr. Bajolet finished, there was restrained applause — and sober expressions. One diplomat raised his eyebrows and nodded slightly; another said, “No holding back there.” So what did he say? That the Afghan project is on thin ice and that, collectively, the West was responsible for a chunk of what went wrong, though much of the rest the Afghans were responsible for. That the West had done a good job of fighting terrorism, but that most of that was done on Pakistani soil, not on the Afghan side of the border. And that without fundamental changes in how Afghanistan did business, the Afghan government, and by extension the West’s investment in it, would come to little. His tone was neither shrill nor reproachful. It was matter-of-fact. “I still cannot understand how we, the international community, and the Afghan government have managed to arrive at a situation in which everything is coming together in 2014 — elections, new president, economic transition, military transition and all this — whereas the negotiations for the peace process have not really started,” Mr. Bajolet said in his opening comments. He was echoing a point shared privately by other diplomats, that 2014 was likely to be “a perfect storm” of political and military upheaval coinciding with the formal close of the NATO combat mission in Afghanistan.

As for the success of the fight on the ground, which American leaders routinely describe now as being “Afghan-led,” Mr. Bajolet sounded dubious. “We do not have enough distance to make an objective assessment,” he said, “but in any case, I think it crucial that the Afghan highest leadership take more visible and obvious ownership for their army.” His tone — the sober, troubled observations of a diplomat closing a chapter — could hardly have been more different from that taken by the new shift of American officials charged with making it work in Afghanistan: in particular, with that of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the new American commanding general here. This week, General Dunford sent out a news release cheering on Afghanistan’s progress, noting some positive-leaning statistics and praising the Afghan Army’s abilities. “Very soon, the A.N.S.F. will be responsible for security nationwide” General Dunford said, referring to the Afghan National Security Forces. “They are steadily gaining in confidence, competence, and commitment.”

At his farewell party, Mr. Bajolet wound up his realpolitik with a brisk analysis of what Afghanistan’s government needed to do: cut corruption, which discourages investment, deal with drugs and become fiscally self-reliant. It must increase its revenues instead of letting politicians divert them, he said. Several diplomats in the room could be seen nodding as he said that drugs caused “more casualties than terrorism” in Russia, Europe and the Balkans and that Western governments would be hard-put to make the case for continued spending on Afghanistan if it remains the world’s largest heroin supplier.

The biggest contrast with the American and British line was Mr. Bajolet’s riff on sovereignty, which has become the political watchword of the moment. The Americans and the international community are giving sovereignty back to Afghanistan. Afghanistan argues frequently that it is a sovereign nation. President Hamid Karzai, in the debate over taking charge of the Bagram prison, repeatedly said that Afghanistan had a sovereign responsibility to its prisoners. His implicit question was, what does that really mean? “We should be lucid: a country that depends almost entirely on the international community for the salaries of its soldiers and policemen, for most of its investments and partly on it for its current civil expenditure, cannot be really independent.”

Summary:  The Spring Offensive announcement is an annual set-piece propaganda creation from the Taliban which gives clues as to their military intent for the year.  It should be due soon.

In a larger piece about how much damage the Taliban managed to inflict upon the Afghan government and international forces in March, the Taliban commented briefly upon this year’s “Spring Offensive”:

 “As the spring season has set in, the trenches of Jihad once again became warm. Last year, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan started the spring operations with name of ‘Al-Farooq’ which had substantial achievements. Though the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has not assigned any name to its fresh spring season operation, still heavy financial and corporeal losses have been inflicted on the crusade invaders and their mercenaries as the weather is becoming warm day by day.”

It has been customary for a few years now, for the Taliban to assign a name to the increase in combat activities permitted by the improvement in weather after winter that many now call the “Spring Offensive”.  This happens somewhere at the end of April and the beginning of May.  The term “Spring Offensive” itself has been a source of debate – some have seen it as a myth in the sense that a slow increase in activities from Spring to summer doesn’t justify the term in a real military sense.  I felt that the Taliban adopted the term having noted that the international media and ISAF were using it when describing likely Taliban actions and decided to make it their own.  Perhaps a minor propaganda victory gifted to the Taliban.  The name of the Spring Offensive, which changes each year, has generally been associated with a significant event in Islamic history, like a military victory.  I wrote about the 2012 announcement here and 2011 here (Taleban announce Spring Operations, 3 May 11).  It is helpful to analyse variations in tone, style, content and length.

I have been expecting some form of official statement to introduce the new operation to come soon.  It normally comes with a set of exhortations to the jihadis, with a list of “viable targets” for them to attack.  In 2012, the key points were thus:

• the pre-amble recalls the struggle thus far against the “foreign invaders”,
• it then explains the choice of al Farooq as the name for 2012’s operations,
• it identifies targets and timings for this year’s offensive
• finally, it appeals to “all those associated with the puppet administration” to change sides

I still think this announcement will come.  But in this statement, it seems to imply a decision not to assign a name to the operation.   This would be a minor surprise and I am not really sure why this has happened.  Perhaps the Taliban felt that there was limited propaganda value in the process (although I don’t think their ability to critically appraise their propaganda efforts are particularly strong).  Perhaps they concluded that it diminished the idea of the “all-year round efforts” of their fighters, that they would like to draw attention to the notion that the insurgency makes no distinction between the seasons in terms of its desire to take the fight to the enemy.   It might be simply that they have not yet decided upon a name for their Spring 2013 fighting season.

But it would be a departure for them not to declare an offensive at all.  The dynamics of this year’s fighting might be significantly different – ISAF mainly confined to base and the bulk of the fghting now between Muslims.  The New York Times notes that ISAF is no longer planning to give out combat statistics, but ANSO, an organisation in Afghanistan concerned wth the safety and security  of NGOs operating in the country, reportedly notes that the first quarter of 2013 has seen an increase of 47% on the same period last year:

There were 2,331 attacks by armed opposition groups in the first quarter, compared with 1,581 in the same period last year, an increase of 47 percent, the statistics show.

“We assess that the current re-escalation trend will be preserved throughout the entire season and that 2013 is set to become the second most violent year after 2011,” said Tomas Muzik, the director of the NGO office.

One of my well-worn themes – this year, information will be harder to come by.